A BIOGRAPHY OF LUCIUS CORNELIUS BALBUS: POMPEY'S VETERAN, CAESAR'S AGENT, AND CICERO'S ACQUAINTANCE

A Thesis
Presented to the
Department of History
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In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

By
David E. Richards
May 1990

ABSTRACT

The following work is a biography of Lucius Cornelius Balbus (c. 100 - 32 B.C.). Balbus was a noteworthy participant in the political struggles of the final days of the Roman Republic. As an agent of both camps (first Pompey's, then Caesar's), he was in the midst of the drama played out by the Triumvirate in the 50s. He survived through the fall of the Republic and witnessed the beginning of the Principate.

Besides his political connections and delegated duties with Pompey and Caesar, Balbus knew the renowned Cicero. During the Triumvirate, Cicero (along with Pompey and Crassus) was obliged to defend Balbus in court. Being Caesar's agent, Balbus gained the enmity of the opposition, and in order to eliminate him from Caesar's camp and from Rome, Caesar's antagonists accused Balbus of violating the lex Papia (a kind of 'Alien Act'). A successful conviction could have evicted Balbus from Rome, and thus ruined his career as Caesar's agent. The prosecution questioned the legitimacy of Balbus' citizenship as granted by Pompey some twenty years earlier for services rendered in the Sertorian War. Cicero, who had lost his own political autonomy to the Triumvirs, was pressured to defend Balbus and successfully secured his acquittal. The trial (56 B.C.) illustrates the cooperation of the Triumvirs and various questions

regarding the importance and prestige of Roman citizenship.

The biography first surveys the homeland and early career of Balbus. He was a Spaniard born in Gades (a Spanish coastal city, largely Phoenician in culture, bound to Rome by treaty). The study of Spain during the Late Republic reveals the social and cultural influences on the young Balbus. The chapter concludes with his service under Pompey the Great during the Sertorian War (79 - 72 B.C.) and his subsequent reward of citizenship.

The second and third chapters deal with Balbus' activities and political associations in Rome and with Caesar. He served as Caesar's praefectus fabrum in 61 B.C. and during the Gallic Wars. After the important trial in 56, Balbus gained in significance until he finally served as one of Caesar's chief financial and adminstrative officers although he did not have an official government position or title during and after the Civil War.

The study concludes with the dawn of the Augustan Age when Balbus became the first foreign born consul of Rome (40 B.C.). Balbus probably died shortly after Atticus in 32 B.C., and it is not known if he heard of the result of the Battle of Actium which inaugurated the Principate.

The thesis involved extensive research into a variety of sources including Cicero's Episulae ad Atticum, and ad Familiares, and the Pro Balbo. Cicero's works

contain the majority of the references to Balbus, but additional highlights are obtained from Caesar, Dio Cassius, Livy, Pliny, Plutarch, and Suetonius. The number of sources is not surprising since Balbus was truly an exceptional individual. He was born a provincial in the distant port of Gades, but later became acquainted with Pompey the Great, Cicero, and Octavian. But more importantly, he became the advisor and friend of Gaius Julius Caesar.

APPROVAL PAGE

This thesis by David E. Richards is accepted in its present form by the Department of History of Western Illinois University as satisfying the thesis requirement for the degree Master of Arts.

[redacted]
Chairman, Examining Committee

[redacted]
Member, Examining Committee

[redacted]
Member, Examining Committee

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Abbreviations

AJP	American Journal of Philology
CAH	Cambrige Ancient History
CA	Classical Antiquity
CJ	Classical Journal
CP	Classical Philology
CQ	Classical Quarterly
Hist.	Historia
JRS	Journal of Roman Studies
OCD	Oxford Classical Dictionary, 2nd. ed.
OHC	Oxford History of the Classical World
WA	World Archaeology

For primary Latin and Greek sources, the abbreviations accepted by the Oxford Classical Dictionary, 2nd ed., have been used. All translations are from the Loeb Classical Library editions and all dates given are "B.C." unless noted otherwise.



Map of Spain during the Sertorian War. Copied from John Leach, Pompey the Great (London: Croom Helm, 1978), p. 38.



Map of Italy and Sicily. Copied from Cicero, Selected Letters, translated by D. R. Shackleton Bailey (New York: Penguin Books, 1986), p. 275.

INTRODUCTION

The following work is a biography of Lucius Cornelius Balbus (c. 100 - 32 B.C.). Balbus was a noteworthy participant in the political struggles of the final days of the Roman Republic. As an agent of both camps (first Pompey's, then Caesar's), he was in the midst of the drama played out by the Triumvirate in the 50s. He survived through the fall of the Republic and witnessed the beginning of the Principate.

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Chapter 1

THE EARLY CAREER OF L. CORNELIUS BALBUS, 100-72 B.C.

"He was born at Gades; and that nobody denies."

--Cicero Pro Balbo, 2.5.

Balbus survived the high mortality rate of antiquity and grew up in Gades, Spain (Hispania Ulterior) in the 90s and 80s B.C.[1] He was raised in a region which was known as one of the most wretched and uncivilized areas under Republican Roman "control." The Spanish provinces had a long history of rebellion and played an important part in the beginnings of Roman imperialism. While this study concerns Balbus, it is also concerned with those factors and events which influenced and shaped many aspects of his life. Thus it is necessary to look briefly at Spain and the city of Gades, the homeland and city of Balbus, to become acquainted with the still expanding Roman world of the young provincial.

There are two major types of land in Spain: the coastal strips and the interior highlands. The interior of Spain is a vast mountainous upland plateau (mesetas) with poor soil and continental climate. The coast, conversely, has temperate conditions, fertile land, and amiable acreage for settlement, except along the north and west coasts where in antiquity, the land was densely wooded.[2]

The varying geography invited and formed differing cultures. The fertile coastal plain attracted agriculture, permanent settlements, and, later, commercial contacts, while the mountainous interior supported only semi-nomadic pastorialists with tribal organizations. The mountains always served to break up the peninsula into various ethnic and cultural groups. Spain's far western location prohibited extensive contact with the civilizations of the Near East and Greece. Even the river system failed to cooperate in civilizing the central plateau. Most of Spain's major rivers flow to the west, towards the stormy Atlantic. Only the Ebro River allowed Mediterranean penetration from the east.[3] The combination of geographic features produced a land minimally exposed to civilization along the south and east coasts, and a rather barbaric mass of independent tribal states in the center.

The effect of Spain's land on settlement and culture can be seen after the first major immigration of folk into the region during the Late Bronze Age (c. 1200). Iberians from North Africa moved into the the southern portion of the peninsula through the straits of Gibraltar and up the Baetis river valley (modern Guadalquivir River). They eventually settled along the entire south and east coasts of Spain. Around the same period arrived various Celtic tribes from the north who later mingled with the Iberians. The result of their union created the ethno-

cultural type known as the Celtiberians who finally established themselves in central and northwest Spain.[4] The Celtiberians were pastorialists, excellent horsemen, non-agricultural, and lived in scattered villages and mountain forts. Their lifestyle included raids on the coastal settlements and the Baetis Valley. The coasts were occupied by the more civilized and urbanized Iberians, who, after discovering the vast mineral deposits of the nearby mountains, established trade contacts and built regional strongholds against the raiders from the interior.[5]

Wealthy in metals, but failing to acquire a civilization strong enough to secure them, the Iberians were soon economically controlled by the Phoenicians and later by the Greeks.[6] The Phoenicians came first to seize the valuable minerals and later established trade centers or stations in the seventh century. They founded such towns as Gades (Cadiz), Sexi, Malaca (Malaga), and Abdere (Adra), all of which were located along the more civilized southern coast.[7] Around 600, the Greeks moved in to exploit the precious metals. Copper was obtained from the Baetic mines, gold from the Sierra Morena, and silver from the mines near the future site of Cathago Nova (Cartagena).[8] They established such cities as Mainake, Hereoskopeion, and Emporiae (Ampurias).

The Greeks began to lose control after being defeated by a Carthaginian and Etruscan allied naval force

around 535, with all Greek centers south of Emporiae being overrun by Carthage during the fourth and third centuries. Following Carthaginian conquest of the trading posts, the former Punic colonies, like Gades, were reinforced and operated for the benefit of Carthaginian imperialism. The Carthaginians may have secured a treaty with Rome in 508 which forbade the Romans from trading beyond Carthago Nova (then called Mastia).[9]

But true Punic domination of Spain did not occur until the late third century. During this period Carthage expanded control into the interior of Spain. In 237, Hamilcar Barca subdued the Baetis Valley with brutal military force, whereas his follower, Hasdrubal, preferred to use diplomacy and marriage to gain control of Spanish tribes. Hasdrubal also founded Carthago Nova in 228.[10] Spain was conquered for her resources: men and metals. Spanish mercenaries fought for Carthage during the First Punic War (264-241) while minerals from Spain financed the war effort.[11] Although Carthage lost the war, neither aggressor forgot the effect Spain's wealth had on the conflict.

Between the wars with Rome, Carthage had to deal with the rebellious tribes of the central highlands (a problem which Rome was to discover later). Hannibal was one of the first generals in antiquity to suffer the expense of guerilla warfare.

Recognizing Carthage's zone of control in Spain but

also realizing the danger of a land invasion route opening through the Pyrenees into southern Gaul, Rome struck an agreement with Hannibal's city. The Ebro Treaty of 226/25 stipulated that Carthage's control was limited to all territory west of the Ebro River, excluding the town of Saguntum (Sagunto), a minor metropolis friendly to Rome. It was after Hannibal finished off the rebellious Spanish tribes, sacked Saguntum, and then crossed the Ebro that the Second Punic War (218-202) commenced.[12]

During the war, Spain was to prove vital to Hannibal's war effort. Spain provided troops, horses, coinage, and raw metal to his forces. Carthago Nova was used as a storehouse and base for operations against Rome.[13] Rome soon realized the importance of Spain for Carthage's strategy and immediately sent an army to intercept the supplies. Rome's concern with Spain involved eliminating Carthaginian power, not securing economic resources or gaining Iberian friendship.[14]

Spain was made a provincia (a theater of military operations) in 218 when Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio was sent to halt Spanish reinforcements to Hannibal. He was successful by utilizing his navy instead of initiating a land war, since the country was uninviting and the tribes were untrustworthy.[15] He seized several ports along the coast. When Publius Cornelius Scipio entered Spain to assist his brother in 217, Hasdrubal (Hannibal's commander in Spain) had lost the eastern coasts, was busy containing

rebellious Celtiberians, and, more importantly, was far from being able to send needed reinforcements to Hannibal.[16] In 212, the Scipios divided Spain into two *provinciae* (hence the birth of Hispania Citerior and Hispania Ulterior) so as to catch the hard pressed Hasdrubal in a pincer movement. Note that the *provincia* divisions were made for strategic considerations and those considerations were based on geography.[17] But the manuever to trap Hasdrubal failed, and in 211 his troops defeated the Roman armies and ended the lives of the Scipio brothers.

The following year saw the arrival of yet another Scipio: Publius Cornelius Scipio (known later as Africanus Major), son of one of the slain commanders (P. Scipio) and the future conqueror of Hannibal. Receiving proconsular *imperium*, he took over the Spanish army, adopted the efficient Spanish short sword for the legions, and strengthened the troops with rigorous training.[18] His reforms and strategy were effective and the Carthaginians were soon soundly defeated, pushed back to Gades, then finally expelled from Spain in 206.[19]

The provincial administration of Spain began in 205 after the victorious Scipio left two generals behind to administer "Nearer" and "Farther" Spain. For the next seven years annually appointed generals received proconsular *imperium* to run the provinces as they saw fit. Rome decided to keep Spain permanently after the Senate

added two to the number of praetors annually elected to office in 197. These two additional praetors now supplied Spain with two governors. Furthermore, that same year the Senate ordered a commission sent to Hispania Citerior and Hispania Ulterior to secure the administration and boundaries of the new official provinces.[20] The actions undertaken by Rome in 197 illustrated the decision to permanently hold Iberia.

Permanent control soon led to economic exploitation of the peninsula. The resources of Spain had been readily used by the Phoenicians, Greeks, and Carthaginians.[21] Rome naturally followed their example when M. Porcius Cato (Cato the Elder, 234-149) was sent to Spain in 195 to quiet the rebellious tribes. Although he failed to pacify the region, he did manage to organize the mining operations and increase their output for the benefit of Rome.[22] The civilized and Romanizing coastal areas were mobilized to efficiency during Cato's administration. Thereafter, Spain would supply the Romans with valuable products in addition to minerals. "Corn, wine, oil, and esparto grass were exported to Italy."[23] Cato's programs also justified the need for greater security, and thus increased military action to protect the rich coastal areas and Baetis Valley. The administration of Spain was designed to produce profit by providing security. "Labour and expense in acquisition [were] counterbalanced by exploitation of Spanish wealth and man-power."[24]

Economic benefits could only be assured as long as the highland tribes (who did not benefit from Roman exploitation) could be kept in line. This brings us back to the original reason why Cato was sent to Spain: to extinguish the endemic revolts. Although his combined use of military and diplomatic channels earned him a triumph in 194, he failed to pacify the provinces.[25] The Spaniards continued their guerilla warfare throughout the 190s, even ending the decade with an extraordinary victory over Aemilius Paulus. A second conflict with the Celtiberians (181-179) ended with the Peace of Tiberius Gracchus. But two more wars erupted until the mountain stronghold of Numantia was seized by the Romans in 133 thus marking the end of indigenous organized resistance to Roman rule.[26]

Before Scipio Aemilianus (the grandson, through adoption, of Scipio Africanus) seized Numantia, Spain was basically one huge legionary outpost. From 205 to 179, over 70,000 legionaries and 80,000 Latin _socii_ were drafted to Spain; it was a "_horrida et bellicosa provincia_."[27] From 184 to Augustus' day, there were always two or more (often four) legions stationed in the "_bellicosa provincia_."[28] And of all the places to be stationed in the glorious empire, the Iberian peninsula was one of the worst. The country was poor, plagued with hot, dusty weather, held little or no booty, and the rugged geography inevitably delayed pay and rations.[29]

Spain was the "ancient equivalent of the Russian front."[30]

Why did Rome have so much trouble with Spain? One factor was the abysmal provincial policy Rome practiced. Dissatisfied provincials revolted because of Rome's failure to improve the province or curtail abusive governors.[31] The Senate had little control over the province after the proconsuls left. This was only practical at first since the governors needed the prerogative and power to act quickly without conferring with the Senate. Second, Spain's distance delayed communications with Rome and made Senatorial jurisdiction impractical.[32] But the lack of Senatorial supervison opened the door for abusive governors.

The actions of Servius Sulpicius Galba illustrate the poor and abusive provincial administration of Spanish governors. Sent as praetor to Further Spain in 151, he slaughtered a numbered of surrendering Lusitanians after they had given up their weapons. Those who were not killed were sold into slavery.[33] The crimes of Galba prompted one of the escapees of the massacre, Viriathus, to rally and lead the Lusitanians in rebellion. Starting in 147, Viriathus headed a victorious insurrection which even forced Rome to sign a peace treaty in 140.[34]

The crimes of Galba were not ignored by Rome. When news of the atrocities reached the imperial capital, Galba was prosecuted and tried under the lex de repetundis in 149. Although the venerable Cato was prosecuting, he was

unable to prevent Galba's acquittal. But the fact that the Senate tried him at all showed at least minimal willingness to "take an initiative to protect" the provincials.[35] Nonetheless, provincial administration was not improved and the tribes were merely pounded into submission by Scipio Aemilianus who seized the Masada of Spain, Numantia, in 133.

With the fall of the Numantines, the Celtiberians were forever weakened and whenever the Spanish tribes made false moves or even seemed suspicious the Romans would launch a preemptive strike. In 98, Titus Didius eliminated 20,000 tribesman and six years later Gaius Valerius Flaccus hit the remaining Celtiberians hard with his own mini-war.[36] Resistance was physically restrained, but the spirit to rebel was still strong when Quintus Sertorius entered Spain's history.

While the country of Spain was plagued by rebellions, Gades (Balbus' hometown) remained a thriving port. It was founded by the Phoenicians around 700 - 600 and was famous for its fishermen and mercantile exchange. The city served as a depot for metals mined from the Sierra Morena and for produce from the fertile Baetis Valley.[37] When Carthage rose to power Hasdrubal occupied Gades and used it in 237 as a base to conquer Iberia.[38] During the second Punic war, the Gaditani joined the Roman forces late in the war and thus gained the status of civitas foederata, being bound to Rome by an informal

treaty negotiated by Lucius Marcius (although the treaty was not ratified till 78). By securing Gades by treaty as a civitas foederata, Rome found "another way of binding a foreign state without committing Rome too precisely, similiar to libertas as used in the East, but perhaps better adapted to the West, where it was safer not to rely entirely on the allied community's sense of moral obligation - and where 'freedom' had less propaganda value."[39]

While the treaty remained informal (until 78 when the Senate formally ratified it), Gades seems to have received limited autonomy like a civitas libera, and, according to Mommsen, "was the first foreign town out of Italy that adopted Roman law and Roman language."[40] As a trade center and a privileged city, Gades was cosmopolitan in both Phoenician and Roman times as Paul MacKendrick relates:

> The most important Punic city in Spain was Cadiz (Punic Gadir: the fortress). The name at once strikes a bellicose note: the city was founded on an impregnable island, its citizens were intrepid sailors, and it was in Cadiz that the battering ram was invented. . . . Its superior port installations made it the natural port of departure for Hanno, the Carthaginian sailor who explored the West African coast before 480 B.C. . . . Its most important temple was to Moloch, god of fire, to whom children were sacrificed; the Greeks identified him with Cronus (the Roman Saturn) who ate his offspring. There is irony in the fact that the Cadiz cathedral now stands on the spot where this cannibal god was worshiped.
>
> Cadiz became a melting pot: in its teeming streets Tartessians and Greeks rubbed elbows with Phoenicians. . . . Cadiz had a reputation, especially in Roman times, as a rich and wicked city. It had tall houses (it is still the only city in Andalucia [the southern

> edge of Spain] with houses of more than three stories) with widow's walks on top, from which the women could watch for the return of their husbands from adventurous voyages to strange lands. Cadiz in Roman times had 500 millionaires -- more than any other city in the Roman world except Rome and Padua. The wealth came from the export of metals, grain, oil, wine, wax, honey, pitch (for caulking ships), cochineal (red dye), and tiles, all exported in huge freighters. Cadiz was notorious for its provocative dancers. . . . They were much in demand at Roman parties; a friend of Pliny's cut a gourmet dinner because he heard there were to be puellae Gaditanae -- and oysters -- at another party. The girls' gyrations (bumps and grinds?) would tempt a Hippolytus. Eudoxus, the Greek sailor who explored the West African coast, took some dancing girls with him to dazzle the chiefs; then never came back. Managers exploited the girls shamefully, enslaving them and forcing them . . . to go on tour.[41]

Such was the city Balbus was born in, and presumably grew up in through childhood. He came from a wealthy family which most certainly acquired their wealth from the trade of Gades.[42] In addition to being affluent, the Balbi were a leading family in Gades.[43] We have references only to three members of Balbus' family: his father, brother, and nephew, and no references to his childhood. The best we can do is surmise that he was raised as a well-to-do provincial (or peregrinus: foreigner). He was apparently taught Latin since he was attached to the Roman military commanders, then later served as the advisor to the ruler of Rome. He did not have any Roman rights or privileges save for those enumerated in the treaty of 206, but being of a leading family he was certainly better off than most.[44] Of his father we only have a brief inscription,[45] while Balbus'

brother is known only because he was the father of Balbus' nephew who became famous in Augustus' reign.[46]

Since the information we have fails to shed any light on Balbus' youth, we are forced to turn next to his military career which starts in around 79. If Balbus was of the normal age of a recruit (around twenty years old, but possibly as young as seventeen), he would have been born around 100.[47] At twenty or so years of age he would have enlisted as an auxiliary (and was probably an officer due to his family's position in Gades) in the post-Marian Republican army. "During the last two centuries of the Republic, Rome made good her deficiency in cavalry and light armed troops with contingents raised outside of Italy. . . . This force was recruited from provincials who had not yet received the franchise."[48]

Auxilaries (auxilia) were usually light infantry or cavalry, and although Spain was noted for its cavalry, troops from the coastal island city of Gades would probably have been infantry. Balbus himself may have been in charge of the auxilaries from Gades as an officer under Q. Metellus Pius, or more immediately under the command of a quaestor, like C. Memmius.[49]

Cicero starts Balbus' service under Metellus' command in 79, yet it is not unreasonable to assume that Balbus was already under arms in the spring of 80 when Sertorius and "3,300 men [were] standing on the high bluffs of Tangier overlooking the straits of Gades."[50]

Sertorius crossed in 80 and defeated the commander Lucius Fufidius along the Baetis. The defeat caused the dispatch of Q. Metellus Pius to Spain and certainly mobilized Balbus' auxilia.[51] Balbus was drawn into a conflict which began in the streets of Rome.

The Sertorian War was the final phase of a series of military encounters between the Sullan and Marian factions. Gaius Marius (157-86), a novus homo of the equestrian class, initiated several democratic reforms after securing popular support from a victorious military career.[52] Marius' military reforms were not nearly as important as how he recruited troops and strengthened the role of the equites and plebs in Rome's government. By enlisting the landless proletarii he created an army loyal to him rather than to the Senate.[53] The auctoritas which he acquired through military victories in Africa (104) and northern Italy (102-1) was so great that it eventually allowed him to hold seven consulships (most of which were consecutive).

He could be termed a popularis, an individual who used the popular (plebeian) offices, like the tribunate, and the general assembly (comitia tributa) to pass and enact laws against the will of the Senate. In a sense, the populares were demagogues who used popular laws to gain power. The laws they passed in the tribal assemblies pleased the masses who in turn would support the demagogues' personal requests be they military

appointments, elected offices, or veteran benefits. Besides using the plebeian branch of government, Marius was able to be elected consul by mobilizing his veterans in the voting booths.[54] Marius used his troops to secure the influence of the equites (his own social class) in politics and obtain benefits for his soldiers. Marius had used the powerful Roman army in a new, abusive way. Professor L. R. Taylor explains:

> It was Marius who introduced the personal army as a decisive factor in Roman politics. Before his day the Roman soldier had in general been recruited from the small landholders of Roman territory, but the normal levies failed after the supply of these landholders had been depleted by Rome's long and costly wars. To find the troops he needed for the war against Jugurtha, Marius turned for recruits to the landless poor, the proletariat of Rome and the Italian municipalities. He raised an army of soldiers ready to serve under him in the hope of personal gain, that is, the acquisition of a land bonus. During the war with the Cimbri and Teutones, when Marius was elected unconstitutionally to repeated consulships, the number of his soldiers grew steadily. When in 100 B.C. he was consul for the sixth time, Marius had a large band of trained soldiers and veterans who owed allegiance to him and looked to him for rewards.
>
> Marius established the role of the general in politics, exemplified by the subsequent careers of Sulla and Pompey, a role that led through Caesar to monarchy.[55]

L. Cornelius Sulla would take the power of the army one step further. Being of an established patrician family and a supporter of the Senatorial aristocracy, Sulla was one of the optimates: the old guard patrician conservatives, the boni of Cicero's day, the "moral and social" superiors of the Romans.[56] They were threatened politically by the reforms of the Gracchi, and now by the

powerful Marius-*equites*-veteran alliance. The pro-senatorial Sulla clashed with the *popularis* Marius and in 88, over a disputed military command, Sulla marched his army into Rome and used armed troops to exile Marius and his democratic partisans.

Sulla's use of an army was unprecedented and initiated a new era as Philip O. Spann states:

> Sulla's march on Rome in 88 inaugurated a new age in the history of the Roman Republic: the last. Up to this point violence in Roman politics had been essentially spontaneous. Responsibility for a fracas was difficult to fix, constitutional propriety impossible to define, the results of it all ambiguous, if, nevertheless, ominous. And for the most part, this was true of the fracas [of Sulla]. . . . It might be argued that Sulla had done no more than others in his position. As consul, he had taken measures to suppress the activities of an obstreperous tribune. Yet in every previous incident of this sort, the violence had been limited to scuffles or daggers in the forum, and even when properly armed force had been employed, as . . . by Marius, it had been on a small scale and sanctioned to some extent by a *senatus consultum ultimum*. But Sulla had acted on his own. Synthesizing the accumulated irregularities of previous years, he had used a client army of *proletarii* . . . to invade the city and destroy his enemies. . . . After this *ne plus ultra* of political violence, no Roman politician could ever be certain that his opponents would respect the traditional and unwritten restraints necessary for government by consensus, that they would not, as a last resort, appeal to an army for redress . . . . Civil war was now thinkable, sanctioned by precedent, indeed, by Sulla's success.[57] [Italics mine.]

After Sulla seized control he enacted laws which weakened the *equites* and the tribunate, and increased the power of the Senate.[58] Sulla's reforms, however, only lasted so long as he lived. Even Pompey, who initially supported Sulla's policies, would return power to the

tribunes.[59] Sulla had to rule with an iron fist and had acquired enemies as a result. One long standing enemy was Quintus Sertorius, a former lieutenant of Marius, a novus homo, and a man who also gained renown through military achievements.[60]

Sertorius had had a colorful career prior to Sulla's coup in Rome. He had served with Marius against the invading Gauls, had been stationed in Spain with T. Didius in 97, had lost an eye in the Social War (91-87), had lost a tribune election due to Sulla's machinations in 89, and joined Marius and Cinna when they reclaimed Rome in 87 and started the proscriptions.[61] When Sulla returned to Italy in 83, Sertorius had been unable to prevent the invader's victories in the field and, according to Julius Exsuperantius (a fourth or fifth century A.D. historian), had been assigned as proconsul of the Hither Province by anti-Sullan forces who still held Rome.[62]

The Marian factions were defeated in 82 while Sertorius secured himself in Spain. With Italy lost, Sertorius was in trouble:

> He had been sent out by the legitimate government of Rome to take charge of a province. That government had been overthrown through violence (per vim), and the new masters of the city had declared him an outlaw. . . .
>
> Sertorius had only two feasible options: he could attempt to flee, or he could use the forces he commanded to defend himself in Spain. Neither course was particularly attractive. As he surely realized and would soon discover, there was virtually no place to go for a fugitve from Sulla's justice, and a military contest for Spain against Sulla and a united empire could have only one outcome. The best

> Sertorius could hope for was an end befitting a soldier.[63]

Sulla's forces soon arrived and pushed Sertorius out of Spain. He returned at the invitation of the rebellious Lusitanians in 80. His early victories prompted the arrival of the old veteran general Q. Metellus Pius. From 80 to 77, Sertorius used guerilla tactics and superior mobility to inflict heavy losses on the Roman forces. These tactics combined with inhospitable terrain and lack of booty lowered the morale of the troops and forced the Senate and Sulla to send a second commander, the young Pompey.[64]

Sertorius was successful for several reasons. First, he was a wise general who properly used his advantages of terrain and interior lines. Second, he treated the Spaniards in such a way as to win their support. He was popular with the Spanish tribes, he treated them as equals, and Romanized their lifestyle and military tactics. He even created a Senate in exile and a school at Osca for the chieftains' children (although it could be seen as merely a hostage holding pen).[65]

The dashing Pompey rushed into Spain in 76 with high hopes of a quick victory. He sobered up soon after he suffered some serious defeats at the hands of Sertorius. For three long years Sertorius fought off Pompey. Such were the defeats and conditions of Pompey's army that one wonders if Balbus ever had second thoughts about serving

under the man known as the "teenage butcher."[66]

In the first year of his command, Pompey was beaten at the Battle of Lauron by Sertorius who used clever tactics. Sextus Julius Frontinus reports the battle:

> When Sertorius was encamped next to Pompey near the town of Lauron in Spain, there were only two tracts from which forage could be gathered, one near by, the other farther off. Sertorius gave orders that the one nearby should be continually raided by light-armed troops, but that the remoter one should not be visited by any troops. Thus, he finally convinced his adversaries that the more distant tract was safer. When, on one occasion, Pompey's troops had gone to this region, Sertorius [ordered his troops] to lay an ambush against the foragers. . . . When Pompey's men, entertaining no suspicion and loaded down with forage, thought of returning . . . the Spaniards, darting out with the swiftness characteristic of their race, poured forth upon the stragglers, inflicted many wounds upon them, and put them to rout, to their great amazement. . . . Provision was also made that no one should escape. For two hundred and fifty reserve horsemen, sent ahead for the purpose, found it a simple matter to race forward by short cuts, and then to turn back and meet those who had first fled, before they reached Pompey's camp. On learning of this, Pompey sent out a legion . . . to reinforce his men, whereupon the cavalry of the enemy . . . pretended to give way, and then, passing round the legion, assaulted it from the rear, while those who had followed up the foragers attacked it from the front also. Thus the legion with its commander was crushed between the two lines of the enemy. When Pompey led out his entire army to help the legion, Sertorius exhibited his forces drawn up on the hillside, and thus baulked Pompey's purpose. Thus, in addition to inflicting a twofold disaster . . . Sertorius forced Pompey to be the helpless witness of the destruction of his own troops. This was the first battle between Sertorius and Pompey. According to Livy, ten thousand men were lost in Pompey's army, along with the entire transport.[67]

Balbus was not present at the Lauro disaster according to Sertorius' modern biographer, Philip O. Spann. Spann believes Balbus was with Pompey's quaestor

(who was also his brother-in-law) C. Memmius at the siege of Carthago Nova in 76. Memmius was sent to seize Carthago Nova in order to secure the east coast (one of the first steps in Pompey's and Metullus' strategy). Our source on the siege is restricted to Cicero's brief mention of it in the Pro Balbo. Balbus was involved in a dangerous operation to capture a port city which was deep within Sertorian controlled territory:

> [The attempt] appears to have been undertaken in 76. It is quite possible that the incident at New Carthage, where Balbus and Memmius were besieged by Sertorius' forces, took place at the same time Pompey and Sertorius were engaged at Lauro. The east coast, from the Ebro south, was probably in the power of Sertorius: Valencia and Dianium certainly, perhaps New Carthage as well. Pompey may have sent Memmius against the city while the main body of the Sertorian forces were engaged at Lauro and unable to render immediate assitance. Balbus and Memmius apparently got control of the place for a period, but were then beseiged and forced to pull out and return north. Had they managed to maintain control of the city, Cicero would have said so.[69]

The next year saw the twin battles of the Turia and Sucro Rivers which are also mentioned by Cicero in praise of Balbus' bravery. Sertorius had stationed his general Perperna[70] on the Turia River near Valencia to block Pompey's southward march. Pompey attacked the forces placed in his way and defeated them soundly eliminating over 10,000 Sertorian troops.[71] Balbus was there to enjoy the victory.

After the engagement, Perperna retreated down to Sucro (a town named after the river) where Sertorius had stationed himself to prevent Metellus Pius from linking up

with Pompey. Upon hearing of Pompey's victory, Sertorius thought it wise to attack him before Metellus could assist.[72] The resulting battle near the Sucro River ended in a draw in terms of gained ground and lost troops, but Pompey "had been personally put to flight, wounded and forced to leave the field on foot" after Sertorius' Libyan allies broke through Pompey's line but foolishly allowed him to escape.[73] Again, Balbus, according to Cicero, was present at this encounter.

Cicero does not mention Balbus as having been in any other battles but states generally that "he was with Pompeius till the very end of the war."[74] If this is true than Balbus suffered the trials of extensive guerilla warfare conducted by Sertorius against the harried Pompey and Metellus. Although Sertorius was seriously defeated in 75 at the Battle of Segontia[75] he persisted in fighting a frustrating and exhausting war of attrition. One cannot overestimate the pains of conducting legionary warfare in Spain:

> The great difficulty in campaigning in the Celtiberian highlands, aside from the mountainous terrain, was the lack of grain and the general poverty of the land, which made it essential that large armies be provisioned from a more fertile region, since local plundering and foraging operations produced little to nothing. Many of the Celtiberian cities allied to Sertorius lay in the midst of the northern Iberic Mountains, that area north of central Spain around modern Burgos and Soria, roughly equivalent to Old Castile. Dominated by towering mountain groups such as the Sierra de la Demanda and the Sierra de Moncayo which rise to some 2,500 meters, the landscape or moonscape consists of wide, gently rolling tablelands with a general elevation of between 1,000 and 1,500

> meters, now denuded of trees but for a few pines, and swept by harsh, cutting winds which are even in the summer are cold on the lower elevations and are freezing up in the mountain passes. The overall aspect is bleak and inhospitable.
>
> Running short of provisions in the middle of this hostile territory, the Roman armies were now an easy mark for small groups of Celtiberian guerillas long acquainted with the terrain. Dashing out of a wooded ravine or over the lip of a flanking ridge, they incessantly attacked the rear of the Roman columns of Pompey and Metellus while other Sertorian forces ambushed overland supply columns coming from Gaul, and, with pirate ships, intercepted what grain was sent from there by sea along the coast.[76]

Nonetheless, without decisive victories Sertorius was doomed to lose this war of attrition as Pompey secured more reinforcements and supplies from the rich imperial coffers of Rome. Sertorius lost also because his own fellow Romans turned against him because they disliked his strategy and amiable attitude toward the barbaric Spanish tribes.[77] In 73, Sertorius was assassinated by the conspiring Perperna and the following year saw the end of the war as the assassin himself was beaten by Pompey.[78]

In 71, Pompey rewarded Balbus for his service by giving him citizenship.[79] For Balbus, this gift was the turning point of his life. He became a Roman citizen with full legal rights overnight. He was no longer a mere provincial. Pompey, in return, gained a client, a local family (Balbus' entire family received the franchise) entrenched in the important city of Gades.

Enfranchisement by a general was uncommon but Pompey had fallen on precedent.[80] Foreign communities had been enfranchised in the Republic to provide Rome with

necessary manpower for her armies.[81] Usually the grant of citizenship lay with the citizen body or the Senate.[82] But Pompey was granting citizenship as a general rewarding veterans, with the grant being confirmed by law in Rome. Marius enfranchised two Umbrian cohorts in 101 and a contingent of Spanish cavalry was given citizenship by Pompey's father in 89.[83] Pompey's right to enfranchise is discussed later with the trial of 56 which questioned Balbus' citizenship. It is sufficient to state now that Pompey was not breaking new ground in his conferral of civitas upon Balbus. Pompey's modern biographer, John Leach summarizes:

> For some time Pompey had been following precedent set by Marius and his own father of granting Roman citizenship to certain Spaniards who had given loyal service to him and his party. In 72 these grants were ratified by a law passed by the two consuls L. Gellius Poplicola and Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus, no doubt in answer to a request from Pompey. Such was the structure of Roman politics that while serving the interests of his government Pompey was at the same time adding to the already considerable body of personal clients which had been growing for many years. More than twenty years later Caesar was to notice the affection in which Pompey was still held in Spain, . . .[84]

Pompey received clients when he enfranchised the Balbi clan of Gades. When Pompey conferred citizenship on the Spaniard, Balbus became indebted to the general who became his patron. The beneficium of citizenship established a bond of clientela between Pompey and Balbus.[85] The bond would benefit Pompey who would acquire the support of the Balbi of Gades, who, being a leading family of the town,

would foster popular support for Pompey among the provincials of Gades. Pompey gained votes from his clients and, more importantly, overseas support to bolster his political actions in Rome. Support from Spain could manifest itself in economic or military forms, as Caesar was to discover in the Civil War.[86] Pompey, by granting citizenship, a premium prize even in the Late Republic, obtained the loyalty of Gades and presumably of the Balbi.

Balbus, after receiving citizenship through the lex Gellia Cornelia in 72, changed his name to fit Roman style. According to Ernst Badian, his name change, besides Romanizing him, could have indicated his patron. "When a non-citizen became a citizen, the chief mark of the change was the acquisition of a Roman name, complete with praenomen, nomen, tribe and cognomen. The cognomen was often a convenient use of the old non-Latin name for distinguishing purposes."[87] Hence, the cognomen Balbus has been argued to be the near equivalent of his original Spanish name, but it could also indicate his imperfect pronunciation of Latin since balbus means stammering (balbutio: to stammer, stutter).[88] His gentilicium nomen, or family name, Cornelius, is harder to pin down. Usually the new citizen would adopt the gens of the reigning magistrate enacting the franchise law or else he would take the name of his patron or sponsoring general.[89] If the latter is true, one would expect Balbus to take the nomen Pompeius, or, if completely indebted to and

enamoured of Pompey, he may have been called Gnaeus Pompeius Balbus.

Balbus instead chose Lucius Cornelius as his praenomen and nomen thus posing the problem explained by the eminent Sir Ronald Syme:

> A Roman friend, patron, or benefactor might provide the gentile name of [a] new citizen. . . . L. Cornelius Balbus, the Gaditane magnate, certainly owed the citizenship to Pompeius. Why then did he not take the name of Pompeius, as did so many others? It is an old problem. Some have invoked the Lex Gellia Cornelia of 72 B.C., which ratified Pompeius' acta in Gaul and Spain. That is not very likely. There is more to be said for the view propounded by Manutius centuries ago. Balbus, as later emerges [through Cicero's letters], was bound by especial ties of friendship and gratitude to L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus. The origin of the relationship is unknown -- but Lentulus may well have been with Pompeius in Spain at the time of the Sertorian War.[90]

L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus appears to be a dear friend of Balbus and he may (although no proof is available) have served in the Sertorian War under Pompey, as Syme suggests, and he may have sponsored Balbus for citizenship. What is known is that Balbus saw no reason to adopt the nomen Pompeius for the conferral of citizenship although he was no doubt thankful for such a reward. This is interesting and should be kept in mind when considering the reasons why Balbus switched loyalty from Pompey to Caesar. It is possible that Balbus never was a strong client of Pompey's (although other members of his family or people of Gades and southern Spain were). Maybe he never felt loyalty to a general under whom he witnessed poor strategy (the siege of Carthago Nova),

average, if not poor tactics (the battle of the Sucro R.), and the inability to deal with the mobile guerilla warfare conducted by Sertorius. As for his citizenship, Balbus, if we agree with Syme's conclusion, owed his franchise more directly to Lentulus than Pompey. Pompey might have easily overlooked the provincial commander from Gades if Lentulus had not sponsored Balbus. These factors may explain why Balbus switched camps in later years.

Chapter 2

BALBUS, CAESAR, AND THE TRIUMVIRATE

"When he was a young man he became acquainted with Caesar; he attracted a most discerning man; among Caesar's large circle of friends he ranked with his closest intimates."

--Cicero Pro Balbo 63.

Following the Sertorian War, Balbus visited Rome with Pompey to claim his citizenship. There he witnessed the operation of the oligarchy, Caesar's rentless energy, and Cicero's exceptional orations. Although our sources on Balbus's whereabouts during this period (71-59) are few, it appears that Balbus was often commuting back and forth between Rome and Spain, gradually serving the interests of Caesar more than those of Pompey.

Pompey brought Balbus to a troubled Italy. In 73, Spartacus caused a panic with his army of bandits, gladiators, and fugitive slaves.[1] Only the ambitious and wealthy Marcus Licinius Crassus was able to subdue the rabble in 71.[2] Since Pompey arrived in March of the same year, he was able to steal part of the victory, but both generals desired the greater prize of the consulship of Rome. The two men led their armies to the city gates and basically forced Rome to accept them as consuls.[3]

With Crassus and Pompey as consuls for 70, three major changes were initiated. First, the power of the tribunate was restored. The tribunes were allowed the

power to propose legislation and veto bills.[4] Second, under the auspices of Pompey (and possibly Crassus), a compromise was worked out with the Senate to reform the juries which tried senators on extortion, provincial excesses, and any criminal offences. The bill allowed the Senate to comprise one-third of the juries while the remaining two-thirds were equites and tribuni aerarii (a class comparable or just beneath the equestrians in terms of wealth).[5] Third, and most important for L. Cornelius Balbus, the office of censor was reestablished.[6]

The censorship had been allowed to fall into disuse since Sulla's reign. The censors were in charge of the census rolls and assigned citizens to various tribes and classes based on wealth. The censors also had the right to expel any senator who failed to live honorably or who acted immorally. When Pompey and Crassus revived the censorship the masses cheered. A census had not been conducted since 85, and the new census would allow new citizens to be placed in tribes to register their votes.[7]

The urban and rural tribes of Italy voted in the comitia tributa or tribal assembly. Here each tribe carried one vote and had the power to pass laws binding on the entire state. The tribunes proposed the laws for the comitia tributa which were often for the benefit of the plebs.[8] The second assembly, which also had legislative power, was the comitia centuriata. This assembly normally

elected the consuls and praetors with the propertied classes holding the majority of the votes. The voters were arranged in five classes based on wealth. The most powerful landholders were grouped into the first class which was composed of 70 centuries. The landless proletariate comprised the fifth and lowest class which counted as one century. With the entire centuriate assembly comprising 193 centuries, the landed aristocracy had an overwhelming edge in passing legislation since a mere majority of centuries would carry a bill.[9]

The centuriata was generally controlled by the landholders of Italy and made certain that the leading families of Rome kept the chief magistracies (praetors and consuls) among themselves. The tributa was not under aristocratic control and tended to be more democratic although demagogues, bribery, and military threats could certainly wipe away any semblance of democracy if employed with determination.[10]

Balbus himself was only partially pleased with the new censors since they enrolled him in one of the four urban tribes (tribus urbanae), but his wealth enabled him to register in the equestrian class (equester ordo).[11] Being enrolled in one of the urban tribes lowered the power of his vote since they were much larger in number than the rural tribes. The rural tribes (of which there were 31) were smaller in size and thus more influential. Balbus soon improved his position (and usefulness as

Pompey's client) after he successfully prosecuted another individual on a charge of ambitus.[12] A successful prosecution awarded the plaintiff the sentenced man's place in his tribe if it was superior. Lily Ross Taylor explains:

> There was endless scheming to have citizens shifted from the urban tribes where their vote did not count to the rural tribes. Prominent citizens could be very helpful in such matters. Quintus Cicero tells his brother to make use in his election of those "who have secured from you or hope to secure a tribe or a century or some other benefit." Such changes were made from time to time as rewards for special services. Thus under the Roman system by which the successful prosecutor was rewarded . . . men who had taken part in an accusation that led to conviction could be rewarded either with citizenship, if they were noncitizens, or with transfer to the tribe of the accused man if it was a better tribe. . . . Apparently by this method Caesar's trusted agent Balbus, a new citizen from Gades, was transferred from an urban to a rural tribe. Similar changes also came about, especially after Marius' reorganization of the army, when men of the proletariat belonging to the urban tribes enlisted and seem thereby to have passed into a rural tribe. Other changes were brought about through pressure and influence. Some censors made wholesale revisions in tribal registration. They also used registration as a means of punishing citizens, transferring men from a rural to an urban tribe.[13]

Balbus, through his successful court case, managed to promote himself to Pompey's rural tribe (the tribus Clustumina). Balbus thus had an influential vote in both the centuriate and tribal assemblies.

But Balbus was only one of thousands who gained the right to vote through the new censors set up by Pompey and Crassus. These thousands now represented thousands of thankful clients for Pompey and Crassus. The new citizens, plebs, and equites who now registered were bound

to Pompey and Crassus, and made control over the tribal assembly that much harder for the optimate oligarchy which had already seen the tribunes restored and the juries changed against them.

But that was not all. In the same year an upstart orator by the name of Marcus Tullius Cicero struck down the powerful senator, Gaius Verres. The courts served as Cicero's forum to denounce Verres' crimes. Cicero used the case to further his career as others had done before. The Roman judicial system granted an orator the chance to become famous through a successful prosecution or defense.

> A great criminal trial was a significant political event. The charges concerned offenses against the public -- extortion in the provinces, embezzlement of state funds, treason against the state, malpractice in candidacy for office, acts of violence, and murder. . . . The cases were often inspired by political motives, and speeches for the defense and prosecution might touch immediately on the problems of the day. The jurors were men of position selected from an official panel of senators.
>
> The political significance of the criminal trial was enhanced by the remarkable publicity with which it was conducted. It took place in the open Forum where everyone was free to come, look on, and listen.
>
> In the Forum, cases were frequently in progress on several tribunals at the same time. . . . The crowds which constantly thronged the Forum, the center of city life, could -- as crowds do nowadays in Union Square or Hyde Park -- drift about from one platform to another to find out what was going on. One could tell how good an orator was merely by looking at the size of the circle, the corona around his tribunal. The speakers often had their minds more on the crowds than the jurors . . . The people who came and went while the speaking was in progress could get a firsthand contact with the proceedings such as is impossible in the limited space of the American courtroom. The trial was like a great drama in which the people crowding on the steps of the tribunal made Cicero think of the audience in the theatre to see a show.[14]

A victory in the courts would bring popularity, but also the spoils of the convicted's rank in tribe and senate as with Balbus.[15] Indeed, Cicero's brilliant tactics and oratory doomed Verres who went into voluntary exile rather than suffer his sentencing.[16] "The Verrines enshrined a victory which greatly enhanced Cicero's reputation and strengthened his credentials as an aspiring statesman."[17] The case furthered Cicero's career,as he obtained Verres' seat in the Senate, and also served to embarrass the Senate. The case may have influenced legislation to alter the juries against the Senate's advantage.[18]

The Senate's superior powers, which had been established by the Sullan reforms, were now seriously curtailed by the activities of 70. The masses were presumably pleased with the events. For the next two years, our sources are silent. Pompey and Crassus steped down from the consulship: Pompey briefly retired to groom his clients while Crassus attended his business dealings.[19] Cicero's successful court battle led to his appointment as head of the Roman bar and election as aedile for 69. The two positions gave him the opportunity to gain support for the praetorship.

But although the years 69-68 were uneventful in Rome they were hardly so for L. Cornelius Balbus. For in 69, a man from the ancient patrician Julian clan named Gaius Julius Caesar was elected quaestor and was sent to Balbus' homeland, Further Spain. It was at this time that Balbus

first met Caesar and became his lifelong friend and ally.

Caesar was born around 100 to a father who failed to reach the consulship and to a family which last produced a consular in 91.[20] In 84, he first displayed his character when he defied Sulla by refusing to divorce his wife Cornelia (the daughter of Cinna).[21] Caesar, like Pompey, was saved from proscriptions (this time Sulla's) by friends and allies who pleaded for him.

Nevertheless, Caesar played it smart and left Italy by joining the military and serving on the staff of the propraetor of Asia in 80. During the governor's campaign against Mytilene, Caesar was sent to obtain King Nicomedes' fleet from Bithynia for action and received the corona civica for distinguished service at the battle which finally took Mytilene.[22]

In 78 he joined the proconsul P. Servilius Vetia in fighting the pirates near Cilicia but then returned to Rome after Sulla's death. The following year Caesar began his political activity through the court system "thus following a path to a political career that had become increasingly common in the last half century."[23] He was effective in the courts but desired to improve his oratorical skills at Rhodes. On his way to the island he encountered some of the pirates who plagued the Mediterranean during this period. The story by Suetonius (Plutarch also recalls it) illuminates Caesar's pride and character:

> Winter had already set in when he sailed for Rhodes and was captured by pirates off the island of Pharmacussa. They kept him prisoner for nearly forty days, to his intense annoyance; he had with him only a physician and two valets, having sent the rest of his staff away to borrow the ransom money. As soon as the stipulated fifty talents arrived (which make 12,000 gold pieces), and the pirates duly set him ashore, he raised a fleet and went after them. He had often smilingly sworn, while still in their power, that he would soon capture and crucify them; and this is exactly what he did.[24] Then he continued to Rhodes ...

While Caesar was studying at Rhodes, the Third Mithridatic War broke out in Asia in 74, and he crossed over on his own initiative and fought off Mithridates' forces which invaded Asia Minor. Both his assault on the pirates and his counter attack on Mithridates indicated his "limitless audacity and self-confidence."[25]

After these daring exploits in the East, Caesar returned to Rome to continue his career and climb the obligatory ladder of offices toward the consulship. In 72 he was elected military tribune and may have served in the war against Spartacus. Caesar then openly supported the actions of Pompey for restoring the tribunate and granting amnesty for the followers of Lepidus and Sertorius.[26] Caesar was becoming a popularis. He was supporting popular causes, the cause of Marius and Cinna. He was anti-Sullan and thus opposed to the extreme powers of the Senate. Caesar chose to support those programs which made him popular and endeared him to powerful individuals like Pompey. At this time, Caesar was not considered a threat by the oligarchy, but rather a man deeply in debt.[27]

In 69, Caesar was elected quaestor and was assigned to Further Spain. Scholars believe that this was the first time Balbus and Caesar met.[28] Balbus probably stayed in Rome only long enough to register with the census and then returned to Spain either with, or to join Caesar's staff. We have no hard evidence of Balbus' actual movements during 70-69, only reasonable estimates. Balbus, now serving as a patronus of Gades would have to keep in touch with his home town to maintain contacts with his (and consequently Pompey's) clients, and, as a member of a leading family in Gades, had to keep up contacts with the Gaditani. Such contacts may also have included business dealings since his "millionaire" status had to be maintained somehow.[29]

Quite possibly Balbus increased his wealth and influence when he joined Caesar on his quaestorship. Suetonius reports, "As quaestor Caesar was appointed to Further Spain, where the governor sent him on an assize-circuit."[30] This was a normal duty of the office of quaestor along with maintaining the praetor's finances (fiscus) and commanding detachments of troops.[31] It was the lowest state office in the cursus honorum. Caesar apparently used his position to gain allies by treating the provincials favorably.[32] While serving with the circuit, Balbus may have served as a lawyer for his clients before the quaestor or he may have served as a liason between the provincials and Caesar.

Whether Balbus followed Caesar to Transpadane Gaul in 68 is uncertain. He probably stayed behind in Gades to further his own interests since we do not hear of him again till 62. Balbus probably was not closely attached enough to Caesar to follow him to Transpadane Gaul and especially not enough to go along with Caesar's plan to stir up the Gauls into armed revolt in order to acquire citizenship for those north of the Po River.[33] The uprising never took place and Caesar returned to Rome as a suspect rabble rouser.

The next few years saw the continued rise of Pompey, Cicero, and Caesar. The latter two individuals gained influence by supporting Pompey's interests. The first incident of support was in 67 when Pompey was offered a command by the tribune Aulus Gabinius to destroy the pirates of the Mediterranean. The lex Gabinia gave Pompey extraordinary proconsular authority which many optimates thought was too powerful for one man to hold.[34] Caesar, riding on Pompey's popular support, vouched for the law.

Pompey was granted the command and deftly executed it by purging the Mediterranean of pirates under a year's time. He then asked for (or had his agents propose) a command against Mithradates IV of Pontus (the same king Caesar fought in 74) who had been overrunning Asia Minor for years.[35]

The command against Mithradates had been assigned to Lucius Licinius Lucullus. At first, he had scored

victories against the king, but recently he had suffered a military defeat, low troop moral (because of his strict discipline), and had reduced revenues to the equites from Asia and thus lost their support in Rome. Lucullus, although supported by the optimates and their leaders, Q. Lutatius Catulus and Q. Hortensius Hortalus, could not hold his command after Gaius Manilius, a tribune, proposed a law awarding Pompey the command. The lex Manilia was supported by Caesar, and also by Cicero in his famous Pro Lege Manilia or De Imperio Cn. Pompeii.[36]

In this speech, Cicero, then praetor, showed himself as an advocate for Pompey. It was the first speech Cicero had ever given to a popular assembly, was aimed at the business class, and seemed to take a popularis position although he was polite to the optimates and Lucullus.[37] The speech succeded and Pompey began his conquest of the East from which he did not return until 62. Balbus did not follow Pompey. He stayed in Gades and Rome, traveling back and forth pursuing his and Gades' interests. It was during this time that Balbus began to switch to Caesar's side. Pompey may have lost Balbus as early as 69 when Caesar was in Spain, but Pompey's absence from Rome for five years certainly played a part in dissolving the ties Balbus felt for his former commander.[38]

Free from obligations to Pompey, Balbus probably assisted Caesar's expenses in 65 when Caesar was elected an aedile. This post was used by politicians to acquire

votes from the masses for higher offices.[39] Caesar, borrowing money from individuals like Crassus and Balbus, sponsored huge games for the people. During this year Caesar furthered his popularis tendencies by replacing Marius' victory trophies in Rome which had been removed by Sulla.[40] He used additional popular measures the following year when he joined Cato in prosecuting those who profited from Sulla's proscriptions and when he and Crassus teamed up to assist the Rullan Law which was supposed to partially solve the social problems in Rome.[41]

Cicero, as consul in 63, saw the law for what it was (as did the optimates) and defeated it. But the year 63 was more important for a conspiracy, a planned coup d'etat which Cicero had to face: the Conspiracy of Catiline.[42]

Lucius Sergius Catilina plotted to overthrow the government after he had lost three consular elections in a row. Calling out to the discontented poor, debtors, bankrupt Sullans, and other destitute veterans, Catiline determined to use land reform and debt relief to make himself a demagogue and overthrow the state.[43] Cicero was warned of the rebellion (partially by Crassus, who, with Caesar, was a suspected conspirator) and took action after the Senate passed the Senatus Consultum Ultimum, and the insurgents were put to death. Cicero would later regret this action as it would haunt his later career.[44]

At the time and forever afterwards, Cicero himself boasted to the extreme about how he saved the state. "The

orator always believed that his suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy was not only the greatest thing that he had ever done but the greatest thing that had ever happened in Roman history."[45] Such bombastic pronoucements fell on deaf ears as the new year began and Pompey's arrival grew closer. The main question on everybody's mind was whether or not Pompey would return as another Sulla.[46] The year was busy with bills concerning Pompey's return, and ended with Pompey fast approaching and Caesar divorcing his second wife Pompeia after P. Clodius Pulcher interrupted a religious celebration of the Bona Dea which was hosted at Caesar's house.[47]

At the end of 62 or early 61, Balbus was involved in a peculiar incident which sheds light on his position between Caesar and the returning conqueror of the East. Pompey, after disbanding his army to the relief of many, allowed or caused Balbus to be adopted by Theophanes of Mytilene.[48] Theophanes was to Pompey what Balbus was to Caesar, a close advisor/agent/companion. Theophanes served as Pompey's historian and accompanied Pompey in the East. He also, like Balbus, received his citizenship from Pompey, was a patron for his home city (a hospes), and served as praefectus fabrum, a post which Balbus was assigned around the same time as the adoption.[49]

The adoption was controversial and considered improper.[50] As discussed by Barbara K. Gold in the American Journal of Philology, the agreement was

beneficial to Balbus and the others for two reasons. First, Balbus gained an inheritance. Second, and more importantly (especially since Balbus certainly had enough coinage) the bond may have served to tie Caesar and Pompey together and shows Balbus as definitely serving Caesar's camp but still an ally of Pompey. Barbara Gold explains the significance:

> The adoption must have taken place shortly after Theophanes came to Rome with Pompey in 62, and Balbus went so far as to call himself Balbus Theophanes. One is tempted to think that Pompey must have figured largely in this adoption since he was then the patron of Theophanes and had been the patron of Balbus, or that the purpose of the adoption was to forge another link between Pompey and Caesar through their praefecti fabrum. We might compare the alliance made in 59, only a couple of years later, by the marriage of Julia to Pompey. It is unlikely that Theophanes needed an heir; his son may well have already been born by then.[51]

The bond, although not as strong as a marriage, would help keep Caesar and Pompey on agreeable terms and an adoption alliance is not completely surprising since Caesar had supported Pompey's cause since 67 with his approval of the lex Gabinia. With the adoption completed, Caesar and Balbus left for Further Spain; Caesar's propraetorian province for 61.[52]

Balbus was chosen by Caesar to serve as praefectus fabrum, a position which is something of an enigma. Scholars have defined it as being anything from "chief engineer" to "chief of staff" to head of artillery.[53] The strongest argument indicates Balbus served as an aide-de-camp having nothing to do with engineering or artillery.

Balbus would have proved valuable with his knowledge of the Spanish natives and terrain, and with his contacts in Gades he probably assisted in obtaining the fleet for Caesar's early operations up the coast. Caesar's activities in Spain are narrated by Caesar's modern German biographer, Matthias Gelzer:

> In Further Spain Caesar made full use of the possibilities which a province offered to a Roman statesman. . . . He knew that the Lusitanian part of the province was infested with bandits, and gave this as the official explanation for his hasty departure . . . On his arrival he again, as a general, showed himself the dashing officer of his youth, immediately enlisted ten new cohorts to reinforce the twenty already under arms and ordered the bandits, who were occupying the Herminius range south of the Duero, to settle in the plain and there to follow peaceful callings. Their refusal gave him the victories for which he hoped. When some of the fugitives established themselves on an island off the west coast and his first attempt to secure a landing with rafts failed, he called up ships from Gades and forced their surrender.
>
> Then he sailed with the squandron to Brigantium, a city of the Callaici on the north coast, whose inhabitants, terrified by the unusual spectacle, also submitted. His army hailed him as Imperator, and the rich booty allowed him to some extant to repair his shattered fortune, but he did not forget to let his brave soldiers have their share, and also sent considerable sums to the treasury in Rome. . . . Even malevolent optimates had to admit that this campaign had pacified areas that had hardly been touched previously . . .
>
> During the winter Caesar applied himself with equal skill to civil administration. Some communities were still suffering under the reparations imposed by Metellus Pius during the war with Sertorius. He asked the Senate that these should be lifted. Numerous other complaints reached the Senate through his agency, and many communities and individuals found in him an active patron. In this he was assisted by Lucius Cornelius Balbus, a Roman knight and native of Gades, one of his most loyal followers, with whom he had become acquianted during his quaestorship and whom in 61 he had nominated as his adjutant (praefectus fabrum).[54]

While Caesar was working in Spain, Pompey was working in Italy but was continually frustrated. The Senate, listening to the vengeful rhetoric of Cato and Lucius Lucullus (the general whom Pompey replaced), refused Pompey's requests for land for his veterans and ratification of his Eastern settlements. Not even friendly tribunes or his overwhelming popularity could produce any positve results. The optimate oligarchy prevented Pompey's objectives. But Pompey was not alone. Crassus was likewise snubbed by Cato and his jealous companions. They refused to reduce the tax contracts which were assigned to the publicani in Asia. Crassus and his associated equestrians were headed for financial loss if the contracts were not reduced; Cato refused to negotiate; Cicero's concordia ordinum was shattered. "The political position here is wretched, rotten, and unstable. I expect you have heard that our friends the knights [equites] have almost had a rupture with the Senate," wrote Cicero in December of 61.[55]

The final act occurred in June of 60. When Caesar returned to Rome, Cato refused to allow him both a triumph and the chance to run for the consulship, Caesar could have either one or the other. Caesar chose to run for the high office. But in order to run a successful consulship, Caesar needed allies; others who were also alienated by the optimates. Thanks to Cato's stern demeanor there was no shortage of anti-optimates. Sir Ronald Syme and other

scholars conclude that Cato himself was one of the primary factors (if not, then the primary factor) in the creation of the Triumvirate:

> The leader of the Optimates [Cato] had fought against the consuls and tribunes of Pompeius Magnus, mocked the flaunting victories over effeminate orientals, and scorned alliance with the conqueror of the world. The triumphal robe of Magnus seemed chill comfort in political defeat.
>
> Cato went too far. When the knights who farmed the taxes of Asia requested a rebate from the Senate, Cato denounced their rapacity and repelled their demand. Crassus was behind the financiers and Crassus waited, patient in rancour. . . .
>
> Caesar, returning from his command in Spain, asked for a triumph. Cato blocked the triumph. To wait for it would be to sacrifice the consulate. Caesar made a rapid decision -- he would be consul, and to some purpose. The Roman noble, constrained in the pursuit of ambition to adopt the language and tactics of a demagogue, might be captured by the government at a certain stage in his career, with no discredit to either. Caesar's choice was still open had it not been for Cato.[56]

Unable to block Caesar's consulship, the optimates, through blatant bribery, elected their own man, M. Calpurnius Bibulus (Caesar's colleague during his aedileship). Furthermore, the combined strength of the oligarchy was enough to halt any legislation proposed by Caesar. "As he could not cope alone with the united strength of the friends and clients that stood behind them, Caesar also had to have allies if he wished to be able to defy the oligarchy. The obvious men were Gnaeus Pompeius and Marcus Crassus, who had long regarded themselves as superior, or at least equal, to the oligarchy and controlled large followings."[57] Caesar immediately sought their support. By late 60, Pompey

had agreed to the plan. Around the same time, Balbus was dispatched to Cicero's house to seek his assistance and cooperation in the plan. Cicero tells of Balbus' visit in December of 60:

> For either I have got to resist the agrarian measure strongly [the land bill for Pompey's veterans], which would mean something of a fight, though I should gain prestige by it; or I must hold my peace, which is equivalent to retiring to Solonium or Antium; or else I must assist the measure, and that is what they say Caesar expects me to do beyond a doubt. For Cornelius paid me a visit -- I mean Balbus, Caesar's great friend. He assured me that Caesar will take my own and Pompey's opinion on everything, and that he will make an effort to reconcile Pompey and Crassus. On this side of the sheet may be placed an intimate connection with Pompey and, if I like, with Caesar too, reconciliation with my enemies, peace with the populace, and ease in my old age. But my blood is still stirred by the finale I laid down for myself in the 3rd book of my poem [on his consulship]:
>
> 'Meantime the course you chose
> In youth's first spring
> And held to, heart and soul, 'mid civic strife
> Keep still, with growing fame and report.'
>
> Since Calliope herself dictated those verses to me in a book full of passages in lordly vein, I ought not to have the least hesitation in holding 'no omen better than to right one's country's wrongs.'[58]

Cicero decided not to join; "it was from shame and principle alone that he stood out of the alliance."[59] Crassus, lacking such ideals, readily accepted Caesar's offer and the so-called First Triumvirate was completed in 59 and sealed with the marriage of Caesar's daughter Julia to Pompey.[60]

Syme describes the arrangement and significance of the formation:

> [The Triumvirate rested upon Pompey's] <u>auctoritas</u>,

> the wealth and influence of Crassus, the consular power of Caesar, and the services of a number of tribunes; further, less obstrusive and barely to be perceived through the tumultuous clamour of political life at Rome under Caesar's consulate, several partisans or allies already in control of the more important provincial armies. The combination ruled, though modified in various ways, and impaired as time went on, for some ten years. This capture of the constitution may fairly be designated as the end of the Free State. From a triumvirate it was a short step to dictatorship.[61]

Balbus probably had a part in the creation of the Triumvirate and thus (although unknown to him and his contemporaries) a part in one of the greatest political alliances in history.[62] Why was he willing to join the ambitious three against the traditional _boni_? He certainly had no love for the Senate (that distant body of politicians who challenged his patrons: Caesar and Pompey). Raised as a provincial, exploited by the Republic, he fought in a war caused by the failure of Republican administration. He received his citizenship through the patronage of a general, not through the resolution of the Senate. He was a Roman citizen, but as a Spaniard by birth and upbringing he probably had no sense of the Roman _mos maiorum_ and had little or no respect for the old traditions of Rome. Maturing under generals who ignored the constitution or continually broke precedent (Sulla, Sertorius, Pompey, and Caesar), he probably knew little about the unwritten constitution of Rome which was used and abused by an elite oligarchy. Balbus admired only the dignity, power, and efficiency of

the autocrats. His position against the Senate was surely strengthened later in his life when they tried to steal his citizenship and after they murdered his friend and patron, Caesar.

It is not surprising, then, that he attached himself to Caesar and may have endeavored to counteract or even eliminate optimate power.

Chapter 3

TRIUMVIRS, TRIALS, AND TYRANNICIDE

"This story should not be dismissed as idle fiction, or a lie, because our authority for it is none other than Cornelius Balbus, a close friend of Caesar's."

--Suetonius Divus Iulius 81.3

In the period between the creation of the Triumvirate in 59 and the death of Caesar on the Ides of March, of 44, Balbus reached the zenith of his political power and administrative activity. He became the confidant of Julius Caesar and one of his primary agents in Rome. As an advisor of the dictator of Rome, Balbus became one of the more powerful and influential men in the Roman world.

Beginning with the year 56, this study is blessed with a refreshing plethora of references and citations (mainly from the opinionated Cicero) regarding Balbus. At various times Balbus was defendant, courier, diplomat, and bureaucrat. At all times, he was Caesar's amicus.

The three years prior to Balbus' trial are fraught with political power struggles, violence, and shifting alliances between the triumvirs and the optimates. Caesar's consulship in 59 succeeded in obtaining the objectives of all three men.[1] The following year saw the rise of Publius Clodius, the scoundrel of the Bona Dea affair, who later exiled Cicero. Clodius proved to be an independent ally of the coalition passing bills of his

own which endeared him to the people. He used his violent gangs (operae) to secure their passage.[2]

In 57, Cicero returned from exile and Pompey faced increased unpopularity. After receiving exceptional imperium to secure the grain supply of Rome, Pompey was accused by the optimates and Clodius of trying to acquire dictatorial power.[3] Pompey defended himself, in part by supporting T. Annius Milo's own gang of thugs and gladiators.

But the political battle lines had been drawn with Pompey (and Caesar's interests) facing Clodius and the optimates. In order to attack the positions of Caesar and Pompey (Crassus successfully avoided the bad press), and in order to utilize the growing popular resentment to their advantage, the oligarchs used a variety of tactics: Bibulus used obnuntiato, Clodius used demagoguery and violence, and others used vetos, decrees, or stall tactics to combat triumviral aims.[4] But another method of attacking a Roman statesman was through his clients or amici. And an efficient form of assault could be through the courts. The previous chapter illustrated how a successful trial could benefit the prosecutor. Likewise, a loss would harm the convicted and his associates. The courts were used to attack the integrity, position (political and financial), and dignitas of political advisaries.[5] If a patron's clients are accused, he is obliged to defend them. If he fails he is deemed impotent

as a protector and a failure at carrying out his duty as a patron. He suffers a loss in standing or dignitas. There are several examples of trials which were used to harm individuals politically prior to 56.

One such example is the case of Aulus Licinius Archias in 62. Archias was a Greek poet and friend of Lucius Licinius Lucullus (whose Asian command was the one taken over by Pompey). In order to take a shot at Lucullus, Pompey's friends prosecuted Archias under the lex Papia (the same law which Balbus would face). Cicero defended the Greek poet successfully and thus saved Lucullus' reputation.[6]

In 59, Pompey and Caesar struck against the optimates by prosecuting L. Valerius Flaccus on a charge of res repetundae. Seeing one of their own being attacked, the oligarchs along with Cicero rushed to his defense. The case was an important gauge of the conflict between the dynasts and the optimates. Flaccus was acquitted and the strength of the oligarchy was bolstered.[7]

In early 56, before Balbus' late summer trial, we have two more vivid examples which illustrate the use of criminal trials for political attacks. In February, Clodius brought charges against his enemy, Milo. Ironically, Clodius charged Milo with using violence (vis). Basically both men were blatantly guilty of conducting gang warfare in and around Rome. The

prosecution, however, was an attack more on Milo's supporters, namely Cicero and Pompey. The trial (or attempted trial) which took place in the Forum on February 7th is described by Cicero in a letter to his brother. It illustrates the rough-and-tumble atmosphere associated with such court gatherings and the effectiveness of Rome's roaming gangs. Cicero reports the fiasco:

> Milo appeared on 7 February. Pompey spoke -- or rather tried to speak, for no sooner was he on his feet than Clodius' gang raised a clamour, and all through the speech he was interrupted not merely by shouting but by insults and abuse. When he wound up (and I will say he showed courage; he was not put off, delivered all he had to say, sometimes even managed to get silence by his personal authority) -- well, when he wound up, Clodius rose. Wishing to repay the compliment, our side gave him such an uproarious reception that he lost command of thoughts, tongue, and countenance. That lasted till half past one, Pompey having finished just after midday- all manner of insults, ending up with some highly scabrous verse to the address of Clodius and Clodia. Pale with fury, he started a game of question and answer in middle of the shouting: "who's starving the people to death?" "Pompey," answered the gang. "Who wants to go to Alexandria?" Answer:"Pompey." "Whom do you want to go?" Answer: "Crassus" (who was present as a supporter of Milo, wishing him no good). About 2:15 the Clodians started spitting at us [!], as though on a signal. Sharp rise in temperature! They made a push to dislodge us, our side counter-charged. Flight of gang. Clodius was hurled from the rostra, at which point I too made off for fear of what might happen in the free-for-all.[8]

The trial degenerated into a battle between the Clodians and the Pompeians; Milo was actually ignored. At any rate, Milo's trial was postponed several times and eventually cancelled by a resolution of the Senate.[9] Pompey was repeatedly attacked after this match of the 7th and eventually accused Crassus of plotting to kill him and

called on his clients for protection.[10]

Failing to convict Milo and avoiding an open battle with pro-Pompey forces, Clodius again prosecuted a friend of Pompey's (and Cicero's), Publius Sestius, late in February. Sestius was charged with committing violence during the previous year, but Cicero's speech (pro Sestio) gained his acquittal. The case is interesting again for its purpose: disgrace Pompey and Cicero, and raise the dignitas and virtus of Clodius. But it is also noted for Cicero's attack on Vatinius, the former tribune who passed the laws regarding Caesar's provinces. Cicero condemned the acts and violence of 59, despite Pompey's and Crassus' presence in the court (both testified on behalf of Sestius).[11] No doubt Cicero felt little danger in attacking the weakened coalition and believed the dynasts were seriously divided and unpopular for their actions of 59-58.[12]

One other trial of note took place in April of 56 when Marcus Caelius Rufus was prosecuted by the Clodians. Cicero defended Caelius successfully and stung the infamous Clodia who formed the case against the defendant.[13] Again, Pompey's interests were at stake. Cato and Clodius were accusing Caelius of murder and intrigue in the Ptolemy affair. Caelius, argued the optimates, committed the atrocities on behalf of Pompey. Caelius was acquitted but Pompey was injured ever so slightly just by the accusation itself. The numerous

cases brought Pompey's dignitas, virtus, and popularity to a dangerously low level. Cicero's pro Sestio illustrates his confidence in the break between the dynasts. Later, on April 5, Cicero ventured to put Caesar's agrarian legislation on the agenda for senatorial debate.[14] Cicero's pro Sestio and the call for debate on the lex Campana threatened the triumvirs yet also revealed their weakened position. Another danger which bothered Caesar was the candidacy of Domitius Ahenobarbus for consul. He openly stated that he would remove Caesar from his Gallic command.[15] Crassus, seeking his own interests and, as always, somewhat of an enigma, saw his own fortunes fade with those of Caesar and Pompey. Thus, all three being endangered, the men were once again brought together.[16]

Sometime in mid-April, Crassus, Caesar, and Pompey met at Luca.[17] There they worked out plans which were much more precise than those of 59 and reaffirmed their alliance. Depending on whose biography one reads, each man had a distinct advantage over the other two.[18] The important point regarding Luca was the reforming and strengthening of the alliance. Caesar's interests in Gaul were secured by Pompey and Crassus who would run for the consulships of 55. They would make sure Caesar would keep his provinces till 49. In return, Pompey and Crassus would also receive five year proconsular commands.[19] Again, all these aims would be achieved through the massed

combination of the dynasts' clients, money, and Caesar's troops on leave. Such a combination was, at this time, even more formidable than in 59 because of Caesar's new wealth and clientelae from the Gallic Wars and from Pompey's corn commission. Gruen explains the nature of the pact of Luca:

> This time the collaboration was closer, the common aims more compatible. Crassus and Pompey determined upon a joint consulship. That also served the interests of Caesar, for it would postpone the ambitions of Domitius Ahenobarbus. A chief magistracy would lay the foundations as well for a new provincial command long desired by Pompey. He could resume his role as commander of armies. And the allure of military glory had not escaped M. Crassus. He would use his allies to secure a major commission in Syria. The combining of clientelae and influence was impressive. Two hundred senators are reported to have gathered at Luca with the triumvirs, most of them probably from the lower registers of the senatorial order. As in 59, so in 56 and 55, the syndicate achieved its immediate ends.[20]

Besides the major deals of the proconsular commands, two other decisions were reached at Luca. First, Clodius was persuaded to cease his attacks on Pompey. And second, Cicero was to cease his attacks on the Triumvirate. He was basically told to cooperate with the dynasts and halt his offensive against Caesar.[21] Cicero obeyed quickly. Evidence of this was seen in his defense of Caesar's Gallic command (de Provinciis Consularibus). In the speech Cicero proved his reluctant loyalty by praising Caesar's victories and defending his right to remain in Gaul to finish the task of subjugating the territory.[22] Shortly after this speech Cicero was called on to defend

L. Cornelius Balbus.

For the past three years, Balbus was probably either in Gaul, serving on Caesar's staff as *praefectus fabrum* or, more likely, in Rome promoting Caesar's aims in the city.[23] There is no evidence either way but one can infer from our sources that Balbus was more likely to have been in Rome. By 56, Balbus had gained the enmity of many Romans. During this time he was still a friend of Pompey's who had given him not only precious citizenship but also a garden villa in the suburbs of Rome and a home in Tusculum.[24] By serving Caesar's interests he received some of the booty from the successful Gallic campaigns to add to his millions garnished from his patronage of Gades.[25] Balbus would not have received so many gifts in Rome if he were not there to acquire them. Likewise, the Roman nobility would not have become so jealous of his rising power and wealth unless they were aware of his presence and material wealth in Rome.

That Balbus incurred the jealousy of the Roman nobility is no mystery. An ally of the unpopular triumvirs, an *inquilinus* who lived and banked like the wealthiest of senators, and one still on the rise to power while others were being constrained by the dynasts, Balbus was bound to have had many enemies. Again, we hear Gruen explain Balbus' price for success:

> In the autumn of 56, the canny Spanish financier L. Cornelius Balbus underwent prosecution. He seemed an inviting target. Balbus was a noted manipulator --

> in matters financial and political. The inordinate wealth accumulated by a foreigner aroused envy and resentment. Slanderous gossip and backbiting circulated against him. It became a favored topic of conversation at aristocratic dinner parties. But when Balbus was brought to court none doubted the real objects of attack. Balbus was close to both Pompey and Caesar.[26]

Due to his connections and his success Balbus was targeted by opponents of the dynasts for prosecution. The exact date of the trial is unknown but it was after the Provinciis Consularibus speech and was the first open evidence of the reunited strength and solidarity of the Triumvirate.[27] The fact that both Pompey and Crassus spoke on behalf of Balbus illustrates the importance of the trial from a political standpoint. A successful prosecution of Pompey's amicus and Caesar's skilled agent would prove damaging to the dignitas of both. For the oligarchs this trial was merely another political propaganda shot at the dynasts which if successful would remove an ostentatious foreigner. And although the aims were political, the excuse and target of the prosecution was Balbus' citizenship.

The plaintiff was, ironically, another Gaditane who also had acquired Roman citizenship. We do not know his name but he certainly would have profited privately with a court victory.[28] The law used against Balbus was the lex Papia. The law was created by the tribune Gaius Papius in 65 to evict all non-citizens of Rome. It was "a kind of 'Alien Act'" used to remove individuals who falsely used

citizen rights to vote in elections or on legislation. The law was used against A. Licinius Archias in 62 whom Cicero defended successfully.[30] Like Archias in 62, "the case against Balbus charged illegal arrogation of the citizenship."[31]

The prosecution assaulted the citizenship of Balbus with three lines of argument, two of which are based on the invalidity of the lex Gellia Cornelia, the law which was supposed to confirm his citizenship back in 72. R. Gardner summarizes the legal arguments in his dated but valuable translation of the Pro Balbo:

> The prosecutor had attacked the enfranchisement of Balbus on three counts. First, he had contended that Pompey's enfranchisement of Balbus was illegal, on the plea that the lex Gellia Cornelia had not been adopted by Gades. . . . [Second,] the prosecutor had maintained that, as many foedera forbade any citizen of the civitas foederata concerned to become a citizen of Rome, such a restriction must apply to the treaty with Gades, though not expressly mentioned in it. . . . Lastly, the prosecutor submitted that the lex Gellia Cornelia contained a saving clause which denied its validity against any enactment by nature sacrosanctum, such as the treaty of Gades.[32]

Cicero's defense began with a praise of the previous speeches of Pompey and Crassus, and then declared that Balbus was basically being attacked out of envy and because of his association with Pompey.[33] He then dealt with each point of the prosecutor's argument. First, to counter the charge that Gades did not adopt the lex Gellia Cornelia, Cicero contended that a civitates foederata can only accept or reject Roman laws if they interfere with that state's internal laws.[34] And, in an aside meant to

appeal to Roman patriots, he stated how absurd it would be if Gades were allowed to reject rewards of Roman citizenship to her people; rewards which were available even to enemies and slaves. It would be an affront to Rome if Gades prevented an individual from accepting Roman citizenship, and Roman law itself values the right of the individual to choose his civitas: "For, by our law, a man cannot change his citizenship against his will, and, if he should wish to change it, he cannot be prevented from doing so, provided he be adopted by that state of which he should desire to become a citizen."[35]

The second point argued that since several foedera did not allow dual citizenship or forbade their citizens to become Romans, it should be assumed that Gades' treaty also held a similar stipulation. Cicero stated that such a clause did not exist in the treaty of Gades, and even if one did exist, it would have been invalidated by the lex Gellia Cornelia.[36]

The third charge, which claimed that the law was void if it went against the sacrosanctum status of the treaty of Gades, was blocked by stating that the treaty was not sacred because it had not been ratified by the Assembly and even if it had been there was no clause in it outlawing the conferral of Roman citizenship to the people of Gades.[37]

Cicero concludes his arguments by reporting on Balbus' loyal followers from Gades who came in support of

him as clients of a Roman patron:

> And the facts of the case show, gentlemen, that my statements are not my own invention, but that I am expressing the view held by the people of Gades. I assert that many years before this the people of Gades publicly appointed Lucius Cornelius as their guest friend at Rome [hospes publicus or patronus]. . . . I summon their envoys; you see men of the highest rank and distinction sent to give evidence of character at this trial and by their prayers to guard my client against the danger now facing him; in fact, when news of this had long ago been heard of at Gades, the people of Gades in their Senate most violently abused the prosecutor, their own fellow-citizen, with a view to safeguarding my client against any risk of danger from him.
>
> Could the people of Gades have given a more formal "consent," since you are highly delighted with this word, if "consent" is given by approval through their vote of our resolutions and orders, than by appointing Balbus as their guest-friend, thereby admitting that he had exchanged citizenship and pronouncing him most worthy of the honour of our citizenship? Could they express their feelings more decisively than by stigmatizing also my client's prosecutor by a fine and a penalty? Could they give a more decided judgment on the matter than by sending a deputation of their most eminent citizens to your Court to bear witness to my client's right, to express their admiration of his character, to guard him from danger by their intercessions?[38]

Cicero also backs up the right and legitimacy of enfranchisements of foreigners by military commanders in the past. In effect, Cicero illustrates the precedents which justify Pompey's reward to Balbus. First, there was Gaius Marius the popularis from Cicero's home town who enfranchised two Umbrian cohorts and a single warrior, Marcus Annius Appius, in recognition of their courage.[39] Gnaeus Pompeius Strabo, Pompey's father, bestowed citizenship on a Publius Caesius who was a member of the civitas foederata of Ravenna.[40] Publius Crassus, consul

of 97, awarded citizenship to Alexas of Heraclea,[41] Lucius Sulla awarded Aristo of Massilia and nine slaves of Gades, while Q. Metellus Pius gave citizenship to Quintus Fabius of Saguntum.[42] And finally, Marcus Crassus enfranchised a fellow from Avennio, another civitas foederata.[43] And so Cicero concludes:

> Do you, in this Court, endeavour to invalidate a favour, or rather a decision and a deed of Gnaeus Pompeius, who did what he had heard Gaius Marius had done, what he heard Pulbius Crassus, Lucius Sulla, Quintus Metellus, Marcus Crassus had done, and, lastly, that for which he had authority in his own house in what he had seen his father do? Nor did he bestow citizenship in the instance of Cornelius alone. For he bestowed it also upon Hasdrubal of Gades after that war in Africa, upon the Ovii descendents of the Mamertines, and upon certain Fabii of Utica and of Saguntum. In fact, if those who defend our State at the cost of their own toil and danger are worthy of other rewards, then assuredly are they most worthy to be presented with that citizenship, to defend which they have braved dangers and the weapons of war.[44]

And with this high powered list of precedents Cicero concluded his legal defense and switched to the political aspects of the trial or the "real" reason why Balbus was being attacked.

On the surface, the trial illuminates the value of Roman citizenship. Civitas was worth fighting for in court, and was one of the chief prizes that the Roman state could give to outsiders. It was an honor to be accepted by the individual, not by the foedus or native city for him, and the franchise was so revered and honored that no one "has ever been prosecuted for his assumption of citizenship, either because his own people had not

'given its consent,' or because . . . it was clear that citizenship had been conferred upon him by one of our commanders."[45]

The value of citizenship is also indicated by how rare it was for foreigners to be awarded it at all, let alone for military bravery. In the early Republic, grants to foreign individuals were exceptionally rare, and if the franchise was granted it was a lesser form of citizenship (civitas sine suffrago).[46] We do not know when the first grant of full citizenship to an alien occurred, and Cicero fails to mention any instances before Marius' day.[47] Nonetheless, such enfranchisements were made and their rarity illustrated the coveted status of civitas.[48] Awards of singular citizenship were made by votes of the Assembly or Senate, or officers of Latin status towns were eligible for citizenship after their term of office as duovir (or one of the lower town magistrates). Citizenship could also be conferred by a successful prosecution (through the lex Acilia) or through manumission.[49] Despite such a variety of methods, the number who received civitas was small and even Marius felt uneasy about awarding citizenship to his cohorts from Camerinum without approval from the people.[50] The only two Republican laws known bestowing mass enfranchisement are the lex Julia in 89, which conferred it on Strabo's Spanish auxiliaries, and the lex Gellia Cornelia of 72, which rewarded Balbus.[51] Cicero tells of other individual

awards but also fails to mention some of which we know. In the end, Balbus was a rara avis with a special gift. Only after Caesar's reforms and during Augustus' day would citizenship be bestowed on foreigners on such a scale that it became devalued.

Another important concept brought up in the trial is the notion of dual citizenship. Balbus, upon accepting Roman citizenship, surrendered any claim of civitas to Gades. Roman law forbade a Roman to be a citizen of any other state, even though the Greek states permitted dual citizenship. Roman law did not allow dual citizenship, but if one did lose or surrendered his Roman status, he could reclaim it upon returning to Rome through postliminium. "The underlying thought is that a man can only be a political member of the community in which he resides, and that when he leaves it he ceases to belong."[53] Cicero diligently describes the Roman notion of dual citizenship and how it is incompatible in sections 27 through 31 of the Pro Balbo. Indeed, one of the reasons why the Romans were loathe to award citizenship to foreigners was because they resided outside of the city (civitas: the word itself means both city and citizenship). What was the point of giving civic rights to an alien who, living far from Rome, was unable to appreciate or utilize them?[54]

Tied to the idea of dual citizenship was the belief that men were free to choose their civitas. Cicero

explains man's free will to accept or reject citizenship and A. N. Sherwin-White declares this to be the message of the Pro Balbo:

> The doctrine of the Pro Balbo is that a man is free to change his civitas as he wishes. This law (the lex Gellia Cornelia) merely offered something to the socii as a gift from the outside. Balbus by accepting it ceased to be a Gaditanus.[55]

Without question Balbus chose to be a Roman citizen with all the privileges and prestige it brought. By accepting it he became one of a select number of foreigners to receive Roman civitas while it was still a treasured possession. By accepting it he gave up his rights to Gades and became their advocate in Rome. And although a fellow Gaditanus attempted to steal it from him, Cicero's defense easily prevailed and Balbus was acquitted, but not before Cicero expounded the real reasons for the trial: the political and vindictive purposes.

The case is of such political importance that many scholars ignore the citizenship topics. For them the case, in terms of legal argument and defense, was easy, a trite affair for the skill of Cicero. The real reason and importance of the trial was its value as an assault on Pompey and Caesar. "The prosecution in 56 was manifestly directed against the triumvirs. . . . One need not dwell on the elaborate legal argumentation. The political factor was the determinant."[56] Balbus' citizenship had remained unopposed (and accepted) for over a decade; it was only because of his association with Pompey, and then

the victorious Caesar, that Balbus was attacked. Cicero declared, "It is not, then, by his own enemies that he is attacked, for he [Balbus] has none, but by the enemies of his friends [Pompey and Caesar]."[57]

With the acquittal Pompey was spared a loss of prestige, Caesar kept an able agent, Cicero scored another court victory, and Balbus remained a Roman citizen and thus was allowed to further his career. And let us not forget the importance of this trial for Balbus himself. Balbus' career was at stake. He did not care about the details of Roman vs Gaditane citizenship or dual civitas, or the right to choose one's citizenship, or even of political jealousy. He was concerned about staying on in Rome as the agent of Caesar and a friend of Pompey and Cicero. If the trial had been lost, Balbus would have been expelled from Rome under the lex Papia and his career would have been cut short. He would have been relegated to serving as a foreign client for the dynasts' interests outside of Roman jurisdiction. He would never have become one of the most powerful men in the empire under Caesar. The importance of the legal arguments or the political agenda should not cloud the personal importance of the trial for Balbus himself.

The trial marks an important period in Balbus' life for other reasons. From the internal evidence in Cicero's speech one can determine Balbus' relationship with his two primary patrons. First evident are his patron-client

connections with Pompey. Pompey awarded him citizenship, defended him in the case, and was the real target of the prosecution. Pompey was concerned about protecting Balbus' citizenship and the ties between the two men were strong. But Balbus' stronger ties with Caesar are also seen. By 56 he was Caesar's "most intimate friend."[58] He had won Caesar's respect and friendship in Spain and now was receiving gold from the Gallic campaigns. He was Caesar's praefectus fabrum, but, more importantly, his agent and confidant. From the speech and from Cicero's letter of 60, one can tell that Balbus was a friend of both men, but he was clearly more attached to Caesar. "Allied to both Pompeius and to Caesar, Balbus gradually edged towards the more powerful attraction."[59]

Powerful attraction was not the only thing going for Caesar during this period. Caesar was not able to testify on Balbus' behalf because he was busy in Gaul. This is not the place to recount his exploits in Gaul other than to note that he was extremely successful and that he was forging a loyal veteran army devoted solely to him. Balbus, who was made praefectus fabrum for Caesar's proconsular assignment, may have seen some action in Gaul, but it is more likely that Balbus stayed in Rome securing Caesar's interests up to the trial of 56.[60] After the trial, in which the dynasts displayed their new unity and strength, Balbus strengthened his ties with Caesar. He also maintained amiable relations with Cicero, and from

this period on we are fortunate to have a number of letters from Cicero which illuminate Balbus' life.

Although the renewed triumvirate was powerful enough to acquit Balbus and secure the consular elections for 55, the dynasts were not all powerful. They needed to use force, bribery, and violence to gain their goals, and through the tribune Gaius Trebonius, Pompey and Crassus received their proconsular commands and Caesar was allowed a free hand in Gaul until 49. Balbus was stationed in Rome to serve Caesar's interests although we hear little about him until 54. Balbus then appears to be on one of his rare visits to Gaul. From the end of 55 to 53, Balbus seems to have been a very busy man "shuttling back and forth between Rome and Gaul to serve his chief's political interests."[61] His necessary activities illustrate the points made by many scholars that the triumvirs were not all powerful and that the oligarchs held considerable strength, enough to keep the dynasts on the move.[62] Balbus' duties as Caesar's agent were to maintain positive relations with contacts in Rome. While Caesar was killing Gauls, Balbus was sharpening his skills in diplomacy and bureaucracy. He was becoming one of Caesar's chief advisors and thus one of the most powerful men in Rome. The German scholar, Matthias Gelzer, gives us an idea of Balbus' importance:

> [Caesar] had detailed reports sent to him about all political business great and small, and based his decisions on them. Gaius Oppius, who from 54 appears

> next to the experienced Cornelius Balbus as his most important agent, directed this news service. Balbus himself, who had hitherto been the general's personal adjutant (praefectus fabrum), transferred completely to the diplomatic service at the end of 55 . . .
>
> Balbus remained for some time at headquarters. After he had spent the beginning of the year [54] in Rome, we find him in northern Italy in the spring of 54, and also with Caesar during his expedition to Britain. But immediately on its return he was sent back to Rome and was to stay there until May 15, 53. In fact, in a letter dated April 8, Cicero refers to his continued presence there. His chief task must have been to keep intact the connection with Pompey. For the same purpose Pompey sent his adjutant Lucius Vibullius Rufus to Gaul as occasion offered. There was also plenty of other diplomatic business which could not be settled in writing. In general, all correspondence and personal contact with Caesar went through Balbus. When Cicero wishes to recommend a young friend to the general, he does so after consultation with Balbus; when he writes to Caesar he encloses a letter for Balbus; and when he does not dare to bother Caesar, he puts his request before Balbus. The friendly reception which met Quintus Cicero on his arrival at Caesar's camp in the summer of 54 is ascribed largely to the influence of Balbus.[63]

Thanks to Cicero's correspondence it is evident how Balbus operated and how well the two got along during the years of the Gallic Wars. Cicero's brother, Quintus, served as one of Caesar's officers and apparently with the help of Balbus was doing well during the campaigns. Cicero was pleased with Quintus' fortune and Balbus' help in September of 54: "I am tremendously pleased that you say you are rising in Caesar's good graces every day. Balbus, who you say is your helper in this, is the apple of my eye."[64]

Cicero also uses Balbus' influence to assist in a recommendation for the young aspiring lawyer and protege

of Cicero's, C. Trebatius Testa. The orator wrote in May of 54, "Every letter I write to Caesar or to Balbus carries as a kind of statutory bonus a recommendation of yourself, and not the standard sort but phrased with some special indication of my regard for you."[65]

In June, Cicero wrote again to Trebatius about Balbus' assistance, and a bit about the barreness of Britain:

> I am continually putting in a word for you, but with what effect I am anxious to hear from yourself. My greatest hope is in Balbus, to whom I write about you very earnestly and often. . . . I hear there is not an ounce of either gold or silver in Britain. If that is true, my advice is to lay hold of a chariot and hurry back to us at full speed! But if we can gain our end even without Britain, contrive to make yourself one of Caesar's intimates. My brother will give you valuable assistance, and so will Balbus; but your greatest asset, believe me, is your own honourable character and hard work.[66]

The letter is casual and encouraging, but the friendly letters of recommendation fail to portray the turbulent years of 55 and 54. The elections for 55 were won, as was noted, by Pompey and Crassus, but were also delayed several months and surrounded by violence. Riots occurred for the election of the aediles and Pompey's bloody clothes gave Julia a shock.[67] The next year was just as bad in terms of violence, but worse in regard to the interests of the dynasts. First, the optimates scored a victory with the election of Domitius Ahenobarbus as consul. Second, Julia died in childbirth in August and thus was broken the strong familial bond between Caesar

and Pompey.[68] Cato and the optimates continued to assault the dynasts as tyrants and the violence continued into 53 especially after the Milonian and Clodian gangs returned to the streets.[69]

To prove the fluid nature of Late Republican politics, Milo, for the elections of 53, was supported by the boni, Cicero, and the people, while Pompey and Clodius actually teamed up against him. Again, elections were postponed and gang warfare raged through the streets. Compounding the political situation came the news of Crassus' defeat and death at the hands of the Parthians.[70] The year ended without consuls or praetors being elected.

On January 18, 52, the ultimate clash took place between Milo and Clodius; Clodius was slain and the resulting chaos caused the Senate to issue their "Ultimate Decree" (senatus consultum ultimum).[71] Through the decree, Pompey was ordered to halt the rioting and violence, and was furthered empowered by being named sole consul in April of 52.[72]

As sole consul Pompey initiated many reforms, brought Milo to trial (and had him convicted), brought peace to Rome, and became reassociated with the optimate oligarchy. He first moved toward reconciliation with the boni by marrying Cornelia, the daughter of Metellus Scipio, instead of Caesar's grandniece, Octavia.[73] Pompey slowly moved back into the oligarch camp and, of course, scholars have debated the motives and causes of the break

between Caesar and Pompey, and Pompey's switch. Plutarch believed Caesar and Pompey had always plotted the other's ruin: "Caesar had long ago decided to put down Pompey, just as, of course, Pompey also had decided to put Caesar down."[74] Others argue that Pompey's jealousy was to blame, and some say Caesar was destined to rule the empire alone.[75] Regardless, relations between Pompey and Caesar deteriorated through 52 and 51. Caesar was threatened by senators who wanted to change the date of his proconsular retirement. They basically wanted him to give up his provinces before running for the consulship. The break in between would be used to prosecute Caesar and through conviction end his political career.[76] Pompey increasingly agreed with the boni but Caesar refused to submit to Pompey and the optimates. Caesar wanted to go straight from his provinces to the consulship. His popular support and victories in Gaul had earned him the right to enter the consulship immediately. "In his opinion it was only the clique of his stubborn enemies that refused to recognize his legitimate right. That they controlled the Senate was unconstitutional oligarchy (factio paucorum)."[77]

As the months went by the situation worsened. Pro-Caesarian tribunes were unable to cope with the Pompey-boni alliance. Balbus' efforts are mostly unknown since our primary source, Cicero, was either governing Cilicia or writing literary masterpieces from 52 to the summer of

50.[78] "From September 29, 51, the position was quite clear to Caesar: if he was not ready to submit, he would have to prepare for the unequal struggle with Pompey and the oligarchy allied with him."[79]

With this grim reality facing him, Caesar (and Balbus as his advocate) worked hard to build up his position, avoid a violent confrontation, and formulate a compromise. Caesar doubled the pay of his troops, planned massive building projects for Rome, arranged contracts for the games and feasts in honor of his arrival, dispensed bribes (fueled by the wealth from Gaul) to hundred of citizens, and Balbus applied pressure on the Senate to secure Cicero's supplicatio for his Cilician victories.[80] All the while the boni continued to debate the termination date of Caesar's imperium. Caesar kept seeking a compromise (cynics contend he was merely buying time to build up his army) and offered, late in 50, to give up his army if Pompey laid down his simultaneously.[81] Although the people and moderates applauded this move, the anti-Caesarian leaders defeated the proposal. Instead, the consul Gaius Marcellus went to visit Pompey and said, "I bid thee, Pompey, to defend thy country, to employ the forces now in readiness, and to levy others."[82] Pompey obeyed and headed for Capua around December 10, 50 to mobilize the troops then in training. Pompey met Cicero on the way and told him that war was unavoidable, but actually Caesar was still seeking negotiations.[83] Balbus

on December 7th, tried to arrange a meeting with Metellus Scipio to discuss the situation, but the meeting never took place.[84] Curio also protested Marcellus' move but he left Rome on the 10th when his tribuneship expired. Caesar's new tribunes (Mark Antony and Q. Cassius Longinus) took over and continued to prevent conflict but they had to leave town after Scipio and the Senate affirmed Marcellus' action by insisting that Caesar surrender his army. The Senate then invoked the senatus consultum ultimum[85] on January 7, 49. A few days later, Caesar crossed the Rubicon and the civil war was underway.

During the civil war, Balbus never took part in the military operations. His job was behind the field of battle, at the "home front." He secured allies, handled diplomacy, and was a sort of minister of propaganda. We are, again, fortunate to have a number of extant letters from Cicero which illuminate Balbus' activity and responsiblities. More importantly we actually have three letters which Balbus wrote during the dramatic days of Caesar's invasion of Italy. These letters are all the more valuable when one considers how rare written documents are from the first century B.C.

Since our evidence on Balbus's activities comes primarily from Cicero, the activities mentioned in the letters deal mainly with relations concerning the two men. But without a doubt, similiar correspondence existed between other senators of lesser and greater importance

and Balbus. The letters show us Balbus' connections with Caesar, his importance, the way he operated, and Cicero's importance since Balbus continually tried to win him over to Caesar's side. Indeed, the primary object of Balbus' dealings with Cicero was to convert him to Caesar's camp. The second major theme of the correspondence was to induce Cicero to act as a middle man in negotiations between the warring parties. Balbus was definitely concerned personally with such negotiations. He was a friend of Pompey's and owed his citizenship to him and to his consular ally, Lentulus Crus who was Balbus' namesake and companion from the old Sertorian War days.[86] In regard to Lentulus, Balbus' intentions were proved when he sent his nephew twice to attempt negotiations with Lentulus.

Balbus made even more efforts to convince Cicero of Caesar's intentions. The first attempts to win Cicero over to Caesar's cause actually occurred just before war erupted. Cicero mentioned in a letter to Atticus of 9 December 50 that Caesar and Balbus were sending him "smooth letters" (litteras blandas) but that he (Cicero) was not about to stray from "the path of strict honour."[87] On the 13th, he writes about his meeting with Pompey in which the general talked about the certainty of war and about Balbus' aborted meeting with Scipio.[88]

Around December 19th, Cicero revealed his feelings regarding Caesar and Balbus, and presumably the reasons

why he resisted their invitations. From the tone of the letter Cicero's disgust and disappointment is apparent, not only with the two men, but also with the way the Senate had handled Caesar.[89] Atticus had read the following:

> You may ask whether I approve of allowing a commander who retains his army after the expiry of the term legally assigned to stand for office. I disapproved even of allowing his candidature in absentia; but the one concession implied the other. Do we approve of the ten years' command and the way it was conferred? Then we also approve of my expulsion and the loss of the Campanian land and the adoption of a patrician by a plebeian and of a man from Gades by a man from Mytilene; and we approve of the fortunes of Labienus and Mamurra and of Balbus' estates in the suburbs and at Tusculum. But the root of all these things is one and the same. We should have stood up to him when he was weak, and that would have been easy. Now we have to deal with eleven legions, all the cavalry he may want, the Gauls beyond the Po, the city populace, all these Tribunes, our demoralized youth, and a leader strong in prestige and hardihood.[90]

The complaint regarding Balbus' adoption and estates is ironic and interesting since Cicero is openly disregarding the remarks he made for these two points in the Pro Balbo. Either Cicero was a hypocrite or a court prevaricator. But Caesar and Balbus were unaware of Cicero's opinion, and continued to write to him.

On February 25th, after Caesar had seized the Picenum region, Cicero wrote to Atticus about Caesar's clemency and about "Balbus minor," Balbus' nephew.[91] This is the first mention of Balbus' nephew and details regarding his life are scarce indeed.[92] On February 24th, however, Balbus' nephew had visited Cicero

explaining about his mission to Lentulus and about Caesar's desire for dialogue with Pompey. Cicero did not believe Caesar (or Balbus, for that matter, both the younger and the elder).

But on February 21st, Caesar had given proof of his clemency during and after the siege of Corfinium. After accepting the surrender of pro-Pompey forces, Caesar gave all the soldiers and officers their freedom. He even pardoned their commander, the "deadly enemy," Domitius Ahenobarbus.[93] Cicero heard about Caesar's clemency by March 1st, and two days later received an important letter from Balbus. Cicero may have offered to lead negotiations between the two men, or Balbus may have merely been begging Cicero to intervene. In either case, Balbus' letter was openly asking Cicero, first, to realize the good intentions of Caesar, and second, to act as a negotiator between him and Pompey. The letter is obsequious, and Cicero complains that Balbus is mocking him. As one of only three surviving documents written by Balbus himself, the letter is worth quoting in full for its valuable contents.

Rome, c. 1 March 49
BALBUS TO CICERO IMPERATOR

> I beg you, dear Cicero, put your thoughts and concern upon a design eminently worthy of your character, I mean the restitution of the old happy relations between Caesar and Pompey, now that intriguers have set them at variance. Believe me when I say that Caesar will not only put himself in your hands but will consider himself under the deepest obligation to you if you will bend your mind that way. I only wish that Pompey may do the like; but I pray

> than hope that he may be brought to any sort of accomodation at such a time. But when he settles down and regains a sense of security, then I shall begin not to despair of your influence counting heavily with him.
>
> Caesar is grateful to you for desiring my friend Consul Lentulus to stay here, and I am indeed more than grateful. I have so high a regard for him that Caesar himself is no dearer to me. If he had let me talk to him as I used to do and had not repeatedly and absolutely declined conversation with me, I should be less unhappy than I am. For you must not think that anyone at the present time suffers more keenly than I do when I see a man who is dearer to me than myself become in his Consulship the sorry travesty of a Consul. But if he will listen to you and believe me about Caesar and serve out the rest of his term in Rome, I shall begin to hope that by the Senate's advice, with you to inspire and him to propose, Pompey and Caesar may yet come to be reconciled. If and when that happens I shall feel I have lived long enough.
>
> I know that Caesar's action over Corfinium will have your entire approval; and in such circumstances a bloodless finish to the business was the best possible outcome.
>
> I was very pleased to hear that you were pleased to see my (and your) dear boy. Whatever he told you about Caesar and whatever Caesar wrote to you, Caesar will, I am sure, prove to you by his actions, however fortune may go with him, that he wrote it in all sincerity.[94]

The letter relays information on Balbus' life at this period in time. First, it indicates his loyalty. He is, in the final analysis, a loyal follower of Caesar who strives to make his friends understand the invader's plans. Second, the epistle tells us that the war has broken Balbus' friendship with Pompey and Lentulus. The break has apparently been painful; especially the severing of ties with Lentulus (who refuses to speak to him). Note the stress on Lentulus' friendship. This could mean two things; first, Balbus valued Lentulus' friendship higher than Pompey's, or second, the friendship is

irrelevant and Balbus stressed Lentulus only because he was trying to win him over to Caesar's side to form the core of the general's legitimizing Senate.

The letter also indicates how strongly Balbus desired Cicero to initiate negotiations and to join the Caesarian faction by sponsoring the dialogue in the Senate. Balbus was attempting to bring Cicero (like Lentulus) into Rome to create an official government which would recognize Caesar's actions.[95]

The final point of interest in the letter is the mention of Corfinium and of Balbus minor's visit. Corfinium was used to illustrate Caesar's sincerity and good faith, while the mention of Balbus minor's visit confirms Cicero's earlier account and shows how the young boy was being used as a messenger.

But Cicero's statement that Balbus was "mocking" him was the first definite sign of estrangement between the two men. From this point on, Cicero was disgusted with Balbus' role and increasingly distrusted him. Indeed, a week later on March 10th, Cicero openly declared his opinion, despite Balbus' promises that "Caesar's whole purpose is and has been from the first to destroy" Pompey. In fact, the only reason Cicero did not come to such a conclusion earlier was "because of Balbus' letters and talk."[96]

The following day, Cicero informed Atticus that "Balbus wrote from Rome that he thought Consul Lentulus

had already crossed [the Adriatic], without having had an interview with Balbus junior."[97] Lentulus either refused to see Balbus minor or just left without knowing about his arrival. In either case, Balbus was apparently disappointed enough to point out the failed attempt to Cicero, and contiued to impart to Cicero his desire for dialogue. The failed meeting also dashed Caesar's hope of winning the consul over to legitimize "his" Senate.

Caesar continued on his conquest of Italy and managed to catch Pompey at Brundisium. Caesar arrived at Brundisium an March 9th with six legions. A few days later Cicero wrote to Atticus again about correspondence with Balbus. In this communique of March 13th, Cicero appears as an indecisive neutral who sees both Caesar and Pompey as threats; he is frightened, always unsure and pesters Atticus for advice. He wrote to Balbus about his proposed neutrality and Balbus replied favorably and emphasized again Caesar's clemency, understanding, and perfectly peaceful intentions to restore the Republic. Cicero was reassured that Caesar did not expect him to fight against Pompey but only hoped that Cicero would act as negotiator.

The letter of the thirteenth is long, as it contains copies of three other letters, one from Balbus and Oppius jointly, Balbus' follow-up letter, and a despatch of Caesar's to Balbus dated back to March 5 after the "clemency of Corfinium." The three copies follow below

with the diplomatic courtesies edited out:

Rome, 10 or 11 March 49
BALBUS AND OPPIUS TO M. CICERO

We shall rely on your charitable heart and give you advice which seems to us the soundest on the matter about which you have written to us. It may or may not be wise, but at any rate it is offered in all sincerity and good will.

If we had learned from Caesar hinmself that he would do what in our judgement we think he ought to do, namely start negotiations for a reconciliation between himself and Pompey as soon as he gets to Rome, we should not cease to urge to consent to take part in them, so that through you, who have ties with both, the whole matter might be settled with greater facility and dignity. Alternatively, if we thought on the contrary that Caesar would not do this and even knew that he wanted war with Pompey, we should never persuade you to bear arms against your benefactor, just as we have always besought you not to fight against Caesar. Since however Caesar's intentions are still a matter of conjecture rather than knowledge, all we can say is that it does not seem to us to suit your dignity and good faith, which all recognize, that you should bear arms against either, since you are a close friend of both; and we do not doubt that Caesar, with his sense of what is due to others, will thoroughly approve this view. However, if you think fit, we will write to Caesar asking him to let us know what he intends to do in this matter. When he replies, we shall immediately write to tell you our sentiments and we shall satisfy you that the course we recommend is what seems to us most serviceable to your dignity and not to Caesar's policy; and we think that Caesar, with the indulgence he always shows his friends, will approve.

Rome, 10 or 11 March 49
BALBUS TO CICERO IMPERATOR

Greetings. After dispatching Oppius' and my joint letter I received a letter from Caesar of which I send you a copy. From it you will see how anxious he is to restore good relations with Pompey, and how far removed from any sort of cruelty. I am of course very pleased that these are his views. As regards yourself and your sentiments of loyalty and gratitude, I feel exactly as you do, my dear Cicero, that your reputation and duty do not allow of your bearing of arms against one from whom you give out that you have received so great a service. That Caesar, the most considerate of men, will take the same view I am well assured, and I know for certain that he will be more

than satisfied if you take no part in war against him and refrain from joining his adversaries. And not only will this satisfy him in the case of so distinguished a personage as yourself, but to me also he signified entirely of his own good will that I need not serve in any army which would be used against Lentulus or Pompey, to whom I am under the greatest obligations, and he told me that he would be content if I rendered him as a civilian in Rome the same good offices as I might, if I chose, render them. Accordingly I am now looking after all Lentulus' affairs in Rome and taking them upon myself, rendering therein my duty, loyalty, and gratitude. But really I begin once more to think that the hope of a composition, which I had given up, is not altogether forlorn, seeing that Caesar's sentiments are such as we must wish.

Therefore I am in favour, if you agree, of your writing to him and requesting him to provide you with a bodyguard, as you requested Pompey to do, very rightly as I thought, in the Milo period. I will guarantee, if I know Caesar, that he will think more of your position than of his own interests.

How wisely I have written I do not know, but this at least I do know, that whatever I write to you is written out of particular affection and good will, for, as I hope to die before Caesar, my regard for you is such that I hold few so dear. When you have come to any decision on this matter, perhaps you will write to me. I am in no little anxiety that you should be able to lend your good will to both parties as you wish to do and as indeed I do not doubt that you will do. Best wishes.

On the march, c. 5 March 49

CAESAR TO OPPIUS AND CORNELIUS

I am indeed glad that you express in your letter such hearty approval of the proceedings at Corfinium. I shall willingly follow your advice, all the more willingly because I had of my own accord decided to show all possible clemency and to do my best to reconcile Pompey. Let us try whether by this means we can win back the good will of all and enjoy a lasting victory, seeing that others have not managed by cruelty to escape hatred or to make their victories endure, except only L. Sulla, whom I do not propose to imitate. Let this be the new style of conquest, to make mercy and generosity our shield. As to how that is to be done, certain possibilities occur to me and many more can be found. I request you to apply your thoughts to these matters.

I captured N. Magius, Pompey's Prefect. Naturally I followed my set practice and immediately discharged

> him. Two Prefects of Engineers of Pompey's have now fallen into my hands and been released by me. If they wish to show themselves grateful they should urge Pompey to prefer my friendship to that of those who have always been his and my bitter enemies, by whose machinations the country has been brought to its present pass.[98]

Each copy is important for various reasons. The first shows us the important position of Balbus (and Oppius) at this time. Cicero asked them if Caesar would approve of his indecisiveness and of his decision not to fight against Pompey. The letters illustrate the influence and connections with Caesar by reassuring Cicero that neutrality is acceptable, negotiation desirable, and that Caesar is an honorable fellow with the best of intentions.

Balbus' follow-up letter reinforces his reassurance to Cicero. First, it is specially written by Balbus only and it gives the latest news illustrating Balbus' openness with Cicero and extraordinary efforts to prove Caesar's good intentions. His letter says "Look, I've already sent you an official letter with Oppius, now I'm writing you personally and here's the latest proof of Caesar's clemency and promise to free the government from the evil clique." Balbus even attempts to soothe Cicero by relating to his position, he too had obligations to Pompey and Lentulus. He has refused to join the army against them and has taken it upon himself to look after Lentulus' house as a sign of continued loyalty. But at the same time, Balbus clearly informed his reader that he has

chosen Caesar's side as an agent rather than a general. And finally, Balbus tried to convince Cicero that, as Caesar's confidant, he knows Caesar better than most. He is "certain" of Caesar's opinion on all matters, and "will guarantee" Caesar's reaction to his advice regarding Cicero's requests and neutrality.

The third copied item (Caesar's letter to Balbus and Oppius) is interesting not only for its proof of Caesar's clemency and intention not to follow Sulla's bloody footsteps, but for its message regarding Balbus and Oppius. "I shall willingly follow your advice," wrote Caesar to his two minions in Rome. Although we must beware of reading too much into single phrase or a collection of letters, could we interpret this as a gauge of Balbus' power? Was Balbus, as an advisor who was listened to by the almighty Caesar, liable to influence his actions? Was Balbus instrumental in forming the famous clemency acts attributed solely to Caesar's genius? If they had not approved of his pardons at Corfinium, would their disapproval have cancelled Caesar's later acts of clemency? Who really wielded absolute power, Caesar or the omnipresent influential advisor who screens information, presents biased reports, and pulls confidential emotional and psychological strings?

With Balbus and Caesar evidence suggests that Balbus' influence was moderate, if not minimal. Caesar's letter should be read closely for clues on the

ruler-advisor relationship: "I shall willingly follow your advice, all the more willingly because I had of my own accord decided to show all possible clemency . . ." Caesar himself had made the decision to pursue a policy of forgiveness. He was a man who was egotistical and full of his own dignitas, he made his own decisions, and, in the end, was responsible for them. We have no evidence to support any contention that Balbus pulled Caesar's strings. We have no scandalous reports of Caesar being scared or duped by his advisors into committing atrocities like we do with accounts of the Late Roman Empire.[99] Balbus did not try to create or change policy; he served to provide information, execute policy, and to sincerely serve Caesar's interests as diplomat and all-purpose agent. To anger Caesar, to go against his wishes would have been foolish; he would have committed political suicide since Caesar was the source of Balbus' own power and influence, and the only trustworthy protection from his many jealous and envious enemies in Rome. Balbus was, in the end, the ideal cliens and Caesar was his ideal patronus.

While Caesar's client was writing to Cicero on the 10th or 11th of March, the siege of Brundisium was underway. Pompey managed to evade Caesar's siegeworks and blockade, and escaped across the sea on 17 March.[100] On March 24th (thus indicating the time delay inherent in dispatches of the ancient world) Cicero heard about the

siege from Balbus who was worried about the outcome. He was tortured (torqueri) with anguish over the encounter between the two men but nonetheless hoped for peace. Cicero doubted Balbus' sincerity and had lost all hope of peace. Cicero's letter to Atticus was as follows:

> Formiae, 24 March 49
> CICERO TO ATTICUS
>
> I should never have believed that I could bear this! Misery everywhere, but this is saddest of all: Pompey has sent N. Magius to treat for peace and is besieged just the same. I did not believe it, but I have a letter from Balbus of which I send you a copy. And pray read that final paragraph by the worthy Balbus himself, the man to whom Gnaeus gave a site for his suburban house, whom he often put before any of us. So the poor fellow is on tenterhooks! But not to make you read the same text twice over, I refer you to the letter itself. Hope of peace I have none. . .
>
> Rome, 22 March 49
> BALBUS TO CICERO IMPERATOR
>
> Caesar has sent us a very short letter of which I append a copy. You will be able to see by its brevity that he is very busy indeed, to write so briefly about a matter of such importance. If there is any further news I shall write to you at once.
>
> CAESAR TO OPPIUS AND CORNELIUS
>
> On 9 March I reached Brundisium and encamped before the walls. Pompey is in Brundisium. He sent N. Magius to me to treat of peace. I replied as I thought proper. This I wanted you to know at once. As soon as I see any hope of achieving anything in the way of a composition I shall at once inform you.
>
> You can imagine, my dear Cicero, how I am on tenterhooks for fear anything should obstruct a composition between them, now that I see a hope of peace once more. I do indeed what I can, not being on the spot -- pray. If I was with him I might perhaps flatter myself that I could be of some use. As it is
>
> 101
>
> I am tortured by suspense.

Cicero's belief that Balbus was acting and that peace was lost was seemingly confirmed by the following letter

written possibly on the same day:

Formiae, 24 or 25 March 49
CICERO TO ATTICUS

I sent on the 24th a copy of Balbus' letter to me and of Caesar's to him. Then on the same day what should come but a letter from Q. Pedius, from Capua, to say that Caesar had written to him on 14 March? Caesar wrote as follows: --

> Pompey shuts himself up in the town. We have our camp at the gates. We are attempting a formidable task and one which will take us many days because of the depth of the sea; but there is nothing better we can do. We are sinking moles from both ends of the harbour so as either to oblige him to take his force at Brundisium overseas as soon as may be or to stop his way out.

Where is the peace about which Balbus wrote he was on tenterhooks? Could anything be harsher or more ruthless? . . .[102]

Three days later Pompey left and Caesar was master of Italy. Balbus' and Caesar's attempts to win Cicero and Pompey over to their views had failed. But after Pompey's departure, Caesar turned his attention to Rome and renewed efforts to create a senate with the authority to legalize his actions. The shortage of senators in Rome was so acute, however, that rumors told about the possibility of Balbus joining the senate. Cicero was appalled at the idea.[103]

Cicero was again targeted to join Caesar but when Caesar's senate gathered in Rome on April 1st, Cicero was not present.[104] Cicero had given up on Balbus' rhetoric and pleas, and had given up any faith that Caesar would restore the res publica. Thus Cicero left Italy on June 7th to join Pompey's forces.[105]

After reiterating his cause for continuing the war, Caesar departed Rome to destroy Pompey's forces in Spain. Mark Antony was left in charge of military forces in Italy while Balbus and Oppius attended administrative and diplomatic affairs in Rome. We lose track of Balbus since our primary source, Cicero, left for Pompey's camp at Dyrrhachium. We can only assume that the two agents continued to work on the home front by encouraging neutral senators to side with Caesar. Balbus may also have been using his patronage with Gades to assure the city's loyalty and alliance with Caesar's forces in Spain. It is certain that Gades supported Caesar's cause to the extant that he rewarded the inhabitants with Roman citizenship.[106]

Without difficulty, Caesar quelled Spain and headed back to Rome enroute to meet Pompey. While in Rome he conferred citizenship on the Gaditani and passed several laws benefiting debtors, convicts, and exiles, and created a corn dole for the plebs.[107] After only eleven days in Rome, Caesar proceeded against Pompey and met him at Dyrrhachium during the first half of 48. Although Balbus himself was not involved in the military operations around the besieged town, his nephew, Balbus minor, was wounded in attempted negotiations. Gelzer paraphrases Caesar's account from the Bellum Civile:

> The de facto truce on the Apsus [River] seemed to offer another opportunity for the demoralization of the enemy army by the demagogic methods which had been

> so successfully practised in Spain. Through frequent conversation of individual soldiers with comrades on the other side, a mood was created which eventually allowed Caesar to send his trusted follower Publius Vatinius to the bank to deliver a loud harangue. In moving language he described the treatment meted out in the past to runaway slaves and pirates, and said that citizens should not now be allowed to use citizens in the same way. Thereupon a shout arose from the audience that on the next day Aulus Terentius Varro Murena, a well-known character . . . would arrive to prepare the way for negotiations. At the appointed hour soldiers from both sides came flocking in; among Caesar's intimates Lucius Cornelius Balbus the younger, who already in the previous year had travelled to Brundisium with Caesar's instructions, was to be seen in the front rank. But from the opposing side Titus Labienus [Caesar's famous lieutenant general in the Gallic Wars] began a haughty altercation with Vatinius and suddenly a volley of missiles, one of which struck Balbus, rained down on Caesar's men. Labienus brought the scene to an end with the words: "Stop this talk of an agreement; peace is impossible for us without the delivery of Caesar's head."[108]

Here again we see Caesar attempting dialogue with Pompey's forces and again one of the Balbi are near the scene. Details are lacking so we cannot say what part Balbus minor played; it appears that he was just one of the escorts of Vatinius and a minor member of the negotiating team at best. Indeed, Balbus may very well have been a leading mediator since a third mission actually took him behind enemy lines. In this attempt, Balbus minor was again trying to persuade Lucius Lentulus Crus to join Caesar's side. The discussions failed "since Lentulus, luxuriating in an insatiable wish for enrichment, feared that he might not do well enough out of the transaction."[109]

With the failure of these missions and others,

Pompey's fate was doomed. On August 9 (June 7th of the Julian calendar) the battle of Pharsalus ended with Pompey's defeat and his subsequent flight to Egypt. It was there that he was murdered along with Balbus' other ex-patron, Lentulus.[110]

The death of Pompey did not end the civil war or Balbus' work in Rome. Cicero returned to Italy by October of 48 and soon began writing to Balbus and Oppius about his problems at Brundisium. He was worried about the reaction of pro-Caesar forces, and complained about the conditions of the seaside town which he would not leave without assured protection from Balbus. Naturally, he was anxious about his standing in the eyes of Caesar, after all he did join Pompey at Dyrrhachium. To this resolve, he maintained contact with Balbus and Oppius who both assured him of Caesar's leniency.[111] Cicero even asked Atticus to pressure Balbus' promise of Caesar's good will.[112] Such communication continued into the summer of 47 while Caesar was delayed in Alexandria and Asia. But when Caesar finally arrived around the end of September, Balbus' words rang true as Cicero was warmly received by Caesar.[113]

It appears that Balbus played no particular part in Caesar's reforms and dealings during the end of 47. He receded into the background and Caesar continued military actions when he left for Africa in December. With 46, we again have recorded renewed contact between Balbus and

Cicero. "Business dealings and the interests of friends are now the main topics of their correspondence."[114] But it is during this time period and until the death of Caesar that Balbus served as the dictator's right hand man in Rome.

When Caesar returned to Rome in the late summer of 46, he intiated several reforms before he left yet again to combat remaining Pompeian forces in Spain.[115] The reforms were many and important, and he needed the right men to see to their execution. He left so suddenly for Spain that the magistrates had not been selected and many of the new laws had not been enacted. Thus, "the direction of policy in fact lay with Balbus and Oppius, with whom the ruler was in frequent contact." Here we witness the height of Balbus' power. He had now become "autocratic."[116]

There were only a few major incidents during this period (46 to 15 March 44) that involved Balbus directly. The first dealt with the editing of Cicero's literary work called Cato. The Cato was a panegyric of the stoic republican who committed suicide after Caesar's victories in Africa. In August of 45, Balbus had reported Caesar's indignant reaction to the book and kept Cicero in touch with the dictator's movements abroad. Caesar was impressed with the book so much that he wrote a strong rebuttal.[117]

A second incident dealing with Cicero and Balbus

involved a letter which Cicero proposed to send to Caesar. The letter was an outline, a plan which Caesar was to use in reordering the state. It was a letter of suggestions and advice directed at Caesar, but it also contained criticisms of dictatorship. Due to its latent attack on Caesar's position, Balbus and Oppius suggested major revisions in the letter. Cicero refused to make the changes and the letter was never sent. From this point on Cicero calls Caesar a rex, "a word uttered only with abhorrence since the foundation of the republic."[118]

With the battle of Munda, the war was over and Caesar returned to Rome by October of 45. Upon his arrival Balbus was close by his side. Balbus as advisor was probably aware of Caesar's plans and reforms, and actively worked with him to fine tune or adminster the changes. In order to carry out and formulate his vast number of reforms, Caesar had to work day and night, especially since he planned to conduct yet another military campaign (this time against the Parthians). Balbus, as a principal advisor, had to work with him. Caesar's tireless energy and activity and Balbus' assistance are related to us by Gelzer:

> In a valuable letter to Atticus [Cicero] has portrayed his impressions and thereby left us a picture of Caesar's restless activity. On December 18 the dictator put up for the night with Cicero's neighbor, Lucius Marcus Philippus, the stepfather of Gaius Octavius; his retinue of friends, freedmen, slaves and soldiers numbered 2,000. Next morning he worked with Balbus until one o'clock without receiving anyone else. Then he walked across to Cicero's villa,

> where he took a bath at two o'clock. While in the bath he heard something (probably complaints) about Mamurra, his well-known follower. After he had been annointed, he dined with Cicero as his guest. He enjoyed his food enormously and, avoiding politics, conversed with animation about literature. After the meal, in order to keep mentally fresh, he relived himself by means of his customary emetic. Then he continued on his journey . . .[119]

All during this time, Caesar was gaining in honors, dictatorial power, and enemies.[120] He had surpassed all others in honor, dignitas, auctoritas, and kingly garb. The Senate gave him a golden chair and wreath, and a divine image of himself was created and revered like any other divinity. More and more Caesar was becoming like a king (rex). His appearance was kingly, his powers were kingly, and soon his bearing and demeanor were to be seen as that of a rex.

The first event which caused many senators to fume at Caesar's arrogant pseudo-kingship actually involved Balbus. Suetonius relates one version of the incident:

> What made the Romans hate [Caesar] so bitterly was that when, one day, the entire Senate, armed with an imposing list of honours that they had just voted him, came to where he sat in front of the Temple of Mother Venus, he did not rise to greet them. According to some accounts he would have risen had not Cornelius Balbus prevented him; according to others, he made no such move and grimaced angrily at Gaius Trebatius who suggested this courtesy.[121]

The story has different verisons but in the end the Senate, either correctly or mistakenly, took Caesar's failure to rise as an affront to their dignity. He was refusing to treat them as equals, as fellow citizens of Rome. Balbus' involvement in the affair was crucial. He

was the one to blame for such arrogance. Why would Balbus commit such a blatant act?

First of all, did he really do it; are the accounts accurate and trustworthy? The accounts differ (see Appendix A), but two of our sources are reliable enough to conclude that Balbus may have done the deed. But one should consider Suetonius who actively gives us an alternative account and so admits to us that there was a lack of consensus regarding the cause of the act. Balbus still had many enemies who would have been more than willing to fabricate a tale to discredit him. Through such a disreputable tale, Balbus could have been labeled as an ungracious alien encouraging Caesar to behave as a king. He could also have been stereotyped as a peregrinus who scorned senatorial protocol and republican courtesies. His enemies, by spreading such rumors, would have additionally furthered their own justification for assassinating Caesar; the man who would be king or who listened to barbarians, foreigners, and sneaky financiers from Gades.

Another point to consider is Balbus' occupation and character. Balbus was a diplomat of sorts. His letters to Cicero show us that he preferred flattery and negotiation to accomplish his aims. To insult the Senate by having Caesar remain seated would have been tactless and counter-productive. Besides the fact that he may have had several enemies in the Senate, there is no reason to

think that Balbus would have suddenly used such abusive tactics.

But even if the rumors were false, even if Balbus did not encourage Caesar to stay seated, one should not be surprised if he did. After all Balbus probably held little respect for a delegation of senators. He was not born or raised in Rome. He had never seen the Republican form of government work under full efficiency and fairness. Balbus had grown up and served under the autocratic direction of generals: first Pompey, then Caesar. He had seen war and bloodshed due to the failure of the Republican system. The Senate disliked him; he was a foreigner, an upstart minion of the dynasts and later of the dictator. To Balbus, who operated without the senate (even ignored them), their existence was unnecessary. There was no advantage for him to respect or befriend the boni. Balbus was the advisor/administrator of the dictator of Rome and thus may have considered himself above the Senate. The same Senate which failed to govern the empire successfully. If Caesar wanted to be king and eliminate the senate, Balbus would certainly not interfere.

Although seen as a key event by classical historians, if the event concerning Caesar's uncourteous reception had not occurred, the course of history would not have changed. Later incidents fueled the assassins toward the Ides of March.

One episode involved the mysterious appearance of a diadem (a symbol of Hellenistic monarchy) on one of Caesar's statues.[122] In January of 44, Caesar was hailed as rex when he was returning to Rome from the Alban Hill. He declared, however, that he was Caesar, not "Rex."[123] Sometime around February 15th, Caesar was made dictator for life (dictator perpetuus). Such a title was contradictory to a Republican form of government and many saw this as the final act; Caesar had no intention to revert the state back to the constitution. The view was reinforced on February 15th during the Lupercalia festival when, dressed in the garb of the ancient Roman kings, he refused Antony's gift of a diadem. He stated that he refused to take the kingship offered to him. But to the senators and others, this was just another close call (or even a tentative experiment to see how the people would react to a crowning).[124]

The plot to kill Caesar gained followers, and no doubt rumors existed that an attempt would be made on Caesar's life. Caesar shrugged off such gossip and apparently even omens. One such omen was reported by Balbus himself as Suetonius reports:

> Unmistakable signs forwarned Caesar of his assassination. A few months previously the veterans who had been sent to colonize Capua under the Julian Law were breaking up some ancient tombs in search of stone for their new farm-houses -- all the more eagerly when they came across a large hoard of ancient vases. One of these tombs proved to be that of Capys, founder of the city, and there they found a bronze tablet with a Greek inscription to this effect:

> "Disturb the bones of Capys, and a man of Trojan stock will be murdered by his kindred, and later avenged at great cost to Italy." This story should not be dismissed as idle fiction, or a lie, because our authority for it is none other than Cornelius Balbus, a close friend of Caesar's.[125]

The prophesy came true. On March 15th, the assassins moved in and murdered Balbus' patron, friend, and employer. Balbus was certainly shocked and most probably feared for his life. Rome itself was stunned and many feared for the worst; with Caesar came enforced peace and stability. Now lurked the unknown future. Caesar tried to correct the faltering government of Republican Rome, he tried (with Balbus' help) and failed by alienating the Senate. The death of such a man of great ability prompted one to ask: "If Caesar with all his genius could not find a way out, who will find one now?"[126]

Chapter 4

THE FINAL YEARS: DAWN OF THE AUGUSTAN AGE

"I see wars, horrible wars, and the Tiber foaming with much blood."

--Virgil Aeneid 6.86

The death of Caesar did not end the political crisis in Rome, nor did it end the political life of Lucius Cornelius Balbus. From the middle of 44 to the death of Atticus in 32, Balbus continued to participate in the death throes of the Republic. He witnessed Antony's brief assumption of power in Rome, Octavian's arrival and subsequent rise to dominance, and the death of Cicero at the end of the 40s. In the last year of the decade, Balbus attained the office of consul (the first foreigner ever to do so). Balbus faded out of history after appearing next to Atticus' death bed. The final years of Balbus' life show him still using his diplomatic and financial advantages for the benefit of his patrons, especially during the 40s.

At first, the assassination left Balbus stranded without a patron. His primary benefactor was murdered by the "liberators." Balbus, possibly fearing for his life like Antony, "temporarily left the scene."[1] He was uncertain of the assassins' plans and may have sought refuge with Oppius, Aulus Hirtius, or other Caesarians.

Soon (within hours), it was evident that the assassins had no long term plans nor any designs of a far

reaching coup, and that the reaction to Caesar's slaying was largely negative. A number of factors led to the ultimate failure of the assassination, the goal of which was the restoration of libertas and the Republic. First, the assassins had no strategy or master plan to follow the murder.[2] They had failed to take the initiative or conduct a coup against the other powerful Caesarian cronies. They believed the death of the tyrant would automatically allow the Republic to return to normal. Second, the people saw Caesar as their benefactor and cared little about libertas since it only applied to the senatorial aristocracy's right to freely bicker among themselves for control of the top offices of Rome. Marcus Brutus and Gaius Cassius Longinus, the chief assassins, were unable to justify their deed to the plebs of Rome. Sir Ronald Syme discusses the problem in his book, The Roman Revolution:

> Nor could the faction of Brutus and Cassius reckon upon the citizen-body of the capital. To the cold logic and legalistic pleas of the Republican Brutus, this motley and excitable rabble turned a deaf ear; for the august traditions of the Roman Senate and the Roman People they had no sympathy at all. The politicians of the previous age, whether conservative or revolutionary, despised so utterly the plebs of Rome that they felt no scruples when they enhanced its degradation. . . .
>
> Debauched by demagogues and largess, the Roman People was ready for the Empire and the dispensation of bread and games. The plebs had acclaimed Caesar, the popular politician, with his public boast of the Julian house, descended from the kings of Rome and from the immortal gods; they buried his daughter Julia with the honours of a princess; they cheered at the games, the shows and the triumphs of the Dictator. In Caesar's defiance of the Senate and his triumph over

noble adversaries, they too had a share of power and glory.[3]

The reaction of the people was first remorseful silence, then later riotous violence. Antony jumped at the chance and (with the help of Marcus Aemilius Lepidus' troops) began to take control. The initiative passed from the assassins to the followers of Caesar. The people turned against the assassins and the Caesarians rode the wave of popular support which eventually caused the liberators to abandon Rome.

Antony, after realizing the reaction of the people, summoned the Senate on March 17th and acted to conciliate the boni and the allies of the slain dictator. The Senate declared a general amnesty for the assassins, but in return Antony secured the validity of Caesar's acts and legislation.[4] Antony also assured himself a position of power, since the day before the meeting he had obtained Caesar's papers from Calpurnia.[5] Antony had also consulted with Caesar's henchmen including Lepidus, Hirtius, and Balbus. According to one source, Balbus and Lepidus "were eager for vengeance."[6] But Antony pushed for patience and prudence. Agreeing with (or possibly forced to accept) Antony's policy of moderation, Balbus apparently joined his camp for the time being. Antony's conciliatory tone sounded hollow after he gave Caesar's funeral oration which sparked riots and caused the flight of Brutus and Cassius.[7]

But Antony was favorable again to the Senate when he abolished the office of Dictator.[8] He also arranged for a treaty with Sextus Pompey who had many Senatorial sympathizers.[9] The Senate in return awarded Antony with the province of Macedonia.

Antony, however, became greedy, or at least concerned about his position in Rome, and began to abuse his control of Caesar's papers and treasure. He used the papers to falsify plans and create laws for political and financial gain. The consul also used Caesar's personal funds to purchase support and buy up legions. The abuse of Caesar's memoranda and money displeased Caesarians like Balbus, Oppius, and Hirtius.[10] Balbus and Oppius, as a result, "dissembled" during the month of April, being displeased with Antony's actions but also wondering about the future and possibly about Caesar's heir, Gaius Octavius (Octavian).

Octavian received a letter from his mother, Atia (daughter of Caesar's sister, Julia), in late March while he was at Apollonia in Greece.[11] Octavian crossed the Adriatic to test the situation in Italy. The heir arrived at Brundisium in mid-April, and Cicero, who had distrusted Antony all along, wondered about the young claimant.[12] Balbus wondered too, although he was apparantly busy with dispatches from various parts of the empire.[13] By the 19th of April, Octavian had reached Naples and Balbus visited as Cicero records:

> Octavius arrived in Naples on the 18th. Balbus met him there early on the following day and was with me later the same day at my house near Cumae; tells me Octavius is going to accept the inheritance. But as you say, he fears (?) a mighty tussle with Antony.[14]

At Naples, Balbus was told about Octavian's intentions and may have at this point decided to join the young heir's banner. For from this time on, Balbus supported Octavian's efforts against Antony. Balbus was again joining the side which seemed, to him, the strongest (although at the time Antony had the troops). Balbus had no scruples about remaining loyal to Antony. Balbus was a man who went with the current, he shifted alliances like any astute Roman politician. Antony's abuse of Caesar's papers, and Cicero's distrust of the consul may have influenced Balbus' decision. Through the rest of April and into July, Balbus was in the middle of affairs at Puetoli and Rome. Cicero was again dependent on the indispensable Balbus for news, gossip, and political shuffles. Balbus was the source of information on the Senate, Hirtius, Oppius, and on the possibility of war. A survey of the letters from the period illustrates Balbus' activity and business during the summer of 44.

On 21 April 44, Balbus was with the designated consuls, Hirtius and Gaius Vibius Pansa at Cicero's villa in Puteoli. The four men may have been visiting Octavian who was staying nearby:

> Balbus, Hirtius, and Pansa are with me here. Octavius had just arrived, in fact he has gone to the house next to mine. . . . He is quite devoted

to me.[15]

The following day Cicero complained about Antony, his abuse of Caesar's memoranda, the state of affairs in Rome. Indeed, Antony should also have been done away with on the Ides of March; "'Twas a fine deed, but half done!"[16] By the end of April, Octavian was traveling up the Appian Way with Caesar's veterans promising him their loyalty and assistance in bringing the assassins of his father to justice. By May, Octavian was in Rome.

Amid hundreds of admirers, he declared his intention to accept Caesar's adoption. The assassins, Brutus and Cassius, were anxiously writing to Cicero to influence Hirtius to join the Republican cause. The assassins were worried about Octavian's popularity and the popular call to bring the liberators to justice. Cicero noted, however, that Hirtius was at the moment talking peace and tied closely to Balbus. Cicero thus wrote to Atticus on May 11th:

> You say they [Brutus and Cassius] want me to make a better republican out of Hirtius. Well, I am doing my best and he speaks very fair; but he and Balbus (who also speaks fair) live in one another's pockets. You will judge for yourself what to believe.[17]

On the same day, another letter to Atticus gives us a glimpse of the character of Balbus and of the volatile situation in Rome even at this early date. The letter also hints at Balbus' unpopularity with Antony. Possibly Balbus' switch of loyalty angered Antony. Balbus

was rightly concerned and argued for peace (especially since Octavian was in no position to put up a defense). Nonetheless, Octavian's power and popularity was increasing and Antony's precautions betray his fears about the young heir:

> Just after I had sent [a] courier on his way, Balbus called. Heavens above, how easily one could see his fear of peace! -- and you know how cagey he is. Still he told me of Antony's plans -- that he is going the rounds of the veterans to get them to stand by Caesar's measures and take an oath to that effect, instructing them all to keep their arms ready and have them inspected monthly by the colonial magistrates. Balbus also complained about his own unpopularity, and the whole tenor of his talk argued friendship with Antony. In short I don't trust him a yard.
>
> Their is no doubt in my mind that we are moving towards war. [Italics mine.][18]

The item about Balbus' unpopularity reappears in a letter on May 18th.[19] Details on the 'unpopularity' are lacking so scholars are left in the dark in regard to its implications. Presumably it passed, for on the 25th, Cicero was anxiously awaiting news from Balbus who may have been in Rome.[20] Balbus wrote to Cicero on the 27th or 28th of May in regard to Brutus' and Cassius' provinces.[21] An immediate confrontation between Octavian and Antony had been avoided, so the Senate was assigning provinces to the two assassins. Such assignments would give them legal reasons to absent themselves from Rome. But by the end of the month, Balbus reported nothing new to Cicero in two letters.[22]

In June, Balbus reported on the duties of Brutus and Cassius.

> On the evening of the 2nd [of June] a letter came to my hand from Balbus to say that the Senate is meeting on the Nones to charge Brutus and Cassius with the purchase of corn in Asia and Sicily respectively and its shipment to Rome.[23]

The grain duty assignments were an insult to the two men, who refused to accept the commissions. They protested and a month later they received proper provinces: Brutus - Crete, Cassius - Cyrene.[24]

The note regarding the provinces is the last report regarding Balbus on political matters. In the remaining correspondence with Cicero, Balbus is mentioned only twice. The second to the last mention deals with finances. On July 17th, after Antony and Octavian had been temporarily reconciled by their troops and followers, Cicero wrote a letter to Atticus. At the time, Cicero was at Pompeii preparing to leave Italy (he had given hope for peace and the return of free government). Before leaving he was settling accounts and debts which seemed to have been higher than he expected. To protect against over drawing his account, so to speak, he asked Balbus to cover him. The millionaire would be contacted by Atticus if the funds were necessary:

> Most of all though it is the business of my balances that worries me. True, they have been put in order, but I am disturbed by the fact that they include [a] debt and claims by transfer as to which I have no personal knowledge. Nothing in the whole situation worries me so acutely. So I think I was right to write to Balbus quite plainly, asking him to come to the rescue if for any reason the payments should fail to synchronize, and telling him that I have asked you to get in touch with him in any such contingency.[25]

The last mention of Balbus in the correspondence is dated to November of 44 and confirms the receipt of one of Balbus' letters, the contents of which concern trivial matters on Lepidus.[26] But prior to November, the important letters dealing with Balbus from April to July of 44 were written during a tense period in Rome. Throughout the period, Octavian was gaining support and strength to obtain and secure his rightful inheritance. In April, he received support from veterans as he traveled down the Appian Way. In May, the crowds hailed him in Rome and he formally accepted his adoption by Caesar. Antony, wary of the young upstart, refused to hand over Caesar's estate to Octavian, and was accused by the youngster of failing to punish the assassins.[27]

The following month, while Antony secured power by obtaining the Gallic provinces and by passing a land law benefitting the urban poor and veterans, Octavian continued to gather allies by appealing to Caesar's veterans to join his slain father's cause.[28] In July, Octavian gained additional popularity by sponsoring the Apollo Games (Ludi Apollinares), and received divine aid when a comet appeared (Octavian used the heavenly event to honor Caesar with a statue).[29]

Octavian's popularity forced Antony to deal with the heir. But soon after the two reconciled, Antony, desiring to appear vigilant against the assassins, had a break with Cicero (who supported the liberators and hailed them as

patriots).[30] On September 1st, Antony convened the Senate to debate the status of Brutus and Cassius; Cicero failed to show up even though he was in Rome. Angered at Cicero's absence, Antony attacked Cicero verbally and threatened him. The orator replied with the first of his Philippics.[31] With the opening shots of this oratorical war, the break between Antony and Cicero was made, and led to Cicero's alliance with Octavian. By October, Antony and Octavian had split up with Antony even accusing Octavian of attempting assassination.[32] Events started rolling toward civil war.

When Antony left Rome to meet his legions from Macedonia, which were arriving at Brundisium, Octavian began to illegally enlist troops in Campania. Angered at Antony, Cicero decided to go with the lesser of two evils and joined Octavian's cause when the young general appeared just outside Rome. Cicero figured that he could control the young man and then discard him after his usefulness had passed. Upon arriving in Rome, Octavian found the troops less than fanatical to his cause, so he returned to recruiting, this time in Etruria. Antony returned to Rome, and realizing Octavian's power, committed himself to military action. He did not turn against Octavian immediately, however. Instead, he marched north to remove Decimus Brutus (a former Caesarian general who turned assassin) from his province of Cisalpine Gaul.[33]

During this power struggle in the fall and early winter of 44, Balbus was supporting Octavian. Octavian needed to drive a wedge between Antony and the Caesarian followers and veterans. He then intended to bring them over to his camp and use them to secure his inheritance and personal ambitions. He performed the break up and secured his following through bribery, promises, demagoguery, and the weight of Caesar's name. He portrayed himself as the avenger of Caesar and the new benefactor of the plebs and veterans. In the fight to secure loyal Caesarian allies, Octavian needed money and connections. Balbus had both.

Balbus helped finance Octavian's bribes, military payroll, and legacies to the plebs. Balbus was instrumental in assisting Octavian in winning over the people, veterans, and Senate.[34] He won over Hirtius, and attempted to convince Cicero.[35] Although Cicero was never convinced by Balbus, the Spaniard's influence and Octavian's audacity, in the end, won over the Senate, and Cicero decided on his own to support Octavian. The Republicans felt that Octavian could be used like a tool to eliminate Antony, and then, like a worn out tool, be discarded. The Senate agreed to award Octavian a command with the new consuls of 43, Hirtius and Pansa, to subdue Antony before he removed Decimus Brutus from Cisalpine Gaul.[36]

Balbus was one of many who enabled a mere teenager

to secure a command and army, and thus the instruments of power. Balbus' assistance gave Octavian his first step toward the principate, and gave him his first taste of political and military power. Cicero and the Senate went along with the young man believing in their ability to control him. They wanted to use him, then discard him. Whether Balbus felt the same is unknown, but considering Octavian's later treatment of the Gaditane, Balbus appears to be sincere in his support of the heir.

With the final letter of Cicero relating to Balbus' activity in November of 44, researchers have the final report on Balbus' activities. "No record survives of his services to Caesar's heir. After November he slips out of history for four years: the manner of his return shows that he had not been inactive."[37] For the next four years we can only assume that Balbus actively supported Octavian. Two points seen to confirm this assumption. First, Balbus survived the bloody proscriptions of 43 in which many of the victims were wealthy bankers, senators, equites, and financiers. Second, Balbus was rewarded with the consulship for 40 (and possibly received a propraetorship earlier in 41).[38] By this time the office was a reward for loyal service to the triumvirs rather than a freely elected magistracy. Balbus played along with the political and military games of the 40s to live to a ripe old age.

The games were rough. Taking the commission to

rescue Decimus from Antony, Octavian, Hirtius, and Pansa moved north. Antony was defeated at the Battle of Forum Gallorum by Hirtius, the man Balbus pressured into writing the eighth book of Caesar's Bellum Gallicum.[39] But in the same engagement, Pansa was mortally wounded. At Antony's next defeat outside of Mutina, Hirtius was killed and Octavian was insulted by the Senate when full honors and command of Republican forces were handed over to Decimus.[40]

Antony escaped since Octavian and his troops refused to serve under an assassin. Antony, given time, was able to secure the assistance of Lepidus, the governors of Further Spain and Gallia Comata, Asinius Pollio and Lucius Munatius Plancus, respectively (both were former henchmen of Caesar). Being overpowered, Decimus fled (only to be caught and killed almost immediately). Octavian, meanwhile did an about face and marched to Rome to force the Senate to give him the consulship. The Senators gave in at sword point only to realize soon after that Antony, Lepidus, and their new consul would form the Second Triumvirate and initiate the dreaded proscriptions. Through the proscriptions, the Triumvirs avoided Caesar's mistake of clemency and secured their positions by using the confiscated property of the victims to pay their troops and settle the veterans.[41]

In 42, the Triumvirs prepared to bring the assassins to justice (in other words, defeat their forces and

execute them). While mobilizing their armed forces to take on Brutus and Cassius' armies in the East, the Triumvirs decided to insure domestic peace by handpicking the future magistrates of Rome. Balbus was obviously friendly to the cause of the Triumvirs or he would not have been designated consul for 40, and, if we can trust the numismatic evidence, he likewise would not have held the propraetorship of Gaul in 41.[42] With Rome pacified with puppets like Balbus, Antony and Octavian began military operations to eliminate the murderers of Caesar.

By the end of 42, the assassins and their armies were eliminated.[43] The victorious veterans were rewarded with land allotments from existing towns. The confiscations angered the landowners of Italy who joined Antony's brother Lucius and Antony's wife, Fulvia, in a miniature, but futile, civil war which ended with the siege of Perusia in February of 40.[44] Antony returned to Italy to investigate the uprising.

Upon his arrival at Brundisium in the summer of 40, it looked as if war would occur between him and Octavian since legions were being moved around and Antony allied himself with the renegade Corsair, Sextus Pompey, who still ruled the high seas. But the troops, tired of civil war, prompted negotiations which led to another formal alliance between Antony and Octavian. One can imagine that Balbus might have had a hand in such negotiations since he was consul late in 40, but we have no evidence to

support such speculation (nor do we have any record of his policies and administration as consul). Nonetheless, the agreement was confirmed by Antony's marriage to Octavian's sister, Octavia.[45] But by 33, Octavian, returning to Italy to commemorate his victories in Illyricum,[46] discovered that Antony had committed atrocities through his liason with Cleopatra.[47] He gave her and their sons titles and claims to lands in the East and he formally married Cleopatra while still being wedded to Octavia. Antony's conduct was unforgivable and war was inevitable. Syme discusses the situation:

> The official Roman version of the cause of the War of Actium is quite simple -- a just war, fought in defence of freedom and peace against a foreign enemy: a degenerate Roman was striving to subvert the liberties of the Roman People, to subjugate Italy and the West under the rule of an oriental queen. An expedient and salutory belief. Octavianus was in reality the aggressor, his war was preceded by a coup d' etat: Antonius had the consuls and the constitution on his side. It was therefore necessary to demostrate that Antonius was 'morally' in the wrong and 'morally' the aggressor. The situation and the phraseology recur in the history of war and politics whenever there is a public opinion worth persuading or deceiving.[48]

The acts committed by Antony were unacceptable to Roman ideals and gave Octavian the perfect excuse to provoke hostilities between them. Accusations soon flew across the Mediterranean. The final act was the disclosure of Antony's will which Octavian forcefully obtained and read aloud to the Senate. Antony intended to move the seat of government to Alexandria and give Rome to Cleopatra. That was the final straw; war was declared on

Cleopatra and the final phase of Octavian's rise to power commenced.

Whether or not Balbus witnessed the decisive battle of the war (Actium), we do not know. Our last reference about him comes from an account of the death of Atticus. Apparently a longtime friend of Atticus' throughout the years, an elderly (nearly 70 years old himself) Balbus stood at the fellow financier's death bed. Our account comes from Cornelius Nepos:

> [Atticus] feeling a daily increase of pain attended with fever, . . . gave orders that his son in law Agrippa should be summoned, and with him Lucius Cornelius Balbus and Sextus Peducaeus.[49]

Upon their arrival, Atticus gave a short farewell speech and died five days later on 31 March, 32 at seventy-seven years of age. Syme says that Balbus must have died shortly afterwards; exactly when is unknown.[50] We do know, however, that upon his death he left a legacy to every Roman citizen as a tribute to his wealth. Balbus "so far surpassed the men of his generation in wealth and munificence that at his death he left a bequest of one hundred sesterces to each Roman citizen."[51] This amount has been calculated to have totaled "at least 25,000,000 sesterces."[52]

The donation emulated Caesar's gift in 44 and may also have been Balbus' way of saying thank you (gratia) to Rome. Possibly it was his way of showing appreciation for being able to rise from the faraway town of Gades as a

peregrinus to become the first foreign born consul of Rome witnessing the dawn of the Augustan Age.

Conclusion

THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF LUCIUS CORNELIUS BALBUS

"In the last decade of the Republic there can have been few intrigues conducted and compacts arranged without the knowledge and mediation of Balbus."

-- Ronald Syme, The Roman Revolution, p. 72

In the first chapter, the young man from Gades served under a young Pompey the Great in a grueling guerilla war of attrition. Sertorius was defeated and Balbus' military bravery and acumen won him the citizenship sponsored by Lucius Cornelius Lentulus Crus (Balbus' namesake). Pompey, the commander, knew the young Spaniard and through the lex Gellia Cornelia ratified Balbus' citizenship. Hence he became the first patron of the Spaniard.

Chapter two pictures the rise of Gaius Julius Caesar and Balbus' switch to the new patron. Balbus chose to side with Caesar in his rise to power, but also remained the friend of Pompey and became acquainted with Cicero. Balbus served as Caesar's praefectus fabrum in 61 and 58, and became attached to the charismatic general. By the end of 60, Cato's obstinance forced three powerful men to form an unprecedented alliance. Balbus attempted to recruit Cicero into the Triumvirate, but failed. This failed attempt was the first of many; Cicero would never be swayed by the counsels of Balbus.

Balbus' continued support of Caesar was illustrated

in the third and most significant period of his life. Surviving the trial of 56, which illustrated the value of citizenship, the importance of political trials, and the power of the triumvirs to rescue one of their men, Balbus continued on his rise to power. After the trial his influence and activity increased till they reached their zenith during and shortly after the civil war against the Pompeians. Balbus was Caesar's trusted agent and confidante, handling diplomatic and administrative matters with Gaius Oppius. By the end of the civil war, Balbus was one of Caesar's righthand men. His devotion to his master may have caused him to keep Caesar seated at the Temple of Venus, or may have caused his enemies to create a fable to that effect. Caesar's other actions inflamed those whom he had pardoned and the Ides of March saw the dictator's death.

With the death of Caesar, a new stage of civil war occurred between Mark Antony and the young Octavian. Balbus, fortunately for him, sided with the latter and aided the young heir to achieve a position of dominance. Balbus survived the proscriptions to serve as consul and to witness Atticus' death and the beginning of the final war leading to Octavian's supremacy. Balbus' nephew continued to carry on the family name with honor and distinction into the reign of Augustus.

The chapters paint a picture of a young wealthy peregrinus rising through the political morass of the Late

Republic to become one of the most powerful men in Rome and to serve as the first foreign born consul of the Eternal City. Without a doubt he was Caesar's and Octavian's trusted agent. His wealth, connections, and political, diplomatic, and administrative skills were invaluable to the dynasts of the First and Second Triumvirates. Here we realize one of Balbus' roles and significance in Roman history. He was an inside agent dealing with the chief men of the final years of the Republic. He worked from within the circles of the triumvirs, ignoring the Senate and bypassing the magistracies until the late 40s when they were merely awards given to loyal servants of the dynasts. He thus served as a precursor of the civil servants of the Principate and later imperial periods. His final claim to fame was his exceptional rise to power. He was a foreigner from the rustic and backward town of Gades at the edge of the known world, yet he rose to power like no other foreigner before him, and was again a projection of the future when provincials would become emperors (though they more often rose through military than civil service). Gardner succinctly sums up the significance of Balbus:

> This able Spaniard excelled in diplomacy. "In the last decade of the Republic there can have been few intrigues conducted and compacts arranged without the knowledge and the meditation of Balbus."[Syme, Rom. Rev., 72] To him fell a full part in the making of contemporary history: he was employed in the formation of Caesar's coalition at the end of 60 B.C.; the Civil Wars saw him active as a negotiator; he figured in the introduction of Cabinet Government during the

> dictatorship of Caesar; he served Octavian. He and Oppius were the predecessors of the civil servants of the Principate. The first foreigner who rose to a consulship, he was a portent of that later age when Trajan, a Spaniard married to a woman from Nemausus in southern Gaul, became the first emperor of provincial origin. [Gardner, 734]

His life, like those of many other advisors to the great leaders of the past, is important to historians in understanding the intricate complexities of the events of Late Republic. Had his memoirs survived they would have made a fascinating addition to the extant sources of the period. For Balbus could have told us things about Pompey, Cicero, Caesar and Octavian that would have eluded the biographers Suetonius and Plutarch. The same memoirs would have made this biographer's work on Balbus' life much easier and might have answered many questions regarding his colorful life, but would likewise have created even more questions regarding the millionaire from Gades who was Pompey's veteran, Caesar's agent, and Cicero's acquaintance.

Appendix A

The episode where Caesar remained seated when Senators approached him at the Temple of Venus Genetrix has often been stressed as one of the major events leading to the assassination of Julius Caesar.[1] It is an event which is reported in several sources, and Balbus plays a leading role in two accounts. If Balbus did in fact tell, advise, or coerce Caesar to remain seated, it would mean his advice was detrimental to Caesar's health since, by extension, Balbus' counsel would have been one of the reasons why Caesar was assassinated. By keeping Caesar seated, Balbus caused an insult to the senators and aggravated the animosity between Caesar and the Senate. But the evidence, upon closer examination, points to different conclusions. First, the sources differ on the Temple episode and Balbus is only mentioned in two of our five accounts. Second, based on Balbus' position, past actions, and character, it is unlikely he would have affronted the senators in such a blunt, undiplomatic manner even considering his dislike of the Senate and Republican politics. Third, if the scholarship of Stefan Weinstock is correct, the affair may have been exaggerated by classical and modern scholars and may have been "transformed into a scandal" in antiquity.[2]

An examination of the various accounts in chronological order is helpful. We begin with the

earliest account. Tabulated below is a synopsis of the accounts, followed by a full translation of the Temple scenes.

KEY: Author- name of author; Date- birth/death dates and date of publication are given; Sources- previous authors, government archives, etc.; Alt. Accts- does author acknowledge the existence of alternate accounts; Balbus- does source mention Balbus' role in the episode; Caesar- reason given for Caesar's failure to rise.

Author: Titus Livius (Livy)
Date: 64/59 B.C.-A.D. 12/17; pub. after 19 B.C.
Sources: Earliest written account of the incident; sources probably include Caesar's works, Augustus' Memoirs, Pollio's Historiae, and Gaius Sulpicius Galba.
Alt. Accts: None given
Balbus: Not mentioned
Caesar: None given

Author: Gaius Tranquillus Suetonius
Date: c. A.D. 69-c. 130
Sources: Had access to the imperial archives, Asinius Pollio; may have used Balbus' memoirs (Balbi Ephemeris)
Alt. Accts: Acknowledges other accounts
Balbus: Balbus is mentioned
Caesar: a.) Balbus restrained him, b.) Caesar decided not to rise on his own.

Author: L.(?) Mestrius Plutarchus (Plutarch)
Date: c. A.D. 50-c. 120, pub. c. 100
Sources: Livy, Sallust, Aug. Mem., Cornelius Nepos; was a contemporary of Suetonius.
Alt. Accts: Acknowledges other accounts
Balbus: Balbus is mentioned
Caesar: a.) Decided not to rise himself, b.) Balbus restrained him, c.) Epilepsy

Author: Appianos of Alexandria (Appian)
Date: fl. A.D. 116
Sources: Livy, Asinius Pollio, memoirs of Augustus.
Alt. Accts: None given
Balbus: Not mentioned
Caesar: Failed to rise on his own account

Author: Cassius Dio Cocceianus (Dio Cassius)

Date: c. A.D. 163/4 - 229
Sources: Livy; member of Emperor Severus' council so he made have had access to the imperial archives.
Alt. Accts: Acknowledges other accounts
Balbus: Not mentioned
Caesar: Failed to rise because of "fate" ,or "joy," or "diarrhoea."

Our sources thus form the following primary and secondary source "tree." Dashed lines indicate a source that could have been used, but has not been proven to have been used.



It should be noted that none of our extant accounts are contemporary. All of the authors are writing after the incident and only two of them (Pollio and Sallust) were possible eye witnesses, thus we have mainly second hand material. Another problem that arises deals with our sources' sources. Ancient authors did not provide their readers with footnote citations or extensive bibliographies. Rarely, an author may indicate his source in the text (i.e. Suetonius gives us some of his sources on Caesar: "Hirtius says downrightly . . . Asinius Pollio, however, believes . . . " (Suet. Caes. 56)), but often the authors would merely borrow material without giving references. Today's scholars can only trace the sources of ancient authors by careful textual analysis. And such analysis is far from perfect so results are tentative and

often debated. The accounts themselves are quoted below:

> When a great abundance of the highest distinctions were voted him by the senate, among which were the title of Father of the Fatherland, inviolability, and dictatorship for life, occasions for a grudge against him were created because he did not rise from his seat before the temple of Mother Venus when the senate came to present him with these distinctions, . . .(Livy Per. 116)

> What made the Romans hate him so bitterly was that when, one day, the entire Senate, armed with an imposing list of honours that they had just voted him, came to where he sat in front of the Temple of Mother Venus, he did not rise to greet them. According to some accounts he would have risen had not Cornelius Balbus prevented him; according to others he made no such move and grimaced angrily at Gaius Trebatius who suggested this courtesy. (Suet. Iul. 78)

> When the senate had conferred on him some extravagant honors, he received the message as he was sitting on the rostra, where, though the consuls and praetors themselves waited on him, attended by the whole body of the senate, he did not rise, but behaved as if they had been private men, and told them his honors needed rather to be retrenched than increased, This treatment offended not only the senate, but the people too, for they thought the affront upon the senate equally reflected upon the whole republic; so that all who could decently leave him went off, looking distressed. Caesar, seeing the false step he had made, immediately went home; and laying his throat bare, told his friends that he was ready to offer this to any one who wished to kill him. But afterwards he made the sickness from which he suffered the excuse for his sitting, saying that those who are attacked by it lose their presence of mind if they talk standing; that they presently grow giddy, fall into convulsions, and quite lose their reason. But this was not true, for he would willingly have stood up to the senators, had not Cornelius Balbus, one of his friends, or rather flatterers, hindered him. "Will you not remember," he said, "you are Caesar, and claim the honor which is due to your merit." (Plut. Caes. 60.4-8)

> While he was thus transacting business in front of the rostra, the Senate, preceded by the consuls, each one in his robes of office, brought the decree awarding him the honours aforesaid. He extended his

> hand to them, but did not rise when they approached nor while they remained there, and this, too, afforded his slanderers a pretext for accusing him of wishing to be greeted as a king. (App. BCiv. 2.107)

> Indeed, when once they had voted to him on a single day an unusually large number of these honours of especial importance, -- which had been granted unanimously by all except Cassius and a few others, who became famous for this action, yet suffered no harm, whereby Caesar's clemency was conspicuously revealed, -- they then approached him as he was sitting in the vestibule of the temple of Venus in order to announce to him in a body their decisions; for they transacted such business in his absence, in order to have the appearance of doing it, not under compulsion, but voluntarily. And either by some heaven-sent fatuity or even through excess of joy he received them sitting, which aroused so great indignation among them all, not only the senators but all the rest, that it afforded his slayers one of their chief excuses for their plot against him. Some who subsequently tried to defend him claimed, it is true, that owing to an attack of diarrhoea he could not control the movement of his bowels and so he remained where he was in order to avoid a flux. They were not able, however, to convince the majority, since not long afterwards he rose up and went home on foot; hence most men suspected him of being inflated with pride and hated him for his haughtiness, when it was they themselves who had made him disdainful by the exaggerated character of their honours. After this occurrence, striking as it was, he increased the suspicion by permitting himself somewhat later to be chosen dictator for life. (Dio Cass. 44.8)

The various accounts agree only on the fact that Caesar failed to rise to greet the senators who had just voted him special honors. Balbus is only mentioned in two accounts and two authors write that alternate accounts exist admitting that the episode had been tampered with in antiquity. Although the affair is mentioned in various sources, one sure source is conspicuously absent; namely Cicero. Cicero never mentions the event at all even though one would expect him to jump on such a scandalous

act. And our sources agree that the episode was a primary factor in aggravating certain individuals into planning a conspiracy.

So did Balbus force Caesar to remain seated? Probably not, for more than one reason. First, the evidence is weak and lacks consensus. Second, Balbus' position during and after Caesar's dictatorship would have prompted envious enemies to create such a tale against Balbus merely to smear his reputation. We have reason to suspect any story regarding Balbus' involvement as being a possible fabrication created by his enemies. Third, reason would indicate that such a move on Balbus' part would have been foolish and completely uncharacteristic of his position as a client, administrator, and diplomat of Caesar. We have concluded in Chapter 3 (pp. 88-9) that Caesar was his own man who made his own decisions independent of any overbearing influence from his advisors. And as an advisor, Balbus was a diplomat and thus knew better than to openly insult the senators by causing Caesar to remain seated. It would have been a crude, arrogant gesture (more along the style of Antony than cunning, smooth-talking, diplomatic Balbus).

But again, we can only say that he <u>probably</u> did not commit the act. Even though the incident is based on only two sources, would have been illogical to commit, and may have been fabricated by his enemies, the two accounts are from two coeval biographers. One of these men had

access to the imperial archives and may have used Balbus' memoirs. Could it be that the story was true but forgotten in later accounts? Would Balbus' disdain for the Senate and its Republican institutions have overidden his diplomatic nature to keep Caesar seated?

Maybe, but not likely, especially when one considers our concluding observation regarding the Temple of Venus scene which indicates that the episode was made into a fable long after it had occurred. Stefan Weinstock, in his book Divus Julius, argues that the episode was blown out of proportion in antiquity. First of all, Caesar did not have to rise to greet the senators. Second, the incident at the time caused little or no concern, and was only later turned into a scandal after Caesar's kingship stories became popular. Weinstock explains his view:

> Towards the end of 45 (rather than in early 44) Caesar sat at the Temple of Venus Genetrix when the Senate, led by the consuls and all other magistrates, came to inform him of the honours just decreed. What is said to have scandalized the senators was that Caesar remained seated in their presence. The following facts are relevant: it was the privilege of the magistrates and senators to conduct offical business seated; a citizen rose when a magistrate came, as did a minor magistrate in the presence of a higher-ranking one; again, men of special merits were honoured by rising at their appearance. There is not a single piece of evidence to show that Caesar [or Balbus if he prevented him from rising] here committed an offense against tradition or that, as modern scholars maintain, he wanted to demonstrate his new monarchic status. What is quoted is . . . irrelevant. As dictator he was superior to the consuls and could therefore remain seated in their presence; and the senatorial privilege only meant that they were not obliged either to rise in the presence of a magistrate. As to the alleged demonstration of his monarchic status, we have met other and really

> significant actions and decrees to this effect. At the Lupercalia of 44 when he was officially approached by his fellow consul Antony he remained seated again, and nobody was scandalized on this account.
>
> The probability is that the incident was transformed into a scandal long after it had taken place.[3]

If Weinstock is correct, than Balbus may be the hapless victim of later propaganda, literature, and over anxious historians and biographers dealing with the deified Julius Caesar. Maybe Balbus did have Caesar remain seated and nobody really cared one way or the other!

APPENDIX B

After Balbus Minor's missions in the civil war, very little is reported concerning him. He seems to have drifted away from his uncle and pursued an independent course through the military service rather than the diplomatic/bureaucratic corps of his uncle's abode. Since Balbus Minor rarely interacts with Balbus after the Civil War, he has been relegated to this appendix. He deserves some attention since he was the nephew of Balbus Maior, served under Augustus, and was the last Balbus from the Gades family in recorded history.

Perhaps Balbus Minor looked to the military because of his failed diplomatic missions of 49 and 48.[1] He followed his uncle's example only when it came to choosing the right side to back and by 44-43 he had survived the post-assassination military and political shuffling to serve as Gaius Asinius Pollio's quaestor in Hispania Ulterior.

His appointment is not surprising since the province was his home territory, but what is surprising is the report which Pollio sent to Cicero on Balbus Minor's actions as quaestor. From the letter, Balbus sounds like a "minor league" Spanish Caligula! He stole from the public treasury, ordered cavalry units to disperse protestors, and executed Romans in horrendous fashion. Pollio's letter is worth quoting:

Corduba, 8 June 43
From C. Asinius Pollio to Cicero

My Quaestor Balbus has taken himself off from Gades, and after three days' hold-up off Calpe due to weather has crossed over into King Bogud's territory [Mauretania] with his pockets very nicely lined - a large sum in cash, a mass of gold, and a bigger mass of silver, all collected from the public revenues - without even giving the troops their pay. With the rumors that are coming in, I don't yet know whether he will be returning to Gades or going to Rome - he changes his plans on every new report in the most contemptible fashion.

The following exploits, on the model of C. Caesar as he himself boasts, are in addition to his pilferings and robberies and floggings of provincials: At the games which he gave at Gades he presented a gold ring [the symbol of a knight] to an actor, one Herennius Gallus, on the last day of the show, and led him to a seat in the fourteen rows (that being the number he had assigned to the Knights). He extended his own term of office on the Board of Four [the governing magistrates of the town]. He held elections, that is to say he returned his own nominees, for two years in two days. . . .

For other proceedings he could not even quote Caesar's precedent. He put on a play at the show about the journey he made to persuade Proconsul L. Lentulus to change sides, and what is worse, burst into tears during the performance at the poignant memory of his adventures. At the gladiators a Pompeian soldier called Fadius, who had been forced to join the troop, twice fought to a finish without pay. Being unable to bind himself over as a gladiator, he besought the people to protect him. Balbus had his Gaulish horse charge the crowd (some stones had been flung at him when Fadius was being hauled off), and then carried the man off to the Gladiator School, where he had him buried in the ground and burned alive. While this was going on, Balbus walked up and down after lunch barefoot, his tunic loose and his hands behind his back. The poor fellow kept crying out pitifully that he was a Roman citizen born. 'Off you go then!' said Balbus. 'Appeal to the People!' He even threw Roman citizens to the wild beasts, among them a certain pedlar who went around auction-sales, a very well-known character in Hispalis - because he had a deformity! Such is the monster I have had to deal with![2]

Indeed, if Pollio's remarks are true (and there is

no obvious reason for him to lie about such atrocities), Balbus junior's actions are horrible! Syme calls him "courageous and proud, cruel and luxurious."[3] One wonders if Balbus Major's complaint of "unpopularity" may have arisen out of his nephew's tyrannical conduct.[4]

Octavian apparantly appreciated such qualities, or else ignored them, since the younger Balbus flourished during the last half of the First Century B.C. Surviving the turbulent years of the 40s and 30s, he does not appear in literary sources but inscriptions indicate that Balbus was rewarded after Actium with a Pontificate and consular rank by Augustus.[5] He became Proconsul of Africa and his aggressive actions during 21-20 earned him a Triumph on 27 March 19 for subjugating the Garamantes. He was the last Roman who was not a member of the Imperial family to receive a triumph.[6]

He apparently matured sufficiently in his later years to become a philanthropist of sorts since he undertook building projects in Gades and built a theatre in Rome.[7] The dedication of the theatre in 13 is the last we hear of the Balbi although we are told through an inscription that his daughter married C. Norbanus Flaccus (cos. 25) who was an ally of Augustus.[8] With the mention of the unnamed daughter, the Balbi disappear from history.

END NOTES -- Chapter 1

[1]To appreciate the high mortality rates of antiquity see J. P. V. D. Balsdon, Life and Leisure in Ancient Rome (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969), 88; Paul Veyne, ed., A History of Private Life (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987), 9-31; P. A. Brunt, Italian Manpower: 225 B.C.-A.D. 14 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 9, 146-53; for a study of the high mortality rate of ancient times see Keith Hopkins, Death and Renewal (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 70-2.

[2]J. S. Richardson, Hispania: Spain and the Developement of Roman Imperialism, 218 - 82 B.C (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 11, 13; C. H. V. Sutherland, The Romans in Spain (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1939), 1-2; Strabo's account is accurate:

> Now of Iberia the larger part affords but poor means of livelihood; for the most of the inhabited country consists of mountains, forests, and plains whose soil is thin -- and even that not uniformly well-watered. And Northern Iberia, in addition to its ruggedness, not only is extremely cold, but lies next to the ocean, and thus has acquired its characteristic of inhospitality and aversion to intercourse with other countries; consequently, it is an exceedingly wretched place to live in. Such, then, is the northern parts; but almost the whole of Southern Iberia is fertile, particularly the region outside the Pillars. (Strab. 3.1.2)

[3]Sutherland, 3; Richardson, 14.

[4]Sutherland, 4.

[5]Ibid., 6, 19; Richardson, 16; Gerhard Herm, The Celts (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1975), 166.

[6]The semi-mythical city of Tarshish (Tartessus) was the only civilized, urban state in Southern Spain which actually had a chance at becoming a major maritime state. It was reputedly a highly civilized city wealthy in art, gold, trade contacts, and industry. It was destroyed by Carthage around 520 - 505 B.C. Its location is unknown but the place is possibly mentioned in the Bible (1 Kings 10.22; 22.48); see Sutherland, 9; and Paul MacKendrick, The Iberian Stones Speak (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1969), 23-40.

[7]Richardson, 17-20; Sutherland, 10; MacKendrick, 39-40.

[8]Richardson, 17-20; Sutherland, 11, 14; MacKendrick, 43-58.

[9]Sutherland, 14. Ernst Badian disagrees saying that "Rome [as late as 231] had not clients or interests in Spain." E. Badian, Foreign Clientelae (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958, reprinted 1967), 48.

[10]Ibid., 16-7; Richardson, 20; Diod. Sic. 25.12; Livy 21.2.3-7.

[11]Sutherland, 18.

[12]Ibid., 27-9; Richardson, 21, 25; Polyb. 3.24.4; Ernst Badian discusses the obligations and political ties with Spain prior to hostilities in his Foreign Clientelae. The breaking of the Ebro Treaty and Saguntum's autonomy were only the sparks which set off the inevitable explosion:

> Did Rome finally go to war for the sake of Saguntum? The question is as absurd as to ask whether in 1939 the Allies went to war for the sake of Poland. In each case there were obligations, yet in each case there was a party that wanted to minimize and ignore them; in each case war was finally forced on the power concerned by the fact that it had staked its prestige by amounts to an ultimatum at a time when the enemy still seemed able to be persuaded -- and by the still more important fact that war was seen to be ultimately inevitable. (Badian, 51-2)

[13]Sutherland, 22, 24; Richardson, 34; Spain was a "powerful and wealthy limb" of the Punic Empire, over 20,000 Spanish troops were sent to Africa. (Sutherland, 29)

[14]Richardson, 29-30.

[15]Sutherland, 32; Richardson, 31.

[16]Sutherland, 33-6; Richardson, 32.

[17]Richardson, 40-2, 56-61;Sutherland, 45; Livy 25.3.6., 32.27.6.

[18]Richardson, 45-51; Lawrence Keppie, The Making of the Roman Army (Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble, 1984), 19; Polyb. 10.20; Livy 26.51; H. H. Scullard, Scipio Africanus: Soldier and Politician (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1970), 39ff, 64-66.

[19]Richardson, 52; Sutherland, 36-42; Scullard, 39-

107.

[20]Richardson, 1, 75-77, 94; Sutherland, 45. Livy 32.28.2 discusses the decision for making boundaries. See also Scullard, 32-3, 39-45; Emilio Gabba, Republican Rome: The Army and the Allies (Berkeley: University of California, 1976), 105. The dividing point between the two provinces was Carthago Nova. Geography and military logistics demanded the division of Spain into two manageable regions. Hispania Citerior consisted of the slim eastern coastal strip which was vital for military operations being conducted in the barren interior. The east coast, with its roads and ports, provided the legions with supplies. The province, however, could not be extended all the way to Gades due to distance and geography. The mountains (Baetic Cordillera) and the sea dangerously tapered the southwest portion of Hispania Citerior. A secure base and port, Nova Carthago, was necessary and served as the dividing point. South of the base was located the second military provincia, Hispania Ulterior, which covered the Baetis Valley and far south coastal areas.

[21]Sutherland, 21.

[22]Sutherland, 57-8; Richardson, 80-94; Gabba, 81, 106; Badian, 121; Livy 32.27.6, 32.28.11, 34.21.7; see also J. S. Richardson, "Spanish Mines and the Developement of Provincial Taxation in the Second Century B.C." J.R.S. 66 (1976): 139-152; G. D. B. Jones, "The Roman Mines at Riotinto." J.R.S. 70 (1980): 146-165.

[23]T. Rice Holmes, The Roman Republic and the Founder of the Empire Vol.3. (New York: Russell & Russell, 1923, Reissued 1967), 138.

[24]Sutherland, 52, 60; see also Badian, 120; Richardson, Hispania, 91-94; Brunt, 230-2; Theodore Mommsen, The Provinces of the Roman Empire William P. Dickson trans. (Chicago: Ares Publishers, Inc.,1909, reprinted 1974), 73; Richardson, 123.

[25]Richardson, Hispania, 80-91; Sutherland, 64-7; Badian, 119; Livy 29.1, 31.49, 33.27; Plut. Cat. Mai., 10, 11.

[26]Sutherland, 64-8, 86; Mommsen, 63, 65.

[27]Sutherland, 70.

[28]R. E. Smith, Service in the Post-Marian Roman Army (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958), 6-7, 21; Brunt, 432-433; Keppie, 44.

[29]Sutherland, 70; Keppie, 44.

[30]Keppie, 44.

[31]Sutherland, 63.

[32]Richardson, Hispania, 124.

[33]Sutherland, 76-8; N. G. L. Hammond and H. H. Scullard, The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 2nd. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 454.

[34]Sutherland, 76-8; Richardson, Hispania, 126-155; O.C.D., 626, 1128. Viriathus served as Spain's Boudicca as Sutherland recounts:

> Alive, Viriathus had represented all that was fine in the national character: a man who, considering that he was a barbarian, had the most eminent qualities as a commander, typically brave, sober, hardy, and resourceful, he was the one leader capable of keeping an army in the field for eight years with out a hint of unrest or sedition. Dead, his name was a perpetual reproach to Roman arms and chivalry; and Spaniards assumed it in his honour for long years afterwards. (Sutherland, 79)

For an account of the war with Viriathus see App. Hisp.11-12.

[35]Richardson, Hispania, 138-9; The lex de repetundis allowed individuals to sue an ex-governor for the loss or damage of property. How this law was applied against Galba is questionable since he basically murdered or sold the Lusitanians; he did not steal or damage any property unless Cato tried to argue that the Lusitanians were the property of their chieftains. At any rate, Richardson discusses the legal problems on pp. 138-9.

[36]Ibid., 126-55; Sutherland, 90; for an account of the Numantine War and Scipio Aemilianus, see A. E. Astin, Scipio Aemilianus (Oxford: Clarendon Press,1967), 135-60.

[37]Sutherland, 9, 48, 102-6, 117; Strab. 3.5.3-5.

[38]Sutherland, 24-5.

[39]Badian, 119;Cic. Balb., 34; Cicero, Pro Balbo, trans. R. Gardner (Cambridge: Loeb Classical Library, 1958, reprinted 1987), 613; Peter Garnsey and Richard Saller, The Roman Empire: Economy, Society,and Culture (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 28. Garnsey and Saller define the civitates foederatae:

> Federate cities (*civitates foederatae*) were so called because they struck treaties with Rome establishing their rights. Free cities (*civitates liberae*) were theoretically exempt from interference by the provincial governor. Free and immune cities (*civitates liberae et immunes*) possessed the additional privilege of immunity from taxation. Tax-exempt cities were always very rare, while the number of free cities declined in the course of the late Republic and early empire. A mere handful of western cities enjoyed free or federate status at any time. (Garnsey & Saller, 28)

[40]Mommsen, 68; Sutherland, 53, 60; Gardner, 613.

[41]MacKendrick, 30-2; see also Strab. 3.5.3. The town was also populated with negotiatores who were middle to upper class business men. P. A. Brunt tells about them in Italian Manpower:

> The *negotiatores* comprised bankers, moneylenders, merchants, manufacturers, mining and transport contractors, and shipowners; the term may even include landowners . . . So far as our evidence goes, the traders were not small retailers, nor were the manufacturers necessarily craftsmen producing goods in small shops for a very narrow market. . . . The richest persons in this class probably retained their domicile in Italy and some probably made only occasional visits to their provincial lands or businesses, which they could manage for the rest of the time through procurators. At any one time some rich men were indeed to be found among the provinces, like the landowners in Sicily, *equites* in Spain, and the 300 who formed the *conventus* of Utica in the 40s . . . (Brunt, 211-12)

[42]Holmes, 153; Ronald Syme, Roman Papers Vol. 1, E. Badian, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 105.

[43]Ibid.; Gardner, 613, 615.

[44]As part of a leading family, Balbus was given an education and had a chance to serve under the Roman commanders as an officer. His lifestyle was probably quite Romanized by the time he received citizenship since the south and east coasts had been inhabited by influential Italian merchants since the Second Punic War.

[45]"Since his father is called Lucius in the Fasti (C.I.L. (ed. 2), i, p. 158) he also must have been enfranchised." (Gardner, 614)

[46]Pliny, HN 5.36, 7.136.

[47]Brunt, 399, 405; Gardner, 613.

[48]O.C.D., 155.

[49]G. R. Watson, The Roman Soldier (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1969), 11-30; Keppie, 78-9; for later auxilia see G. L. Cheesman, The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1914).

[50]Cic. Balb. 2.5; Philip O. Spann, Quintus Sertorius and the Legacy of Sulla (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 1987), 56; Plut. Sert. 9.3.

[51]Spann, 51.

[52]O.C.D., 648; Stewart Perowne, Death of the Roman Republic (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1968), 84-91; Holmes, 47-53; Plut. Mar.; T. F. Carney, Marius (Chicago: Argonaut, Inc., 1970).

[53]Gabba states in his book that Marius' reforms have been exaggerated. The lower classes had been entering the army gradually due to the lowering of property qualifications for service in the army. "These reductions of the census minimum qualifications [from 11,000 sesterces to 1,500], therefore, marked the stages in the proletarianization of the Roman citizen militia." (Gabba, 5) "Marius' 'reform' (107 B.C.) did not make important or substantial innovations in the Roman army; the proletarian army of the years following 107 B.C., a professional and voluntary one, differed little in composition or outlook from the army that preceded it." (Gabba, 12)

[54]Perowne, 91.

[55]Lily Ross Taylor, Party Politics in the Age of Caesar (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1948), 17.

[56]O.C.D., 753; Taylor, 10-16; "Those who have wished their deeds and words to be pleasing to the multitude have been held to be *populares*, and those who have conducted themselves in such a manner that their consuls have met the approval of all the best men have been held to be *optimates*." (Taylor, 11, quoting Cir. Sest. 96); Spann, 6.

[57]Spann, 28; see also 46.

[58]Perowne, 96-112; Erich S. Gruen, The Last Generation of the Roman Republic (Berkeley: University of

California, 1974), Gruen explains the major reform of the Sullan constitution:

> Of civilian magistrates, only the tribunate saw its powers diminished. This was consistent with the Sullan system. Ambitious politicians had recently used the tribunate to make reckless promises and stir the populace against its leaders. Sulla closed higher magistracies to holders of the tribunate. If the post attracted second-rank individuals, the people would continue to look to their traditional patrons in the rolls of the Senate." (Gruen, 8)

For the consequences of Sulla's reign in general see Gruen 6-46; and T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistracies of the Roman Republic, Vol. 2 (Cleveland: Western Reserve University, 1951, reprinted 1968), 74-78; Spann believes that Sulla's reign "was, in effect, the school (with Sulla as the headmaster) where the major figures of the next generation acquired the personal and political hatreds, the cynicism, and the contempt for the unwritten rules of the Republic that led them to destroy it in the 40s" (Spann, xiii, see also 54); for a biography see, Plut. Sull.

[59]See Chapter 2.

[60]Spann, 10-17; for general comments on pro versus con Sertorian studies see Gabba, 103-5, Gruen, 17, and Spann's bibliography.

[61]Spann, 11-32; O.C.D., 979; Plut. Sert.3-5.

[62]Spann, 38-39; Exsup. Opusc. 8; T. Robert S. Broughton, Magistrates of the Roman Republic, Vol. 2 (Cleveland: American Philological Association, 1952, reprinted 1968), 63.

[63]Spann, 44-5; see also Gruen, 46.

[64]Keppie, 44, 71-3; John Boardman, et al., Oxford History of the Classical World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 429.; for a general account on the "theories" of successful guerilla warfare see E. Guevara, On Guerilla Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), and Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerilla Warfare (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965).

[65]Plut. Sert. 10; Spann, 58; Sutherland, 91-5.

[66]:John Leach, Pompey the Great (London: Croom Helm, 1978), 29.

[67]Frontin. Str. 2.5.31; Plut. Sert. 18; Leach reports that "the failure of the operation can be largely attributed to Pompey's inexperience, both of the geography of Spain and of guerilla tactics, and to over-confidence leading to carelessness." (Leach, 47); Spann, 94-7. Spann's account is excellent.

[68]Cic. Balb. 2.5.

[69]Spann, 104.

[70]Spann, 111.

[71]Ibid.; Plut. Pomp. 18; Cic. Balb. 2.5.

[72]Spann, 111-2.

[73]Ibid.; Plut. Pomp. 19; Plut. Sert. 19; Appian BC 1.110.

[74]Cic. Balb. 2.5; Cicero also mentions that Balbus served on land and *sea*, but there are no passages placing Balbus in the Roman navy. Roman naval activity was limited to protecting the supply convoys from Sertorius' pirates. (Plut. Pomp.19.6; Plut. Sert. 21.5) Perhaps Balbus, with his knowledge of the coast or possible maritime skills acquired from Gades, was employed as a coast guard some time during the war.

[75]Spann, 115; for the battle of Segontia see Plut. Sert. 21. P. O. Spann, " Saguntume vs. Segontia: A Note on the Topography of the Sertorian War." Historia 33 (1984): 116-19; Memmius, Pompey's quaestor and Balbus' companion at New Carthage, was killed during this battle (Plut. Sert. 21.1).

[76]Spann, 177; "A war of attrition was impossible without more supplies and reinforcements, and during this winter (75-74 B.C.) Pompey sent a toughly-worded despatch to the Senate in which he complained bitterly of their failure to keep him properly supplied and threatened that if he was forced to abandon his campaign they might expect and invasion of Italy to follow." (Leach, 50) One can realize how desperate Pompey was by perusing the actual letter:

> If I had been warring against you, against my country, against my father's gods, when I endured such hardships and dangers as those amid which from my early youth the armies under my command have routed the most criminal of your enemies and insured your safety; even then, Conscript Fathers, you could have done no more against me in my absence tha you are

> doing. For after having exposed me, in spite of my youth, to a most cruel war, you have . . . destroyed me and a faithful army by starvation, the most wretched of all deaths. Was it with such expectations that the Roman people sent its sons to war? Are these the rewards for wounds and for so often shedding our blood for our country? Wearied with writing letters and sending envoys, I have exhausted my personal resources and even my expectations, and in the meantime for three years you have barely given me the means of meeting a year's expenses. By the immortal gods! do you think that I can play the part of a treasury or maintain an army without food or pay?. . .
>
> Why need I enumerate our battles or our winter campaigns, the towns which we destroyed or captured? Actions speak louder than words. The taking of the enemy's camp at Sucro, the battle at the River Turia, . . . In return for these, grateful fathers, you give me want and hunger. Thus the condition of my army and of that the enemy is the same; for neither is paid and either can march victorius into Italy. Of this situation I warn you and I beg you to give it your attention; do not force me to provide for my necessities on my own responsibility. Hither Spain, so far as it is not in the possession of the enemy,either we or Sertorius have devastated to the point of ruin, except for the coastal towns, so that it is actually an expense and a burden to us. . . . I myself have exhausted not only my means, but even my credit. You are our only resource; unless you come to our rescue, against my will, but not without warning from me, our army will pass over into Italy, bringing with it all the war in Spain. (Spann, 121-2; translation of Sall. Historia 2.98)

Syme relates that the letter was used by Sallust in his Historia to discredit Pompey. Besides falsifying the victory of the Battle of the Sucro the "document discloses chill ambition, boasting, menace and mendacity." (see Ronald Syme, Sallust (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), 201)

[77]Spann, 123-33.

[78]Ibid., 133-36; the assassination is vividly described by Plut. Sert. 26.

[79]Leach, 53; Cic. Balb. 19; Gardner, 614; Spann, 138.

[80]Holmes, 132; Badian, 254, 259; Badian calls the granting of citizenship by commanders as "quite a common practice." (Badian, 259); A. N. Sherwin-White, in The

Roman Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), concludes that the viritum grants went back to the Punic Wars (pp. 53-4, 188) and "the gift of honorary citizenship to individuals in return for services rendered was a long-established practice among the Romans." (Sherwin-White, 188)

[81]Brunt, 5, 204-5.

[82]Ibid., 204-5; Gardner, 621; Polyb. 6.14 alludes to the people having the "right to confer honours." For a detailed study of Roman citizenship see A. N. Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship ((Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939).

[83]Gardner, 623; Brunt, 204-5; For Marius' enfranchisement see Plut. Mar.28.2, and Cic. Balb. 46, 47; Cn. Pompeius Strabo with the *lex Iulia* conferred citizenship on the Spanish auxiliaries in 89 (C.I.L., 2nd. ed., Vol.1, 709, 714). The enfranchisements will be covered in greater detail in Chapter 3.

[84]Leach, 53.

[85]Badian, 253-259.

[86]Ibid., 278,285-90.

[87]bid., 253. See also Syme, 51; Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, ed. Patronage in Ancient Society (New York: Routledge, 1989), 65, 75-6.

[88]Gardner, 614; D. P. Simpson, comp. Cassell's Latin & English Dictionary (New York: Collier Books, 1963), 26.

[89]Badian, 253-255; Syme, 51-2.

[90]Syme, 52, see also 68; Gardner, 614.

END NOTES -- Chapter 2

[1]Holmes, 156-60; Perowne 125-6; Allen M. Ward, Marcus Crassus and the Late Roman Republic (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1977), 83-98; Plut. Crass. 8; Pomp. 21.

[2]Ward, 46-57, 88-96; OCD, 295. Crassus derived his wealth through a variety of methods. He bought up real estate in Rome, purchased burned out buildings and renovatedthem for a profit, held rental property, and employed an army of skilled slaves which were often hired out. "If someone needed the temporary services of a reader or copyist, Crassus, for a fee, could fill the need from the ranks of his trained slaves. If someone were giving an unusually large banquet, Crassus was right there with the necessary personnel." (Ward, 73-4; see also Plut. Crass. 2) With his wealth, clientela, family connections, and cunning, Crassus ascended the cursus honorum as any aspiring young Roman politician. For his part in the war see Ward, 85-96.

[3]Ward, 98-103; Ronald Syme, The Roman Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939; reprinted w/corrections 1952), 29. See also Perowne, 130; Holmes, 163; Leach, 58-9; B. A. Marshall, "Crassus' Ovation in 71," Hist. 21 (1972): 669-73; Plut. Pomp. 21.2; Plut. Crass. 11.7-8. Although we have no evidence, Balbus may have taken part in the mopping up operations against Spartacus and may have marched along in Pompey's triumph. If he did see action against Spartacus there was a slight chance he could have met Caesar who was military tribune in 72 and may have also seen service against Spartacus in 72-71 (see Matthias Gelzer, Caesar: Politician and Statesman, trans. Peter Needham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968), 29, for Caesar as military tribune and for possible involvment in Servile War).

[4]Ward, 102-3; Leach, 60-1; Holmes, 164-5; Perowne, 130; Gruen, 43-5; Taylor, 19-20; Plut. Pomp. 22.3; T. R. S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, Vol.2 (Cleveland, OH: American Philological Association, 1952, reprinted 1968), 126-31.

[5]Ward, 103; Leach, 62; Holmes, 164; Perowne, 130; Taylor, 112; A. M. H. Jones, The Criminal Courts of the Roman Republic and Principate (Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1972), 69; Gruen, 32-3. Gruen states the jury reforms had little impact on the *plebs* and the reforms mattered little to them.

[6]Ward, 103; Leach, 61-2; Cic. Div. Caec. 8; Cic.

Verr. 2.5.15, 1.54; Flac. 45; Plut. Pomp. 22.5.

[7]Taylor, 52; Brunt, 16.

[8]Taylor, 53-55, 72; OHC, 395-6; see also E. S. Staveley, Greek and Roman Voting and Elections (London: 1972); L. R. Taylor, Roman Voting Assemblies (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, 1966).

[9]Taylor, Party Politics, 55-62.

[10]Ibid.

[11]Ward, 52, 104; Gardner, 615; Cic. Balb. 56. By this time the equestrian order (the knights) was very powerful (hence Sulla's attempt at controling them). The business class, publicani, negotiatores, and other entrepreneurs, had gained in power ever since the lex Claudia of 218 BC forbade Senators from owning large ships for overseas trade (Livy, 21.63). The growth of the empire led to the growth and influence of the equites, who becoming near equals to the Senators in wealth and status demanded a stronger say in government. The power of the equites continued to rise as they maintained financial control of the empire. See H. Hill, The Roman Middle Class in the Republican Period (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952). "Next to the magistracy, the Middle Class represented the most dangerous threat to senatorial supremacy." (Hill, 148) Balbus, "the millionaire from Gades" (Syme, "Caesar, The Senate, and Italy," Papers of the British School at Rome 14 (1938):1-31) was one of these equites. Much later, Balbus' wealth is also indicated in a letter to Atticus (Cic. Att. 7.7) wherein Balbus' garden and villa are mentioned.

[12]Gardner, 615; Cic. Balb. 57. We have no details on the trial, only Cicero's mention of it in the Pro Balbo.

[13]Taylor, Party Politics, 54; see also 113-4; and Jones, Criminal Courts, 74-80.

[14]Taylor, Party Politics, 98-9. See also p.100 and Jones Criminal Courts, passim.

[15]See pages 3-4 above.

[16]Thomas N. Mitchell, Cicero: The Ascending Years (London: Yale University Press, 1979), 108; D. R. Shackleton Bailey, Cicero (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971) 16-7; David Stockton, Cicero: A Political Biography, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 48.

[17]Mitchell, 108.

[18]This point is debated. Holmes, 164-5, Stockton, 43, and Elizabeth Rawson, Cicero: A Portrait. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1975, revised 1983), 43 see the speech as a shot at the optimates and as a factor in the jury reforms. Mitchell disagrees saying that the trial was not an attack against the oligarchy nor a call for reform. The evidence for such a contention is too slim according to Mitchell (109, 144-6).

[19]Holmes, 166; "There are no major events in 69 or 68 to highlight specific details of Crassus's activity, but he certainly did not remain inactive politically, as has sometimes been thought. We can be sure that, along with managing his extensive financial affairs, he resumed his familiar routine of earning gratitude as an advocate [in the courts]." (Ward, 112) "For Pompey this was his first release from arduous public duty for eight years, and it is hardly surprising that, as Plutarch tells us, 'he ceased his frequent appearances as a barrister, gradually abandoned the Forum, and seldom showed himself in public and when he did was always accompanied by a large crowd of followers.'" (Leach, 63)

[20]Gelzer, 19; Plutarch and Suetonius are both missing the family history and years of Caesar's childhood in their manuscripts.

[21]Gelzer, 20-1; Suet. Iul. 1; Plut. Caes. 1.

[22]Gelzer, 21-2; Suet. Iul. 2.

[23]Gelzer, 22-3.

[24]Suet. Iul. 4; Translation from Gaius Suetonius Tranquillus, The Twelve Caesars, trans. Robert Graves (New York: Penguin Books, 1957, revised edition by Michael Grant, 1979), 14; see also A. M. Ward, "Caesar and the Pirates," CP 70 (1975): 267-68.

[25]Gelzer, 24.

[26]Ibid., 29; Suet. Iul. 5.

[27]Gelzer, 30; Ward, 110-11; Holmes, 227.

[28]Gelzer, 63; Syme, Rom. Rev., 72; Gardner, 615. It should be noted that we have no evidence which specifically tells us that Caesar met Balbus during his quaestorship. The above scholars are making assumptions. It is only probable, not definite, that Caesar met Balbus during his quaestorship. Balbus would have had

connections in Gades and Further Spain, and thus would have been a valuable person to Caesar. Balbus may have made a favorable impression on Caesar in Spain and so was chosen as praefectus fabrum for 71, and finally we cannot forget the possibility that the two met (and became friends) during the Servile War (Chap. 2, n. 9).

[29]Cic. Balb. 43; Gardner (p. 615) describes Balbus as hospes publicus or patronus of the people of Gades. Section 43 of the Pro Balbo discusses in detail the benefits which Balbus was able to secure for the city with his connections in Rome. See also Barbara K. Gold, "Pompey and Theophanes of Mytilene," AJP 106 (Fall 1985): 312-27. "Balbus, like Theophanes, became a sort of ambassador for his own city: Cicero calls him a *hospes* in the Pro Balbo (43)." (Gold, 323)

[30]Suet. Iul. 7. Plutarch passes over this period in Caesar's career (Plut. Caes. 5.3); Gelzer, 31; Holmes, 224.

[31]OCD, 906; On their custody over the praetor's finances see Cic. In Verr. 1.40; Taylor, 30; E. Badian, "The Silence of Norbanus: A Note on Provincial Quaestors under the Republic," AJP 104 (Summer 1983): 156-71.

[32]Caesar speaks of his generosity toward Further Spain: "At the start of my quaestorship I determined that this above all provinces should be my especial concern and I lavished on it such good offices as were at that time in my power." (Caes. bell. Hisp. 42.1) Translation from Caesar, The Civil War: together with The Alexandrian War, The African War, and The Spanish War by other Hands, trans. Jane F. Gardner (New York: Penguin Books, 1976), 287.

[33]Gelzer, 32; Suetonius gives an adequate synopsis of the incident which Balbus probably thought was a little far fetched:

> [Caesar] laid down his quaestorship at once, bent on performing some notable act at the first opportunity that offered. He visited the Latin colonists beyond the Po, who were bitterly demanding the same Roman citizenship as that granted to other townsfolk in Italy; and might have persuaded them to revolt, had not the Consuls realized the danger and garrisoned that district with the legions recently raised for [operations in the East]. (Suet. Iul. 8)

[34]Gelzer, 33; S. Jameson, "Pompey's *Imperium* in 67: Some Constitutional Fictions," Hist. 19 (1970): 539-60; Leach, 63-74; On the pirates see Plut. Pomp. 24 Cic. Leg.

Man. 11; and Dio Cassius 20-23; Caesar had a personal reason for seeing Pompey rid the sea of pirates because of his abduction in 75 (see pp. 12-3).

The importance and historical significance of the lex Gabinia is pointed out by T. R. Holmes:

> Plutarch remarked that the law made Pompey 'not an admiral, but a monarch'; and modern historians for the most part hold that it was a revolutionary measure, which tended towards the establishment of military autocracy. Perhaps, though the people were now clutching at the senatorial prerogative of appointing to extraordinary commands, it would be nearer the truth to say it was a symptom of revolution. The immense power which it conferred upon Pompey did not itself lead to military rule; it was conferred because the evolution of Roman politics had long been heading towards that end. Unlimited power had been granted without protest to Antonius [an optimate who had been given a proconsular command against the pirates in 73, and the father of Mark Antony] because the senators had no fear that he would use it against themselves: they did fear Pompey because they failed to understand that what he desired was not despotism, but that all men should do reverence to Pompey the Great. One may doubt whether at any time during the past few years piracy could have been extirpated unless discretionary power had been conferred upon one commander; and if it was dangerous to the Republic to grant such power, the reason was that the Republic was already in danger. The Senate had become weakened and contained no one of great practical ability except Pompey himself, Crassus, and Caesar; its authority must have been shaken by the disgrace of Verres; it was not supported by the public opinion of Italy; and it no longer commanded the allegiance of the troops. (Holmes, 172-3)

For Cicero's position on the law see, A. M. Ward, "Cicero's Support of the *Lex Gabinia*," CW 63 (1969): 8-10.

[35]Leach, 74-5; Plut. Pomp. 30; Cic. Leg. Man.

[36]"This [speech] was a turning-point in Cicero's fortunes, because from now onwards (though with occasional lapses, as will be seen) his principal alliance was given to Pompeius -- though sometimes to an ideal Pompeius who bore little relation to that gifted but ungracious hero himself." (Cicero, Selected Political Speeches, trans. w/ intro. Michael Grant (New York: Penguin Books, 1969), 34-5.

[37]Rawson, 53; Stockton, 59-61; Holmes, 202; For the

importance of Asia to the publicani and to the economy of Rome see Hill, 68; OHC, 426-428; Kevin Greene, The Archaeology of the Roman Economy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986); M. I. Finley, The Ancient Economy (London: 1973); Michael Fulford, "Economic Interdependence Among Urban Communities of the Roman Mediterranean," WA 19 (June 1987):58-75; OCD, 130-1; Cicero himself had financial concerns andso sympathized with the businessmen, see D. Lange, "Two Financial Manuevers of Cicero," CW 65 (1972): 152-5; David Magie, Roman Rule in Asia Minor, 2 Vols. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1950, reprinted 1966), 159ff.

[38]"[It] was vital for the Roman politician to maintain personal contact, both with his fellows in the Senate and with his supporters and clients." Leach, p. 102, talking about Pompey's loss of support and disadvagtages while being away in the East.

[39]Ward, 125; Gelzer, 37; Plut. Caes. 5.4-5, 11.1; on the grand games Caesar hosted during his aedileship see Suet. Iul. 10.

[40]Gelzer, 38; Suet. Iul. 11; Plut. Caes. 6.

[41]Plut. Cic. 12.2-5; Cic. Leg. Agr., passim; Gelzer, 42-3; Ward, 152-162; Stockton, 86; Gruen, 389-96; Broughton, MRR, 168.

[42]Stockton, 83-90; Mitchell, 204; Rawson, 64-6; A. W. Lintott, Violence in Repulbican Rome (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 179; Cic. Leg. Agr. For the conspiracy see Rawson, 60-88; Taylor, Party Politics, 124-5; Stockton, 100-142; Holmes, 253-77; Sallust Bellum Catilinae; Plut. Cic. 11-22; Cicero In Catilinam (four speeches); K. H. Waters, "Cicero, Sallust, and Cataline," Hist. 19 (1970): 195-215.

[43]Ward, 173; Gelzer, 47-53; Mitchell, 179-84; Sall. Cat. 26-27; Cic. Cat. 1.1-3.

[44]Caesar and Crassus may have supported Catiline up until the time he became a revolutionary, see Ward, 172, 183; Gelzer, 47-9; Holmes, 470-73. The "ultimate decree" was first used against Gaius Tiberius by the Senate who felt threatened by him. The decree was used for state emergencies when the aediles were unable to maintain order (since they were quasi-police officials). Since there were no police in Rome the magistrates served the purpose. When the mob became violent the decree was used; it was a last resort to keep the peace but there was no set criteria for its use. It was generally interpreted as allowing the magistrates to undertake any measures to

secure the safety of the state, but it was not as overreaching as a conferred dictatorship. See Taylor, 16, 123-4; Lintott, 172-4; Mitchell, 207-213; A. N. Sherwin-White, "Violence in Roman Politics," JRS 46 (1956): 1-9.

[45]Grant, Selected Speeches, 73. Mitchell states that the conspiracy was suppressed quickly and had never "come close to overthowing the government or precipitating a dangerous civil war." (p. 239) But it could have been since Rome had no police force and no home army to defend itself against a serious uprising. There were certainly enough malcontents to pose a threat. The keys to subduing the revolt were the early warnings and Cicero's subsequent actions carried through with his oratory. (Mitchell, 239-41); see also Stockton, 143; Rawson, 90-1.

[46]Holmes, 290; Ward, 197; Plut. Pomp. 43.1.

[47]Gelzer, 59. The amusing story is narrated in Plut. Caes. 10. Pompeia was divorced since, of course, Caesar's wife "must be above suspicion." (10.6) Quite ironic considering Caesar's flirtatious activites described by Suet. Iul. 50-52. And one must not forget the vulgar song sung by his troops in their triumph for Gaul:

> Home we bring our bald whoremonger;
> Romans, lock your wives away!
> All the bags of gold you lent him
> Went his Gallic tarts to pay.
> -- Suet. Iul. 51.

For Clodius' political significance and his policies see, A. W. Lintott, "P. Clodius Pulcher -- Felix Catalina?" Greece and Rome 14 (1967): 157-69.

[48]See note 29; Leach, 78; OCD, 1058.

[49]Gold (above n. 29), 322-4; Gardner, 616-7; Cic. Att. 7.11. The rise and importance of foreigners in Late Republican politics has been noted by scholars. "By the end of the Republic foreign amici had even begun to wield power in Rome as advisors to the great dynasts; Theophanes of Mytilene was an intimate of Pompey's, and L. Cornelius Balbus of Gades was Caesar's trusted agent." (OHC, 433) See also, Badian's Foreign Clientelae, passim; Gruen, 409-11; Ronald Syme, "Some Friends of the Caesars," American Journal of Philology 77 (1956) 264-73; J. P. V. D. Balsdon, Romans and Aliens (London: 1979). Roman attitudes toward foreigners are discussed in Chapter 3.

[50]Gold (above n. 29), 323; Gardner, 616-7; Cic. Att. 7.7. In the Pro Balbo, Circero stated, "[Balbus'] adoption by . . . Theophanes was severely criticized; but

by it Cornelius gained nothing but the right to inherit the property of his own relatives." (Cic. Balb. 57)

[51]Gold, 324. See also Gardner, 616.

[52]Caesar, being heavily in debt, immediately left for Spain so as to avoid his creditors. Crassus staved off some of the collectors by providing some security. The loan illustrates the continuing friendship between Crassus and Caesar. See Gelzer, 61; Ward 209; Plut. Caes. 11.1-3; Plut. Crass. 7.6.

[53] Cic. Balb. 63. Older accounts see the praefectus fabrum as a chief engineer (engineers built the catapults, bridges, etc.), see Holmes, 117-8; Gardner, 615; Caes. BGall. 5.11.3. More recent studies suggest the officer served really as an chief of staff or aide-de-camp to the general, see Gold, 322 (she agrees with J. Suolahti, The Junior Officers of the Roman Army in the Republican Period: A Study on Social Structure (Helsinki: 1955), 205-9, 216); Keppie agrees: "An officer of engineers (*praefectus fabrum*) is frequently attested in the armies of the Late Republic, but the post seems in reality an aide-de-camp on a commander's personal staff, and certainly no *praefectus fabrum* appears in any account of battle, or fortification or engineering project in Caesar's writings." (Keppie, 99; see also p. 178); and also Syme, Rom. Rev., 355; Ronald Syme, "Who was Vedius Pollio?" JRS 51 (1961): 23-30.

[54]Gelzer, 62-3. See also, Holmes, 302-3; Plut. Caes. 12.

[55]Cic. Att. 1.17.

[56]Syme, Rom. Rev., 34. See also Taylor, Party Politics, 119-137, especially 139; Gruen, 83-90; Plut. Cat. Min. 30-31.

[57]Gelzer, 68.

[58]Cic. Att. 2.3.

[59]Rawson, 106. See also Bailey, 50-1; Stockton, 168-9.

[60]Suet. Iul. 19, 21; Plut. Pomp. 67.6; Plut. Caes. 14.4-5.

[61]Syme, Rom. Rev., 35-6. Gruen believes the alliance of 59 has been exaggerated:

But the retrospective lamenting is excessive. . . .

the union of political cliques in 59 was an informal *amicitia*. That betokened no novelty in Roman politics and simply underlined the mobility of groupings that had been characteristic of previous decades. The three men sought mutual advantage by combining *clientelae* and influence. In traditional fashion the pact was sealed by marriage alliance: Pompey wed the daughter of Caesar. Rape of the Republic was not its aim, nor its effect. (Gruen, 90-91)

[62]Syme, Rom. Rev., 72; Gardner, 615-6, 732.

END NOTES -- Chapter 3

[1]Dio Cass. 38.1-2; Plut. Caes. 14; Gelzer, 72-5, 86-7; Gerard Walter, Caesar: A Biography (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), 111-13, 121-2; Plut. Pomp. 47.4-5, 48.1-3; Suet. Iul. 20-22; Leach, 123-7; Gardner, xvii; Ward, 219, 226; Dio Cass. 38.8.5; Lintott, 189-90; Syme Rom. Rev., 35-6; Gruen, 91.; Gelzer, 87.

[2]Suet. Iul. 20.4; Dio Cass. 38.11.2; Leach, 125-30; Gelzer, 77, 96; Ward 219; Stockton, 168-9; Rawson, 107; Bailey, 50-1, 54, 58, 61; Leach 125; Holmes, Vol. 1, 331-3; Dio Cass. 38. During his exile we find Cicero in complete misery. It was one of the worst periods of his life and he continually wrote to Atticus about his pain and suffering in exile. All biographies of Cicero impart his feelings of discontent. Plutarch relates that Cicero "passed his time for the most part in dejection and great grief." (Plut. Cic. 32.4) See also Cic. Att. 3.8-21; Bailey 64-72; Rawson, 116-21; Stockton, 186-90; Holmes, Vol. 2, 56-9.

[3]Leach, 132-39; Greenhalgh, 19, 23-7; Stockton, 193; Rawson, 121; Plut. Pomp. 49-50. See also Dio Cass. 39.12-16.2; Holmes, Vol. 2, 66-8; Ward, 250-53.

[4]Gruen, 90-259; Taylor, Party Politics, 76ff.

[5]Gruen, 266-7; Erich S. Gruen first stresses the importance of political trials in Roman Politics and the Criminal Courts 149-78 B.C. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968). Although dealing with a different time period, Gruen illustrates the changing politics in Rome by analyzing political trials. The same trial tactics and court duels were used (possibly to an even greater extent) during the Late Republic. Leach, 141-2; Taylor, Party Politics, 98-100; Jones, Criminal Courts, 1-85.

[6]Grant, Selected Speeches, 146-7; Gruen, LGen., 267-8; Stockton, 153-4.

[7]Cic. Flac. passim; Gruen, LGen., 289-91. Joining the dynasts, Balbus was part of the prosecution of Flaccus. See Gardner, 617; Gruen, LGen., 290.

[8]Cic. QFr. 2.3.1-2. See also Stockton, 202; Gruen, LGen., 298-99; Leach, 139-41; Greenhalgh, 34.

[9]Gruen, LGen. p.299, note 142. See also Greenhalgh, 34.

[10]Holmes, Vol. 2, 69; Leach, 140-1; Ward, 252.

[11]Cic. Sest. passim; Leach, 141; Stockton, 205-6.

[12]Stockton, 205-6; Rawson, 127.

[13]Scholars praise this speech: "The speech is graceful, humorous and light of touch, written in a vivid, dramatic, . . . style." (Grant, Selected Speeches, 166). See also Gruen, LGen., 305-9, Leach, 141-2, and Stockton who describes the speech (Pro Caelio) superbly:

> In defending his young friend Marcus Caelius Rufus [Cicero] found a case dear to his own heart. The prosectution was inspired by Clodia, the 'Lesbia' of Catullus, Clodius' sister. Cicero assailed her with a *tour de force* of wit, sarcasm, irony, vituperation, slapstick-comedy, and sheer forensic brillance. His tongue rolled lovingly around the Latin language, he purred and slashed at Clodia and her associates: *libidines, amores, adulteria, Baias, actas, convivia, commissationes, cantus, symphonia, navigia;* he called up the ghost of the great censor, Appius Claudius the Blind, to excoriate his debauched descendant -- poor Clodia, already saddled with the brilliant nickname Caelius had coined for her: *'quadrantaria Clytemnestra* [two-bit whore].' (Stockton, 213)

[14]Holmes, Vol. 2, 72-3; Stockton, 206; Rawson, 127-8; Bailey, 80-2.

[15]Suet. Iul. 24.1; Plut. Cat. Min. 41; Walter, 198; Gelzer, 124.

[16]Gruen, LGen., 100-2; Mommsen, Vol. 5, 118-24; Syme, Rom. Rev., 37; Gelzer, 119.

[17]Plut. Caes. 21.2-5; Pomp. 51.3-4; App. BCiv. 2.3.17; Suet. Iul. 24.1; Gelzer, 121; Leach, 143; Ward, 262-4; C. Luibheid, "The Luca Conference" Classical Philology 65 (1970): 88-94.

[18]Leach, 143; Stockton, 208-9; Greenhalgh, 50-1; and Syme, Rom. Rev., 37 term Pompey as the dominant member. Ward says Crassus was the key individual, 262-4. Gelzer, 122-23, Mommsen, Vol. 5, 124-6, and Walter, 198-200 believe in Caesar's dominant role, while Gruen says Pompey needed both Crassus and Caesar (no dominant member since none of the three was strong enough to overpower the others). Dio denies the existence of any conference of Luca and says that Crassus and Pompey merely teamed up to combat Caesar's growing power, see Dio Cass. 39.27. Plutarch lays the advantage to no one (Plut. Caes. 21.5-9;

Pomp. 51.3-4), while Suetonius makes Caesar the primary designer of the renewed coalition (Suet. Iul. 21.1). See also Erich S. Gruen, "Pompey, The Roman Aristocracy, and the Conference of Luca," Historia 18 (1969): 71-108; L. Hayne, "Who went to Luca?" Classical Philology 69 (1974): 217-20.

[19]Plut. Crass. 14.5-6; Pomp. 51.4; Caes. 21.3; Suet. Iul. 24; App. BCiv. 2.3.17; Ward, 264; Gelzer, 122; Leach, 143.

[20]Gruen, LGen., 101. The importance of the alliance is all the more impressive after the Trebonian laws which awarded the military commands as Leach reports:

> The situation was thus a fascinating one for the historian. The military forces of the Republic were shared between three men for the next five years. With those forces went patronage, wealth, and the ability if necessary to impose their will upon the Senate and people. The danger to the peace of the Roman world should any of these three try to impose his will on the others is, and was, obvious. (Leach, 146)

[21]Cic. QFr. 2.7; Fam. 1.9; Stockton, 208; Rawson, 128; Leach, 143-4; Gelzer, 123; Bailey, 82; Greenhalgh, 39-42; Mommsen, Vol. 5, 133.

[22]Cic. Prov. Cons. passim. For a commentary on the speech see Gardner, 525-37; Stockton, 211; Gelzer, 124-5.

[23]Cic. Balb. 63-4; Gardner, 617.

[24]Cic. Balb. 56; Att. 7.7.6; 9.13a; Gruen, LGen., 312; Gardner, 615; see also T. P. Wiseman, New Men in the Roman Senate: 139 B.C. - A.D. 14 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 191, 194.

[25]Cic. Balb. 56, 63; Dio 48.32.2; Gelzer, 120, 168; Syme. Rom. Rev., 77, 381; Gardner, 615.

[26]Gruen, LGen., 312. See Cic. Balb. 18-9, 56-9; Greenhalgh, 43; Syme, Rom. Rev. 77.

[27]Gruen, LGen., 312; Gardner, 617-18; Gelzer, 126-7.

[28]The prosecutor from Gades had lost his civic rights since he had been convicted of a criminal offense earlier (Cic. Balb. 32). A successful prosecution would restore his rights and standing as a citizen. Taylor, Party Politics, 112-4; Gardner, 620.

[29]Cic. Arch. 10; Gardner, 618-9; Grant, Selected Speeches, 146; OCD, 604; Ward, 130-1; E. G. Hardy, "The Transpadane Question and the Alien Act of 65 or 64 B.C.," JRS 6 (1916): 77-82, explains the original purpose of the law which was to eliminate the Transpadanians who had come to Rome to ask for citizenship. Dio gives us a description of its first use: "Meanwhile [in 65] all those who were resident (aliens) in Rome, except inhabitants of what is now Italy, were banished on the motion of one Gaius Papius, a tribune, because they were coming to be too numerous and were not thought fit persons to dwell with the citizens." (Dio Cass. 37.9.5) From Dio's information it is apparent that the Transpadanes were not expelled since they resided in Italy; the primary targets of this law were Pompey's foreign clients from his eastern campaigns and Spainish allies resident in Rome who had come from beyond the boundaries of Italy (See Gruen, LGen., 64 and, for the importance of foreign clients see Badian's Foreign Clientelae and Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, ed. Patronage in Ancient Society (New York: Routledge, 1989), 65, 75. Fortunately Balbus was a citizen long before the law was passed and was not liable to expulsion. For the problems of foreigners falsely claiming citizenship, see Brunt, Manpower, 208.

[30]Cic. Arch. 10; Grant, Selected Speeches, 146.

[31]Gruen, LGen. 312.

[32]Gardner, 720-21. See Cic. Balbo. 19-37.

[33]Gruen, LGen. 312; Cic. Balb. 1-10, 18-19, 63, 65.

[34]"When the Roman People have made any law, and if this law is of such a kind that it seems likely to give certain states, whether bound to us by treaty or free, an option to decide themselves, not with reference to our but to their own concerns, what legal principle they desire to adopt, in that case we clearly ought to ask whether these states have, or have not, 'given consent.' But when it is a question of our own State, of our Empire, of our wars, of our victory or of our welfare, our forefathers did not desire that states should 'give consent.'" (Cic. Balb. 22) See also Gardner's summary, p. 724.

[35]Cic. Balb. 27.

[36]"Where, then, is there any saving clause in the treaty with Gades, under which the Roman People may not admit to citizenship any citizen of Gades? Nowhere; and even if it did occur anywhere, the Gellian and Cornelian Law, which expressly gave to Pompeius the power of granting citizenship, would have overridden it."(Cic.

Balb. 32)

[37]Cic. Balb. 32-3.

[38]Cic. Balb. 41-2. See also 39-40.

[39]Cic. Balb. 46, 50; cf Plut. Mar. 28.2. See also Gardner, 628; A. N. Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 292.

[40]Cic. Balb. 50. Pompeius Strabo also granted citizenship to a detachment of Spanish cavalry under the lex Iulia, see Hermann Dessau, Inscriptiones latinae Selectae, 5 Vols. (Chicago: Ares, 1979), #8888. See also Leach, 14, 53.

[41]Cic. Balb. 50.

[42]Ibid.

[43]Ibid.

[44]Ibid., 51. See also 64-5.

[45]Ibid., 52-3; Gardner, 625. For the advantages of Roman citizenship see A. N. Sherwin-White, The Roman Citizenship, 2nd ed. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1973), 143-4; C. Nicolet, The World of the Citizen in Repulbican Rome, trans. P. S. Falla (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980, French edition, 1976), 17-23; OCD, 243-4.

[46]Gardner, 621; Sherwin-White, 291; Brunt, 5.

[47]For the rarity of grants to foreigners see, Sherwin-White, 291-2, 294; Badian's Foriegn Clientelae, 254, 259. For the half-citizenship or civitas sine suffragio, see Sherwin-White, 200ff.

[48]Gardner, 621. See also Holmes, Vol. 1, 132; Brunt, 204.

[49]For the Lex Acilia, Sherwin-White, 111-2, 216, and 292. For manumission grants see 322ff.

[50]Gardner, 622-3; Sherwin-White, 294-5.

[51]Gardner, 623-4; Sherwin-White, 294-5.

[52]Cicero does not mention the enfranchisement of Theophanes, Pompey's historian and Balbus' adoptive parent (Cic. Arch. 24), nor of the award to C. Valerius Caburus, who was a Gallic chieftain (Caes. BGall. 1.47.4).

[53]Sherwin-White, 293. See also 301-2; on postliminium,literally "right to return home," see 93, 292-3.

[54]Sherwin-White, 293, 301.

[55]Gardner, 312-3, quoting Sherwin-White, Citizenship, 1st ed., 162.

[56]Gruen, LGen., 312-3. See also Stockton, 214. Rawson declares the trial "was an easy case: a clear exposition of the principles . . ." (p. 132) Gelzer states that Balbus was brought to trial "on purely political grounds." (p. 127) Greenhalgh concludes: "The charges against the defendent were irrelevant to his case: Balbus' real crime was that he was Caesar's agent and his principal go-between with Pompey." (p. 42)

[57]Cic. Balb. 59. See also 64-5, and Greenhalgh, 43.

[58]Ibid., 64. As early as December of 60, Cicero called Balbus "Caesar's intimate" [Shackleton Bailey's translation of Caesaris familiarem]. (Cic. Att. 2.3.3)

[59]Syme, Rom. Rev., 72. On page 75, Syme states that Caesar had "filched the Balbi."

[60]See page 52, note 23.

[61]Gruen, LGen., 112. See also Gelzer, 134-5; Gardner, 731.

[62]Leach, 147-8; Gruen, LGen., 2-3, 148, 322-5, 330. Gruen's thesis basically argues that aristocracy had always maintained a strong position through the period. The triumvirate was never dominant over the long-standing, powerful noble families of Rome.

[63]Gelzer, 134-5.

[64]Cic. QFr. 3.1.9. For information on Quintus' earlier and later political career see William C. McDermott, "Q. Cicero," Historia 20 (1971): 702-17. McDermott sees Quintus as a capable military man and Cicero's political advisor. T. P. Wiseman discusses Quintus' military ties with Caesar and the legate's possible desire for the consulship in "The Ambitions of Quintus Cicero," JRS 56 (1966), 108-15.

[65]Cic. Fam. 7.6.1.

[66]Ibid. 7.7.

[67]Plut. Pomp. 53.3; Leach, 145; Stockton, 219.

[68]Plut. Pomp. 53.4-5; Caes. 23.4; Gelzer, 147; Leach, 151; Holmes, Vol. 2, 154; Stockton, 220; Greenhalgh, 65.

[69]Dio Cass. 40.45; Leach, 152-5; Gelzer, 148; Holmes, Vol. 2, 159, 165.

[70]Dio Cass. 40.12-27; Plut. Crass. 17-31; Ward, 289-95; Mommsen, Vol. 5, 150-65.

[71]Dio Cass. 40.48; App. BCiv. 2.21-22; Leach, 155; Holmes, Vol. 2, 165-67; Gruen, LGen., 152; Mommsen, Vol. 5, 144-6.

[72]App. BCiv. 2.23; Plut. Pomp. 54.4-6; Dio Cass. 40.50.3-5; Holmes, Vol. 2, 168; Leach, 155-7; Greenhalgh, 78-9.

[73]Plut. Pomp. 55.1-3; Leach, 154; Gelzer, 151, 153; Mommsen, Vol. 5, 166-75.

[74]Plut. Caes. 28.1. See also 28.2-4; cf. Pomp. 53.5-7.

[75]Syme, Rom. Rev., 47-48, and Gelzer, 92-3 conclude that Caesar used constitutional means at first and only resorted to force after many attempts at compromise failed. Mommsen says Caesar was forced to act because of his enemies (Vol. 5, 185-6). Bailey blames the war on the fact that neither general had a strong desire to avoid war (137). Caesar says that he went to war because a.) Pompey had been turned against him by his enemies, b.) the tribunes had been assaulted, and c.) to defend his dignitas (Caes. BCiv. 1.7). Greenhalgh agrees with Caesar's reasons but also adds that Pompey's dignitas was just as important, and thus both men, being protective of their honor, drew their swords.

[76]Dio Cass. 40.60.1; Leach, 159; Rawson, 183.

[77]Gelzer, 170-71. For an excellent study and definition of the word factio, see Taylor, Party Politics, 9.

[78]Stockton, 227-51; Rawson, 146-82; Bailey, 111-25.

[79]Gelzer, 177. See also Walter, 311.

[80]Stockton, 238; Gelzer, 181. On the preparations, bribes, and contracts for Caesar's return see, Dio Cass. 40.60.1-4;Plut. Cat. Min. 49.1; Gelzer, 177; Holmes, Vol.

2, 245.

[81]Plut. Pomp. 30; Dio Cass. 40.62.3; App. BCiv. 2.27; Gelzer, 185; Holmes, Vol.2, 253; Leach, 164,

[82]Plut. Pomp. 59.1. See also Leach, 167.

[83]Cic. Att. 7.4.2-3; Bailey, 141; Gelzer, 187; Leach, 169.

[84]Cicero wrote to Atticus circa 13 December 49:

> On the political situation [Pompey] talked as though we were certainly in for war, nothing to suggest a hope of agreement. He told me that although he had previously been aware of Caesar's complete estrangement from himself, a very recent incident had confirmed his opinion. Hirtius, a very close friend of Caesar's, had come from him to Rome, but had not approached himself; he had arrived on the evening of 6 December, and Balbus had arranged to call at Scipio's before dawn on the 7th for a talk on the whole situation. But Hirtius had left to join Caesar in the middle of the night. This seemed to Pompey proof positive of estrangement. (Cic. Att. 7.4.2-3)

[85]Plut. Pomp. 61.1; Cat. Min. 52.2; App. BCiv. 2.34; Caes. BCiv. 1.5.2-5; Leach, 171-2.

[86]Gardner, 614; Syme, Roman Papers, 68.

[87]Cic. Att. 7.11.

[88]See note 84.

[89]Stockton, 252-3; 257; Rawson, 190. Cicero's opinion of Caesar hardened after the invasion. "Whatever strength there might have been in Caesar's case before the war, his invasion of Italy made him in Cicero's eyes a would-be despot, a brigand, and a moral lunatic. Nothing could justifiy a Roman general in using the army entrusted to him against the home authorities in assertion of purely personal claims." (Bailey, 146)

[90]Cic. Att. 7.7.6. For other letters which indicate Cicero's and others' opinions regarding the civil war, and for the importance of Cicero's civil war correspondence in general see P. A. Brunt, "Cicero's Officium in the Civil War" JRS 76 (1986): 12-32.

[91]Cic. Att. 8.9a.2. The letter briefly mentions Balbus Minor's visit and illustrates Cicero's scepticism regarding Caesar's clemency and Balbus' desire for

dialogue:

> On the evening of the 24th Balbus junior visited me. He was travelling post-haste on a secret mission from Caesar to Consul Lentulus, bearing a letter, a verbal message,and the promise of a province to induce him to return to Rome. I don't think he can be persuaded, if the meeting takes place. Balbus also said that Caesar would like nothing better than to come up with Pompey (I believe him there) and be reconciled -- there I don't believe him, and I am afraid that all this piling up of clemency may be simply a prelude to the cruelty we feared. Balbus senior for his part writes to me that Caesar would like nothing more than to live without fear under Pompey's primacy. You believe this of course! But as I write on the 25th Pompey can already have reached Brundisium. He set off ahead of his troops on the 19th from Luceria, travelling light. But this portent is horribly wide awake and swift and thorough. What will happen I simply don't know. (Cic. Att. 8.9a.2)

[92]See pp. 83, 92-3; Gardner, 164; OCD, 160.

[93]For the siege, surrender, and pardon of Corfinium see Caes. BCiv. 1.16-23; App. BCiv. 2.38; Gelzer, 200. Greenhalgh says that the clemency business has been exaggerated. Caesar has duped modern historians as well as his contemporaries by playing up his pardons. The acts of clemency were acts of "common sense paraded as virtue." (p. 184) Caesar did not have any other choice but to pardon Pompey's troops and generals. Caesar could not afford to keep prisoners, and to massacre them would have meant political and diplomatic suicide, especially during the fickle early period of the war.

[94]Cic. Att. 8.15a. See also Gelzer's comments, 202-3. For Cicero's initiatives to serve as mediator see Plut. Cic. 37.1.

[95]"It is easy to understand why Caesar was so anxious for Cicero's support; he was at this time attempting to represent himself, as we see from his account of the Civil War, as the most constitutionally proper of the leaders (had he not gone to war to protect tribunes in the exercise of their rights, and for a perfectly legal second consulship?), and hoped that enough of the Senate could be collected in Rome for his position to be regularized." (Rawson, 194) Stockton also gives an insight into the reason behind the work to attract Cicero:

> It is easy to see why Caesar was anxious to win

> Cicero over. His own followers did not inspire confidence. Syme delinates them acidly: 'Deplorable in appearance, the lack of consulars, while precluding the personal rivalries that disturbed the camp and counsels of Pompeius, and strengthening Caesar's hands for action, gave his rule as a party-leader a personal and monarchic character . . . For the rest, elderly survivors, nonentities, neutrals or renegades. A few names stand out, through merit or accident, from a dreary background.' [Syme, Rom. Rev., 61-2] For Caesar, then, Cicero would be a fine catch, giving to his actions and his cause a *cachet* of respectability and adding to his propaganda the most persuasive tongue in Rome. (Stockton, 257)

Gelzer also sees the efforts of Balbus and Caesar aim toward winning over well known boni to "secure the moral authority which he [Caesar] needed so badly." (Gelzer, 205)

[96]Cic. Att. 9.5.3.

[97]Ibid. 9.6.1.

[98]Ibid. 9.7a-c. Gaius Oppius is almost always mentioned along with Balbus. He was "Caesar's friend of equestrian rank and manager with Balbus of his affairs." (OCD, 753) We have very little information regarding Oppius prior to, and during, the Civil War. Syme says Balbus and Oppius were "inseparable" and postulates that Oppius "belonged to a substantial family of Roman bankers." He admits the paucity of information on Oppius when he declares "Oppius lacks colour beside the formidable Balbus."(Syme, Rom. Rev., 71f)

Oppius and Balbus were just two of the many Caesarians who operated in and out of Rome. They included military men like Marcus Antonius, Lucius Munatius Plancus, and Aulus Hirtius, but also bankers and financiers like Gaius Matius and C. Rabirius Postumus. They formed what Syme has called the "Caesarian Party" which is studied in his Roman Revolution (61-77). The members of this "party" would later become the cabinet members of his Dictatorship.

The exact delegation of duties among the Caesarians is difficult to find. They did not form a formal presidential cabinet, nor were specific areas of jurisdiction defined by law or precedent (indeed they were forming precedent themselves by assisting a renegade proconsul in taking over the empire). Any evidence regarding the exact delegation of duties has been lost, and many of these agents (like Balbus) worked underground or through back channels which left no traces. Gruen's observation is relevant:

> Politics is only in small part a public performance. More extensive and generally more important activities lie behind the scenes, closed to the view of contemporary and historian alike. Clandestine, private maneuvers are the genuine stuff of politics, but it is only their issue that stands on record. (Gruen, Roman Politics, 1)

It is only through the chance survival of Cicero's correspondence that we know so much about the negotiations of Balbus. And it appears from the letters that Balbus' area of operations was: a.)in Rome, b.) diplomatic/adminstrative in nature (with no military connections), and c.) (through correspondence and thus behind the scenes) he worked with financial, public, private, and personal channels to persuade neutrals and advarsaries to support Caesar's cause. Again, this was not a strict delegation of responsibility. Oppius assisted him, Antony, as Master of the Horse, would have had influence, and the unknown duties of the other Caesarians would have also played a role in such work. In short, Balbus is a secret because he was supposed to be secret.

[99]See Antonina's control over Belisarius in Procopius' Secret History translated by G. A. Williamson, (New York: Penguin Books, 1966, reprinted 1987). Antonina "could twist her husband around her little finger." (p. 41). For the power of advisors over an emperor see Ammianus Marcellinus describe the court's leash around Constantius in Amm. Marc. 16.8. On the power of Late Imperial Chamberlains and other advisors over the emperors see OHC, 810; A. M. H. Jones, The Later Roman Empire Vol. 1 (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1964), 37-586. We even have evidence from Cicero that Caesar was never under the control of his advisors, and, indeed, hardly listened to their advice. Cicero wrote to Marcus Marcellus in 46: "All power has been handed over to one man; and *he follows no counsel, not even that of his friends, except his own.*"[Italics mine.] (Cic. Fam. 4.9.2)

[100]Caes. BCiv. 1.26; Plut. Pomp. 62.3-4; Gelzer, 203; Leach, 185.

[101]Cic. Att. 9.13.

[102]Ibid. 9.14.1-2.

[103]Ibid. 10.11.4;Rawson translates Cicero's reaction as "Good gods, is even Balbus thinking of getting into the Senate?" (Rawson, 198) Syme does not think Balbus joined the Senate at this time, nor later. He was much more

useful outside of the Senate. (Syme, Rom. Rev., 80; Roman Papers, 36, 105)

[104]Gelzer, 207-9; Stockton, 259; Rawson, 198-9.

[105]Gelzer, 209; Stockton, 259; Rawson, 199; Plut. Cic. 38.1.

[106]Dio Cass. 41.24.1; Pliny HN 4.119; Gelzer, 218.

[107]Caes. BCiv. 3.1-2; App. BCiv. 2.48; Plut. Caes. 37.1; Gelzer, 121-2.

[108]Gelzer, 226. See Caes. BCiv. 3.19.

[109]Gelzer, 232-3.

[110]Caes. BCiv. 3.104; Plut. Pomp. 78-80. For an account of the military history of the civil war see Caesar's book; Keppie, 103-11; Walter, 322-46, 356-505, Dio Cassius, and Appian's history.

[111]Cicero wrote to Atticus regarding his requests to Balbus and Oppius:

> On the one hand, to be stuck in Brundisium is in every way disagreeable: on the other, how is it possible for me to draw nearer, as you advise, without the lictors [ceremonial body guards given to proconsuls to hold the fasces] which the people gave me and which cannot be taken away so long as I retain my rights as a citizen? I lately made them mix with the crowd, with staves, for a short time when I was approaching the town, for fear of an attack by the soldiery. Even since I have kept indoors.
>
> I have written all this to Balbus and Oppius and asked them, since they think I should come nearer, to consider the matter. I think they will give their backing, for they guarantee that Caesar will be concerned not only to preserve my standing by even to enhance it, and they urge me to keep a lofty spirit and set my hopes high. (Cic. Att. 11.6.2-3)

See also Cic. Att. 11.7.5, 11.18; Rawson, 203-4; Stockton, 264-5.

[112]Cic. Att. 11.8.1; Stockton, 264.

[113]Plut. Cic. 39.2-4; Gelzer, 261; Stockton, 268.

[114]Gardner, 732. For examples see Cic. Att. 12.12, 12.29.2.

[115]See the Bellum Hispaniense; App. BCiv. 2.103-5; Plut. Caes. 56.1-3; Walter, 496-505; Gelzer, 292-6.

[116]Gelzer, 294. See also Stockton. Gardner (p. 732) terms Balbus as "autocratic." It is during this time period to which Tacitus refers to the power of Balbus and Oppius. He sees their ability to make war or peace under Caesar equal to the power of imperial procurators under Claudius. "Gaius Oppius and Cornelius Balbus were the first individuals who, supported by the might of Caesar, were able to take for their province the conditions of a peace or the determination of a war." (Tac. Ann. 12.60) Cicero confirms the ability and importance of Balbus when he wrote in December of 46, saying, "Caesar is in the habit of confirming arrangements made by Balbus and Oppius in his absence . . ."(Cic. Fam. 6.8. See also 9.19.)

[117]For the Anti-Cato see Suet. Iul. 56.5; Gelzer, 302. For Caesar's reaction to (relayed through Balbus) Cicero's Cato see Cic. Att. 13.46.2. Both the "Cato" and "Anti-Cato" are lost.

[118]Gelzer, 306. For the letter of advice see Gelzer, 304-5; and Stockton's assessment:

> In May 45 he began the composition of a "letter of advice" to Caesar. Inevitably, it had first to pass through the sieve of the scrutiny of Balbus and Oppius. Their suggested modifications Cicero found intolerable: "For God's sake," he wrote to Atticus, "let us be rid of the whole business, and at least be *half*-free!" [Cic. Att. 13.31.1] From this point onwards, he resigned himself to the hard and unalterable fact of absolutism. (Stockton, 275)

[119]Gelzer, 313. See Cic. Att. 13.52.

[120]Suet. Iul. 76-7; Plut. Caes. 56ff;App. BCiv. 2.106; Gelzer, 324.

[121]Suet. Iul. 78. For other accounts see Appendix A.

[122]Suet. Iul. 79.1; Plut. Caes. 61.4-5; Gelzer, 319.

[123]Suet. Iul. 79.2; Plut. Caes. 60.1-2; Gelzer, 319.

[124]Suet. Iul. 79.2; Plut. Caes. 61.1-4; App. BCiv. 2.109; Gelzer, 321-2; For a discussion of the significance of Caesar's "kingship" and divine images see Stefan Weinstock, Divus Julius (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 270-340.

[125]Suet. Iul. 81.1-2. For other omens see Plut.

Caes. 63; App. BCiv. 2.116.

[126]Cic. Att. 14.1.1. Cicero is quoting Gaius Matius.

END NOTES -- Chapter 4

[1]Gardner, 733. Antony fled for his life immediately after the murder (see Plut. Ant. 13, 14.1; App. BCiv. 2.118). He had reason to believe the assassins would want him too. At the time of the assassination "Antonius was both the leading man in the Caesarian party and consul, head of government." (Syme, Rom. Rev., 96) Born around 83, Antony had first served in the army under Gabinius in the East from 57-54. He first joined Caesar in Gaul and there became attached to the magnetic general. He supported Caesar as a tribune in 49 and fled Rome when the consultum ultimum was passed. During the civil war Antony was first stationed in Italy. At the Battle of Pharsalus Antony was in charge of Caesar's left wing. After the decisive engagement Antony was made Caesar's Master of Horse (magister equitum) and stationed in Italy until 47. During his tenure as magister equitum, Antony's violent autocratic actions displeased Caesar who put him aside till 44 when Antony became consul. Balbus probably first met Antony when he was in Gaul (Eleanor Goltz Huzar, Mark Antony: A Biography (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1978), 35). For Antony's career up to the Ides of March, see Huzar, 12-66; Plut. Ant. 1-12. When Antony was magister equitum he sometimes went against the plans of Balbus and Oppius, hence their later reluctance to serve under him immediately after the assassination (Huzar, 65-6).

[2]Syme, Rom. Rev., 97, 99; Rawson, 262; Bailey, 229; T. Rice Holmes, The Architect of the Roman Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928), 2; M. L. Clarke, The Noblest Roman: Marcus Brutus and His Reputation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), 38-9; John M. Carter, The Battle of Actium: The Rise and Triumph of Augustus Caesar (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1970), 12.

[3]Syme, 100. For the reaction of the people see App. BCiv. 2.118; Plut. Caes. 67.4, 68; Dio Cass. 44.35.2-4; Suet. Iul. 84-5.

[4]; Dio Cass. 22.3-34.7; Plut. Ant. 14.2; Cic. 42.2; Cic. Phil. 1.1, 1.31; App. BCiv. 2.126-9; Huzar, 83; Clarke, 42.

[5]Plut. Ant. 15.1; App. BCiv. 2.125. With the papers also came Caesar's estate and personal funds. Huzar explains the importance of the papers:

> During the night [of March 15th-16th Antony] obtained, from Caesar's widow Calpurnia and secretary Faberius,

> Caesar's state papers and a rich, special fund of 700 million sesterces (approximately $30 million) from the state treasury in the temple of Ops. The money was critical for many needs, since Antony was chronically insolvent, but particularly it could satisfy Caesar's veterans with monetary and land settlements, and thus keep them loyal. The secret papers were potent weapons which Antony could use at will for his own ends. (Huzar, 82)

[6]Syme, 97. See also Huzar, 82; and Carter, 16. The primary source for Balbus' vengence is Nicolaus, Vita Caesaris, 27.106. Appian mentions Antony's and Lepidus' desire for revenge (see BCiv. 2.119, 124), but does not mention Balbus. It would sound reasonable to expect Balbus to clamour for revenge. The assassins had slain his friend, confidant, and chief patron whom he had known since 62. He would have wanted to punish the men who killed his friend. If one wants to take a cynical viewpoint, Balbus may have wanted to use Caesar's death as an immediate excuse to murder or eliminate his own enemies before they could harm him. With Caesar dead, Balbus would have been vulnerable. Such a view, however, belongs more to one like Lepidus than Balbus. Balbus was probably just very upset with his master's murder, and rightly expected punishment, there is no evidence to suggest that Balbus ever had anyone killed through malice. (And it should be noted that no one had ever tried to kill Balbus, exile him maybe, but not murder him. Balbus' wealth, influence, and connections did not allow him to be sacrificed.)

[7]App. BCiv. 2.144-5; Plut. Ant. 14.3-4; Holmes, Architect, 3-4; Carter, 21.

[8]Dio Cass. 44.51.2; Cic. Phil. 1.1.3; Holmes, Architect, 5.

[9]Dio Cass. 45.10.6; Huzar, 87-8; Appian explains Antony's proposal regarding Sextus Pompey:

> Antony also moved that Sextus Pompeius (the son of Pompey the Great, who was still much beloved by all) should be recalled from Spain, where he was still attacked by Caesar's lieutenants, and that he should be paid 50 millions of Attic drachmas out of the public treasury for his father's confiscated property and be appointed commander of the sea, as his father had been, with charge of all Roman ships, wherever situated, which were needed for immediate service. (App. BCiv. 3.4)

Sextus Pompeius had escaped after the battle of Munda to

conduct guerilla warfare in Spain. A deal needed to be made with Sextus because his sucessful tactics had increased his forces to six legions and he thus posed a threat to Antony's supremacy in Rome. For Sextus Pompey's early career see Moses Hadas, Sextus Pompey (New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1930, reprinted 1966), 1-55, for the awarded naval command see p. 66.

[10]"Caesarian friends like Hirtius, Pansa, and Balbus criticized Antony's use of Caesar's money and soldiers but judged that only Antony gave hope of peace and perpetuation of Caesar's policies." (Huzar, 87); Syme says that "Balbus and Oppius dissembled; others again were frankly willing to make the best of the new dispensation." (p. 106)

[11]App. BCiv. 3.9; Suet. Aug. 10; Holmes, Architect, 11. Octavian was born on September 23, 63 to Atia (Caesar's niece). His father died when he was four but he received a good education in literature, philosophy, and rhetoric. At age twelve he gave his grandmother's (Julia) laudatio and in 46 he took part in Caesar's triumph. The next year he accompanied Caesar in Spain and in 44 he was in Apollonia with his lifelong friend Marcus Agrippa when he heard of Caesar's death. For an account of Octavian's early years see Suetonius, passim; Syme, Rom. Rev., 112ff; Holmes, Architect, 10-11. On Octavian's ambitions Syme gives us idea:

> The personality of Octavianus will best be left to emerge from his actions. One thing is clear. From the beginning, his sense for realities was unerring, his ambition implacable. In that the young man was a Roman and a Roman aristocrat. He was only eighteen years of age: but he resolved to acquire the power and the glory along with the name of Caesar. Whether his insistence that Caesar be avenged and the murderers punished derives more from horror of the deed, traditional sense of the solidarity of the family, or resentment at the thwarting of his own legitimate aspirations is a question that concerns the ultimate nature of human character and the deepest springs of human action. (Syme, Rom. Rev., 113)

[12]Cic. Att. 14.5.3.

[13]Balbus had received letters on or prior to April 17 from Syria and Gaul. Cicero relates their contents in a letter to Atticus:

> Balbus too is here [Puteoli] and I see a lot of him. He has had a letter from Vetus [Antistius Vetus was one of Caesar's men sent out to finish off

> Caecilius Bassus who was a Pompeian renegade in Syria. Later Vetus would join the liberators, Brutus and Cassius.] dated 31 December to the effect that when Caecilius was besieged by him and on the point of capture Pacorus of Parthia came up with a very large force. Thus Caecilius was snatched from his clutches with the loss of many of his own men. . . . So it looks to me as though war in that quarter is imminent. . . . Balbus also gives better news of Gaul. He has a letter three weeks old announcing that the Germans and the tribes there, hearing what had happened to Caesar,had sent envoys to Hirtius' deputy Aurelius promising to obey orders. (Cic. Att. 14.9.3-4)

One wonders if Balbus received letters from Vetus and Hirtius just because they were friends, or if Vetus and Hirtius were reporting to Balbus on the state of affairs in an official capacity. In either case the letters show how in touch with the empire Balbus was as one of Caesar's top adminstrators.

[14]Cic. Att. 14.10.3. See also Stockton, 283; Bailey, 235. Syme relates that Octavian cooly appraised the situation in Rome and made contacts before he took action:

> [Octavian] kept his head, neither dazzled by good fortune nor spurred to rash activity -- the appeal to the troops, which certain friends counselled, was wisely postponed. Nor would he enter Rome until he had got in touch with persons of influence and had surveyed the political situation. By the middle of April his presence was signalled in Campania, where he was staying with his step-father, the consular Philippus. *More important, he had met Balbus, the trusted confidant and secretary of the Dictator.* Other prominent members of the Caesarian faction were approached: Hirtius and Pansa were certainly in the neighborhood.[Italics mine.] (Syme, Rom. Rev., 114)

[15]Cic. Att. 14.11.2.

[16]Ibid. 14.12.1.

[17]Ibid. 14.20.4.

[18]Ibid. 14.21.2-3.

[19]Cicero wrote: "I should be happy if Balbus could be relieved of unpopularity by me, but he himself has no faith in such a possibilty. Therefore he has other ideas in mind." (Cic. Att. 15.2.3) What were the "other ideas?" Maybe those "ideas" had something to do with his four year

disappearance (or three year disappearance if one accepts Balbus' Gallic propraetorship in 41 (see note 38)).

[20]Cic. Att. 15.4a.

[21]"Both Balbus and Oppius (?) write as you do about Brutus' and Cassius' provinces being settled by a senatorial decree." (Ibid. 15.5.2)

[22]Ibid. 15.8.1.

[23]Ibid. 15.9.1. See App. BCiv. 3.6; Holmes, Architect, 17.

[24]Cic. Att. 15.11.1-2; 12.1; App. BCiv. 3.8; Plut. Brut. 19; Dio Cass. 47.21.1; Holmes, Architect, 196-7.

[25]Cic. Att. 16.3.5. For a scathing review of Cicero's financial woes and debts see Jerome Carcopino, Cicero: The Secrets of his Correspondence, 2 vols (New York: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1951, reprinted 1969), 55-67; and M. W. Frederiksen, "Caesar, Cicero, and the Problem of Debt" JRS 56 (1966):128-41.

[26]Cic. Att. 16.11.8. The letter is dated 5 November 44. Cicero's correspondence to Atticus ends in November but the ad Familiares continues on to July of 43.

[27]Plut. Ant. 16.1-3; Dio Cass. 15.6.2; Holmes, Architect, 14; Huzar, 94; Syme, Rom. Rev., 115.

[28]Holmes, Architect, 18; Syme, Rom. Rev., 117, 120, 131.

[29]Dio Cass. 15.7.1; Suet. Iul. 88; Syme, Rom. Rev., 117; Holmes, Architect, 19.

[30]Plut. Cic. 42, Holmes, Architect, 20; Bailey, 227; Stockton, 280-1.

[31]Plut. Cic. 43.4-6; Holmes, Architect, 24; Grant, 279-80; Rawson, 271; Bailey, 245; Stockton, 292-3. The first Philippic is the kindest of all the speeches against Antony. The rest become violent, scandalous oratorical bombardments designed to destroy Antony's character. The speeches will ultimately backfire resulting in Cicero's proscription.

[32]Plut. Ant. 16.3-4; Dio Cass. 15.8.2-4; Holmes, Architect, 27.

[33]Dio Cass. 12-15, Plut. Ant. 16.4-17.1; Huzar, 100-3; Syme, Rom. Rev., 123-7; Holmes, Architect, 32-4; Syme,

Roman Papers, Vol. 3, 1236ff.

[34]Syme, Rom. Rev., 131-3. For the use of the money see App. BCiv. 3.23; Carter, 45.

[35]Ibid., 133. Syme saw the letter of May 11th as an indication of Balbus' influence: "Hirtius was accessible to the sinister influence of Balbus -- no good prospect for the Republicans,but a gain for Octavianus." (Ibid., 133) For Balbus' failed attempts on Cicero see Syme, 141-2. That Balbus failed is no surprise, Cicero never trusted him. Balbus and Hirtius may have wanted to see Cicero at Aquinum around November as indicated in a brief letter from Cicero to a friend of his (Cic. Fam. 16.24). But they missed him. Balbus was "journeying to Campania, ostensibly to take the waters. Wherever there was trouble, the secret agent Balbus might be detected in the background." (Syme, Rom. Rev., 142)

[36]Plut. Ant. 17.1; Dio Cass. 16.29.2-6; Holmes, Architect, 35-50; Syme, Rom. Rev., 162-70; Carter, 52.

[37]Syme, Rom. Rev., 131.

[38]Balbus was made consul suffectus for 40. As suffectus he merely took office for the short remaining time after the regular consul stepped down. For Balbus' consulship see T. R. S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, Vol. 2 (Cleveland, OH: American Philological Association, 1952, reprinted 1968), 378-9. The evidence for Balbus' consulship is conclusive: Pliny HN 7.136; Dio Cass. 48.32.2; ILS 888. Evidence for his propraetorship is not. Broughton fails to list him as a magistrate for 41, and there is no written evidence to suggest that Balbus served as such. However, we do have numismatic evidence which clearly suggests that Balbus served as propraetor in Gaul in 41. Michael H. Crawford of the University of Cambridge and Edward A. Sydenham argue that Balbus was a propraetor in Gaul based on a coin dated to 41 with the reverse legend "BALBVS PRO.PR." (for a picture of the coin see Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1974), Plate LXII, 19.518/1) The denarius pictures Octavian on the obverse and was minted by Balbus for Octavian. It was found in Gaul, but Broughton believed the coin came from Hither Spain and, hence, may be a coin of Balbus Minor when he was a Legate in Spain in 40 (Broughton, MRR Vol. 2, 381). Crawford and Syndenham declare that the coin belongs to Balbus Major who was "propraetor in Gaul" (Edward A. Sydenham, The Coinage of the Roman Republic (New York: Arno Press, 1975), 206), and "they cannot possibly be attributed to Spain (*contra* T. R. S. Broughton . . .). It is most reasonable to suppose

the elder L. Cornelius Balbus to have been Propraetor the year before becoming Consul Suffectus." (Crawford, Vol. 1, 527) If the propraetorship is correctly assigned, then Balbus would have had imperium and thus control over legions in Gaul. It appears that Octavian trusted Balbus enough to place him in Gaul with a command; but there is a problem here. During 41, Gaul was peaceful, but Octavian had to deal with the internal Perusian War in Italy. And one of his worries was interference from Antony's generals in Gaul, Calenus and Ventidius, who controled eleven legions. After the Battle of Philippi, the triumvirs divided up the empire with Antony receiving Gaul (Huzar, 129-30). Balbus, clearly was pro-Octavian and so we have conflicting evidence. Why would Balbus, a pro-Octavian, be sent to Gaul as a propraetor when that region was clearly under Antony's control and held down by his own generals with eleven legions? The problem suggests three answers: a.) Balbus had a propraetorship without imperium. b.) The goodwill between the triumvirs was such that Balbus held partial command over troops in Gaul, and/or served under Calenus and Ventidius. c.) Broughton's ambigious answer regarding the propraetorship should stand as it would be illogical to have a pro-Octavian magistrate minting coins in an Antonian region during the unstable year of 41. If only the coin could speak!

[39]The preface of the eight book begins as follows:

> Aulus Hirtius' Preface
>
> Under constant pressure from you, Balbus, and since my regular refusal was beginning to look like a cover for laziness rather than a justified plea of the difficulty involved, I have undertaken this task -- a very difficult one. I have written a continuation of our friend Caesar's commentaries on his achievements in Gaul, since his earlier writings do not link up with the later. His latest work, which leaves off at events in Alexandria, I have completed up to the end of Caesar's life, though not to the end of civil dissension, for no end of that is in sight. (Caes. BGall. 8.1)

[40]Dio Cass. 46.40; Holmes, Architect, 55. The time period is noted for the political and diplomatic correspondence between the Caesarians and Cicero. Balbus was not the only former lieutenent of Caesar who had to make a decision to join either Octavian or Antony. L. Munatius Plancus, who was governor of Gallia Comata, carefully and intelligently felt out the situation during the campaigns, only joining Antony until he had no choice. Gaius Asinius Pollio, who was in Spain, also had to watch his step. These two generals in far off provinces had to weigh their options carefully before committing themselves

and their armies to any particular cause. Balbus' postion was different from these other Caesarians, however. He did not have an army and was close to the action in Rome. Such factors could have affected his rather early decision to join Octavian. At any rate, it was a trying time for the formerly united Caesarian party which was forced into partisan camps.

[41]Dio Cass. 47.2-6; Suet. Aug. 27.1; Plut. Ant. 19.2-3; Holmes, Architect, 70-5; Huzar, 118-21; Syme has a whole chapter devoted to the fact and fiction of the proscriptions, see Rom. Rev., 187-201. He states that the Republic died with the proscriptions:

> The Republic had been abolished. Whatever the outcome of the armed struggle, it could never be restored. Despotism ruled, supported by violence and confiscation. The best men were dead or proscribed. The Senate was packed with ruffians, the consulate, once the reward of civic virtue, now became the recompense of craft or crime [hence Balbus' reward of 40]. (Syme, Rom. Rev., 201)

[42]See note 39.

[43]Dio Cass. 48.1.2-2.4; Suet. Aug. 13; Huzar, 129; Holmes, Architect, 89-90.

[44]Dio Cass. 48.14; Suet. Aug. 14; Holmes, Architect, 95-98.

[45]Plut. Ant. 31; Dio Cass. 48.28.3-4, 31.3-4; App. BCiv. 5.60-4; Huzar, 139; Holmes, Architect, 104-5; Syme, Rom. Rev., 217.

[46]Dio Cass. 49.34-8; Suet. Aug. 20-21.1; Holmes, Architect, 130-6.

[47]Huzar contends that Cleopatra was the primary cause of Antony's fall from grace. "Cleopatra must be judged as destroying Antony's reputation more than any other factor in the east." (Huzar, 186) See also pp. 186-9, 191, 198-9.

[48]Syme, Rom. Rev., 270-1. Dio gives good contemporary reasons (the ones Balbus heard) for the break up of Antony and Octavian:

> The causes of war and the pretexts which each leader put forward were as follows. Antony accused Octavian of having removed Lepidus from his office of triumvir, and of having appropriated both the territory and the troops which had been under the

> last-named and Sextus' control, and which ought to have been shared with Antony . . . Octavian countered with the charge that Antony was still keeping possession of Egypt and other territories without having drawn them by lot; that he had executed Sextus Pompeius, whom Octavian had willingly spared, so he claimed; and that by having tricked, arrested and put in chains the king of Armenia, he had brought the Roman people into great disrepute. He likewise demanded a half share of Antony's conquests, and above all denounced Antony for his union with Cleopatra, for begetting their children whom he had acknowledged as his own, and for the gifts he had made to them. In particular he attacked Antony because he was using the name Caesarion for Cleopatra's son by Julius Caesar, and thus making him a member of the Caesarian family.(Dio Cass. 50.1. See also Suet. Aug. 17.1)

[49]Nep. Att. 21.4; See also Cornelius Nepos: A Selection, Including the Lives of Cato and Atticus. Translated with introductions and commentary by Nicholas Horsfall. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 27, 109.

[50]Syme, Rom. Rev., 257; Gardner, 733.

[51]Dio Cass. 48.32.1-2.

[52]Leonard A. Curchin, "Personal Wealth in Roman Spain" Historia 32 (1983): 227-44, 232.

ENDNOTES -- Appendix A

[1] Suet. Iul. 78; Plut. Caes. 60-2; Livy Per. 116; Gelzer, 315-24; Syme, Rom. Rev. 47ff; Weinstock, 220, 343.

[2] Weinstock, 343. For an overview of the various primary sources used by the ancient authors see the various introductions to the Loeb and Penguin translations, the Oxford Classical Dictionary, and the following studies: Thomas A. Dorey, Latin Biography (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967); C. P. Jones, Plutarch and Rome (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 81-87; R. H. Barrow, Plutarch and His Times (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1967), 150-55; C. B. R. Pelling, "Plutarch's Method of Work in the Roman Lives," JHS 99 (1979): 74-96. M. Grant, The Ancient Historians (New York: Charles Scribners' Sons, 1970); A. Wallace-Hadrill, Suetonius: The Scholar and His Caesars (London: Duckworth, 1983); M. L. W. Laistner, The Greater Roman Historians (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1947); Fergus Millar, A Study of Cassius Dio (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964).

[3] Weinstock, 343.

ENDNOTES -- Appendix B

[1] See Chapter 3, pp. 74-5, 83-4.

[2] Cic. Fam. 10.32.

[3] Syme, Rom. Rev., 80.

[4] See Chapter 4, notes 18 and 19.

[5] OCD, 160; c.f. Broughton, MRR, vol. 2, 550.

[6] OCD, 160; Syme, Rom. Rev., 328, 339, 367; Ronald Syme, The Augustan Aristocracy (Oxford: Calrendon Press, 1986), 41.

[7] Dio Cass. 54.25; Suet. Aug. 29; M. K. Thornton, "Julio-Claudian Building Programs: Eat, Drink, and be Merry" Historia 35 (1986): 28-44, 34-5.

[8] ILS, #7381; Syme, Aug. Arist., 33; Rom. Rev., 325, 498.

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Appian. Bella Civilia.
Caesar. Bellum Civile.*
_____. Bellum Gallicum.
Cassius Dio.*
Cicero. Pro Archia.
_____. Epistulae ad Atticum.*
_____. Pro Balbo.*
_____. Pro Caelio.
_____. In Catilinam.
_____. Epistulae ad Familiares.*
_____. Pro Lege Manilia.
_____. Orationes Philippicae.
_____. De Provinciis Consularibus.
_____. Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem.*
Livy. Periochae.
Nepos. Atticus.*
Pliny (the Elder). Naturalis Historia.*
Plutarch. Brutus.
_____. Caesar.*
_____. Cato Maior.
_____. Cicero.
_____. Crassus.
_____. Marius.
_____. Pompeius.
_____. Sertorius.
_____. Sulla.
Sallust. Bellum Catilinae.
_____. Historia.
Suetonius. Divus Augustus.*
_____. Divus Iulius.*

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